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A great amount of literature exists on 
Heidegger's philosophical thought. But.from a 
survey of the crit:i.cal · works, it•· appears that,
often, critics judge Heidegger.too much from their 
own philosophical perspective. This, unfortunately, 
leads to misunderstandings of Heidegger's real 
standpoint. In this thesis ., we-wish to make the 
attempt to assess Heidegger's concept of 
alienation which may be regarded as a key to.his way 
of thinking, as objectively as possible, in the 
light of his philosophy as a whole, 
The co�cept of alienation strikes at the root of 
what is called human nature. In attempting to come 
to terms with what constitutes alienation and 
authenticity, various theories have been put forward. 
Fr-om-among these I choose the philosophico­
anthropological approach to deal with the question 
"What is the essence of man?" or the question 11Who 
am I? tt, In the light of the above, this thesis· 
affords me an opportunity to investigate the various 
implications of the concept of al:i.enation. For, in 
my view, Martin Heidegger's analysis of the nature 
of man and what constitutes authenticity provides ah 
excellent springboard/ ... 
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excellent springboard from which to·study critically 
the problem of alienation.as it has.appeared to 
different thinkers in different times. 
Heidegger:, in his philosophy, stands opposed 
to the traditional approach to truth in metaphysics, 
religion, and science, because of their neglect of· 
Being and their preoccupation ,dth beings; · In his 
view, sucha forgetfulness of Being, constitutes 
man's alienation. This thesis investigates 
critically Heidegger's conception of human nature 
and considers carefully what he regards as 
.· authenticity. In his anxiety over the destiny of 
man·Heidegger writes : "Is 'being' only an empty word? 
Or are being and the asking of the question of being. 
the crux of the spiritual history of the West? Is 
being merely the last cloudy streak or evaporating 
reality; is the only possible attitude for us to let 
it evaporate into complete indifference? Or is being 
the worthiest of all questions? Thus inquiring, we 
take the decisive step from an indifferent.fact, 
from the supposed meaninglessness of. the word 'being,' 
to the supremely problematic phenomenon that being 
necessarily discloses itself in our understanding. 
The seemingly unshakable bald fact so blindly t.rusted 
by metaphysics has been shaken." (l). Thus 
Heidegger; s preoccupation/ .•. 
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Heidegger" s preoccupation·. is with a· question 
trwhich has dawned on Western thinking from the 
beginning as.the one thing that has to be thought -
Being." (2) Therefore,Philosophy is the authentic
response to the appeal of Being which Heidegger.in 
the beginning responded to in an ontological way. 
Man is man only as long as his Being-there· 
discloses to him Being.as such,.through which·he 
gains consciousness and authenticity. 
This analysis, however, is conducted against the 
background of the realization that Heidegger is not 
only the child of tradition; but also the child.of 
his own time, a time of operationalism, actionalism.,
and phenomenological analysis. It is from this 
experience of the world that he sees metaphysics 
(philosophy) and that he seeks to overcome the 
"reified" Being of metaphysics and gains its concept 
from an act or event, that is, the unconcealment of 
Being in man's Dasein. (3) It is shown that any 
such attempt·at locating human authenticity is 
bound to be problematic and that Heidegger's intention 
to·rehouse man in.authentic Being does not overcome 
the dialectical relationshi� between das Sein and 
das Seiende. The dichotomies bf Being and 
Nothingness, Life/ ... 
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Nothingness, Life and Death, Existence and non­
Existence, which are embedded in the process of 
man's Dasein as a Being-to-death remain and explain 
man's historical and contingent nature. The attempt 
to overcome man's natural contingency inevitably 
leads to man's alienation as would follow from 
Heidegger's characterization of man's authentic nature 
as a Being-to-death and as a humble "shepherd of 
Being". (4) 
Heidegger's philosophy has been the subject of a 
great deal of positive.and fruitful discussion, for 
example ., by Professors Joseph Kockelmans, Walter 
Biernel, Werner Marx, and Father William Richardson. 
However
., his philosophy has invited some harsh 
criticism. Professor Georges. Gurvitch has .said of 
Heidegger that he is "not an honest thinker". 
Heidegger has been dismissed by the analytical 
(5) 
thinkers who interpret h:i..m from the confined stand­
point of their own philosophical method. He has 
been criticised for being meaningless and nonsensical. 
Professor John Passmore says: 11 A passage which 
Carnap quoted from Heidegger's 'What is Metaphvsics? 
1n order to illustrate the nonsensical character 
of metaphysics has assumed the status of a classical 
:example. Certainly';/ ... 
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example. Certainly such sentences as 'Nihilation 
is neither an annihilation of what-is, nor does it 
spring from negation • ... Nothing annihilates 
itself' leave one with the impression that something 
has gone very wrong indeed. n · ( 6) · This kind of
criticism may appear to have some justification 
when the sentence is taken out of context like this, 
and is stated in isolation. However, the criticism 
must be rejected when the sentence is seen in its 
context where it is quite meaningful. Therefore, 
this thesis attempts to demonstrate critically., in. 
terms of the concept of alienation, Heidegger's 
contrib1.1tion to our understanding of human nature. 
Whether one accepts or rejects his contribution is 
quite another matter. That he has presented a 
penetrating analysis of human nature and has shown a 
tremendous concern over the destiny of mankind can 
hardly be denied. 
This thesis also seeks to show that Heidegger's 
thinking on authenticity does not end with his 
Sein und Zeit as would appear from the manner in which 
Heidegger has been handled by some of his interpreters 
and critics. In a fairly biting criticism.of 
Heidegger's writings, Professor Versenyi says: "the 
latest writings no longer even have this aim (of 
making man/ ... 
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making man authentic here and now); they not only 
fail to make man an authentic Being-in-the-world ., 
they al'.'e al together opposed to authenticity. u •. (7) 
In this thesis it is demonstrated by many references 
to Heidegger's latest writings·that his motivation 
(of authenticating human existence) has remained the 
driving force of his thinking despite the 11 reversal 
of thinking", which Heidegger openly admits.he made, 
but adding. that it is only possible to understand 
his later writings if one constantly keeps in mind 
what he said in his earlier writings; and just as 
importantly his earlier writings received a deeper 
understanding when one keeps in mind his later writings. 
Professor·John Macquarrie quite readily appreciates 
that Heidegger's focus of interest in philosophy is 
Being. But in saying that Heidegger's "philosophy 
is centered in Being rathe·r than in human existence," (B) 
and in isolating Being from human existence in this 
way, Macquarrie has also neglected to make the 
necessary connection between the early and the later 
Heidegger meaningful. In this dissertation, it is 
shown that Heidegger's concern for the alienated 
condition of man and his finding a way to authenticity 
forms a continuous theme throughout his writings and 
so forms an important key to an understanding and an 
unravelling of his occasionally enigmatic.thought as 
contained in/ ... 
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contained in his later, more mystical writings. 
The body of this thesis provided us with the 
opportunity of studying at length aspects of Greek 
and nineteenth century philosophy, which formed a vital 
background to a study of the .concept of alienation and 
of the thought of Heidegger. This dissertation also 
caused us to indulge our interest in·the relationship 
between philosophy and literature. The latter part 
of this thesis deals with that relationship, giving 
special attention to poetry. 
It is now my pleasant duty to acknowledge my debt 
to Professor G. A. Rauche (of the University of Durban­
Westville) for attending to my philosophical education 
and development over the past few years and for the 
sound advice, .comments, and suggestions he was. ever 
so willing to provide whenever the occasion arose. 
The finest tribute I can pay Pro.fessor Rauche is to .. 
make·reference to a few lines from Heidegger's own 
Was heisst Denken'? In one of the lectures there, 
Heidegger says: "Teaching is more difficult than 
learning because what teaching calls for is this: to· 
let learn, The real teacher, in fact, lets nothing 
else be learned than - learning." (9) 
I also/ ... 
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I also wish to extend a special word of thanks to 
my dear wife who·has had the unique position, not only 
of relieving me of any financial obligations, but 
also of engaging me in fruitfully enjoyable 
philosophical discussions. 
The production of this thesis was assisted by many 
persons. I thank them all and single out for special 
mention Mrs. Theresa Venkatrathnam for typing the 
manuscript, Mr. Ro Ro Singh for typing the draft manu­
script, and Mr. S. Maharaj for his general assistance. 
The financial assistance of the Human Sciences 
Research Council towards the costs of this research 
is.hereby acknowledged. Opinions expressed or 
conclusions reached are those of the author and are 
not to be regarded as a reflection of the opinions and 
conclusions of the Human Sciences Research Council. 
I conclude with a note on terminological use. 
,'lbere there was no ambiguity in the translation of 
German words arid expressions I have made use of the 
English words and expressions. However, wherever the 
translation involved/ ... 
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translation involved subtleties, I have retained 
the original German. I have standardized the 
various renderings of ltdas Seiende 11 (for example, 
essent, what-is) to "beings", in most cases. 
11 Das Sein" I have rendered as nBeing". However, in 
quotations, these words have been rendered exactly 
as used by different authors. 
Prem R. Singh. 
Durban. 
31st January, 1975. 
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Every humanism either is grounded in a metaphysics, or
., 
in making of itself.its own ground
., 
becomes a meta­
physics. Every determination of the essence of man 
which attempts to explain the things-that-are without 
first asking about the truth of Being is ., whether it 
kno,'1s it or not ., metaphysical. 
Heidegger 













CHAP TER 0 N E 
INTRODUCTION: THE CONCEPT OF ALIENATION 
The problem of alienation as seen by Martin 
Heidegger can be traced back to a tradition which was 
initiated by Plato. The deepest meaning of truth 
resides, for Heidegger, in aletheia, i.e., disclosure 
or non-concealment. Any deviation from this 
conception of truth would, for Heidegger, constitute 
man's alienation. Heidegger, in his quest for 
authenticity, surveys the entire tradition of Western 
metaphysics, interpreting it in the light of his own 
conception.of Being in his desire never to let beings 
conceal from man.his authentic nature. It is for this 
reason that it is.necessary to undertake an inquiry
into the metaphysical theories of thinkers such as 
Plato, Aquinas, Descartes, Kant, Hegel ., and Mar:x: from 
the perspective that each of these theories represents 
an attempt to overcome the problem of alienation and 
establish human authenticity in terms of the specific 
circumstances of the time. It is also necessary to 
view each of these theories from the Heideggerian 
perspective, in order to show that ., for Heidegger, these 
attempts have/ .•. 
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attempts have not succeeded in overcoming the problem 
of alienation, since, in each case, truth as disclosed 
by Being, has been replaced by the truth of·beings. By 
such a tendency.,. the problem of alienation has in fact 
been compounded, culminating.in Hegel's Absolute 
Spirit. Heidegger's own thought, which we discuss in 
greater detail in subsequent chapters, attempts to 
recall man to his true nature and so put him back on the 
path to Being. 
For Plato, the question of establishing the true 
meaning of human existence once again became especially 
pressing in the light of the disruptive upheavals that 
beset the Athenian polis in the fifth century B.C� 
War between the city-states, the military conquests of 
Philip.and Alexander, and the see-saw of successive 
aristocratic and democratic.governments gradually 
contributed to the decline of the city...:.state and of the 
culture that it had fostered. In philosophical. terms, 
conflicting theories and increasing scepticism was 
undermining long established moral and religious 
traditions. In Plato's view., the possibility of a 
harmonious authentic life could only be resumed.if the 
polis could once again be built up as an economic ., social, 
and political unity. Within such a unity the individual 
could live authentically, guided by reason which 
governs not/ ... 
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governs not only his soul and the polis, but the 
cosmos as well. Plato's Republic is a mirror of 
such an·integrated existence where harmony and 
stability are ensured by the "acceptance by each 
citizen of an allocation of function according to 
character and capacity". (10) 
The Republic portrays an ideal state where justice, 
" 
self-control, and wisdom are the sta�izing factors, 
where human needs are satisfied apd man lives in line 
with reality. But this could only be achieved once 
the disruptive effects of class war (between the 
aristocrats and the democrats) and poor government were 
eliminated. For this, a co-operative effort was 
necessary. Plato envisages his ideal society as a 
harmonious balance-between three classes - the 
philosopher kings who govern by virtue of their reason, 
the soldiers who defend the polis, and the artisans 
who produce life's necessities. The tripartite 
division of society corresponds to Plato's equally 
tripartite vision of the human soul. Just as harmony 
between the three classes in the state will result in 
justice, similarly, harmony between the rational, 
spirited, and appetitive elements of the soul results in 
a just, well integrated individual. The primacy of 
reason in/; ... 
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reason in the human soul enables man to live in line 
with the harmony of the cosmos and of the city-state. 
Plato's social and political solution: therefore, 
cannot be separ�ted from his metaphysical conception 
of the universe as being divided into a doxa world of 
appearance and a real world of Forms or Ideas. It is 
in this respect that, in Heidegger's view, Platonic 
metaphysics began the preoccupation of man with 
beings instead of Being that has beset the Western. 
metaphysical tradition, culminating in Hegel's 
Absolute Spirit. "The Platonic separation of a world 
of Ideas and a world of opinion opened the gap between 
Being and being and destroyed the fundamental 
ontological inseparability of the Being of being, n (ll)
Despite Plato's utopian attempt to rescue man from 
the alienation of a disrupted social, political, 
intellectual, and metaphysical existence, man's 
alienation, in Heidegger's view, is actually escalated 
in Platonic theory by the transformation.of the Ideas, 
especially the Idea of the Good (Being) from being a 
source of light·or disclosure itself to that which is 
disclosed. Being is actually reduced to being. Truth 
as aletheia or non-concealment can still be ascribed 
to the/ ... 
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to the Platonic Forms or Ideas since Plato, in 
Heidegger's view, did conceive of them as being 
essentially 11 a source of light by.reason of which, 
through participation, the "beings" of experience shine 
forth". (12) However, the Ideas, from representing 
truth as disclosure, are transformed into that which is 
seen through disclosure. Truth now takes on a new 
meaning
., 
standing for "the proper viewing of the Ideas, 
the conformity •.• between the being that views and the 
Ideas (conceived as beings) that are viewed. tt (l3)
In Heidegger's eyes, this marks the origin of the 
tradition in Western metaphysical thinking to reduce 
Being to beings. 
This forgetfulness of Being goes hand. in hand with 
"the creation of an anthropomorphic world of Ideas as 
the ostensible locus of truth, and so of value, A human 
interpretation of Being was mistaken for Being itself, 
an interpretation which removed significance from the 
world of actual human existence." (14) The reduction 
of truth from disclosure of Being to a me·re relation­
ship between the being who.knows and the Ideas (beings) 
which are known, is for Heidegger, a disturbing trend. 
For Plato, the Idea of the Good or Agathon is that which 
renders all/ ... 
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renders all else not only intelligible but possible 
as well. " ••• it is the ground of the possibility of 
Being of all that is. 1' But to make the idea of 
the Good as that which makes disclosure possible is, 
for Heidegger,to subordinate truth or disclosure to the 
idea. By doing so Plato had "weakened the original 
character of truth. With the idea dominant over 
aletheia, the important factor in all our relations 
to beings is the right vision of the form ... , and man, 
in order to attain to truth, must be concerned, above 
all, with the correctness of his vision." (l6)
The reduction of truth from disclosure to correct 
vision or perception is for Heidegger the 11hwnanization 11 
of truth. Truth no longer discloses thin.gs in their own 
nature. Instead man becomee "the criterion of all 
truth and Being •.. To make ... man, the measure of all is 
'humanism-' and 'subjectivism' pure and· simple. 
Plato's transformation of the essence of truth, 
Heidegger maintains, transformed philosophy. Truth 
having become a characteristic of the attitude and relation 
of the knower to the known ., philosophy became a 
humanism: a restless circling around man in the 
attempt to secure his position in the midst of all. 
and the original meaning of truth as disclosure of 
Being was forgotten.'' (l 7) 
For Heidegger,/ ... 
(l.S) 
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For Heid.egger, the metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas 
is similarly affected by the change in emphasis from 
Being to beings. But first we have to consider how 
the mediaeval explanation of reality arose. The 
failure of reason as an adequate instrument to cope 
with human needs and problems is related to the change 
in historical circumstances ., more specifically, the 
breakdown of the Greek polis, that compact unity which 
had served as.the foundation for an authentic economic, 
social, and political human existence. The accompanying 
decline of classical Greek culture also exposed, in 
the light of the changed circumstances, the inadequacy 
of human rationality as the ultimate means of achieving 
a meaningful existence. The self-sufficiency implied by 
a rational explariatiort of human life ., for example, as 
in the Platonic vision of a harmonious existence, was 
belied by the actual sense of dislocation which 'was the 
result of the breakdown of the polis and the dispersion 
of culture within the increasing confines of the Roman 
Empire. The problem of alienation, despite.the fact 
that it was not articulated in terms of the precise use 
of this concept, could not have been more• pressing than 
in times of deep-seated change and upheaval, 
Rational inquiry into the cosmos and man's place in 
it increasingly gave way to speculation about man's fate 
after death./ ... 
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after death. The question of supernatural reward and 
·punishment, of salvation, became an important
preoccupation and this demonstrated more clearly than
other factors the inability of human reason to
satisfy man adequately in his search for Truth. The
dimension of truth had now.widened dramatically to
include the supernatural. Any explanation which took
this into account would now be more acceptable to man
in terms of his new needs. The Christian religion
proved to be this explanation, despite the rival claims
of neo-Platonism, Gnosticism, Epicureanism, etc.
The failure of reason had in a sense undermined 
man's belief in his own self-sufficiency in trying to 
arrive at Truth. His own effort had to be supplernented 
and even superseded by a transcendent source of 
explanation, that is, God, through revelation. Apart 
from his reason and even superior to it, as an 
instrument for the knowledge of truth, is man's 
conscious faith. Man as a rational being is now super­
seded by man as a fideistic being. Faith enables man 
to cope with the contradictions which con.front him and 
which Greek philosophy could not rationalize away. 
Human reason was not to be rejected out of hand but should 
assume its true status and that is to assist man to under­
stand the widsom of the scriptures. This meant that 
the tremendous/ •.• 
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the tremendous value of Greek philosophy was not lost to 
civilized man but actually incorporated in the various 
doctrines of faith, The system of Thomas Aquinas, 
for example, is such an instance. Specifically, it can 
be seen as a reaction to the purely naturalistic 
philosophy of Aristotle and a desire to supplement 
and complete it by the addition of Christian faith on 
a rational foundation. An equally impor-tant concern 
for Thomas was his desire to obviate the threat of a 
split truth theory as it manifested itself in the thought 
of the Latin Averroists (Siger of Brabant), The 
theory that one truth is valid in philosophy and another 
truth is valid in theology was not acceptable to Thomas, 
for whom all truth comes from a single source; that is, 
God. 
The Thomist view of authentic existence can be 
regarded in the light of the prevailing situation, as a 
successful combination of the various components of 
human life, It did not underestimate the. powers of human 
reason, nor did it ignore the genuine human need for 
faith in a transcendent dimension, which need Greek 
philosophy had sought to satisfy by its attempt to blend 
rational man into the cosmos. We now discuss in a 
little more detail the nature of the Thomist theory. 
For Thomas, meaning and direction are restored to human 
life on/ ... 
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life on the basis of the belief that God is at the 
centre of existence. In fact, God is the being 
whose essence is to be, with no separation between his 
essence and existence. "According to Aquinas the most 
appropriate name for God is the name disclosed to Moses 
(Exodus 3,19), Qui est, He Who is . •.• He is infinite 
existence or being itself. 11 (lS) 
All finite things have their ground in the existence 
of God. This is made clear by the fact that if God 
withdrew his sustaining force, finite things would not 
be able to exist. So Thomas's constant preoccupation 
was with the question of why things exist at all, 
rather than there being nothing. His answer is linked 
to his conception of God as the cause and ground of all 
things. Finite substances only exist because Goel is the 
sustaining ground of their existence. God's wisdom 
and grace govern all things in the universe, including 
man, according to their specific ends. Man's 
ultimate end is that state of beatitude which stems 
from the mystical vision of God in heaven. Being 
endowed by God with reason, man can rationally and 
consciously choose ways of thinking and acting that were 
compatible with his achieving an authentic life. The 
highest development of man's rational potentialities 
exist solely/ ..• 
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exist solely for the glory of God. Through rational 
reflection on God's creations, man can come to a 
knowledge of God. Knowledge and faith, philosophy 
and religion, then, do not work at crosspurposes, 
but in fact are supplementary in the act of directing 
man towards God. 
Hegel later conceived of theology as finding its 
culmination in philosophy. For Aquinas, this order 
is reversed. Philosophy provides some knowledge of 
God but is unable to include God's self-revelation in 
Christ� for example. Only faith can provide such 
knowledge. So philosophy finds its consummation in 
theology. Being a rational and a free being, man ca11 
choose specific ways of conduct that enable him to 
reach God and hence achieve his ultimate goal, in other 
words, achieve his authenticity. nThe God which 
Aquinas describes is not a deus ex machina, a pure 
product of reason, a metaphysical storehouse for 
Platonic Ideas. He is Infinite Life, and it is the 
divine life which gives a meaning to human life. For,
God presents himself to man as the sole object worthy 
of his knowledge and love. 11 (19) By his rational
Christian faith, man can attain to a vision of God, thus 
satisfying at one stroke his rational as well as his 
spiritual needs. 
In Heidegger's/ ... 
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In Heidegger's view, the Thomist position which 
had replaced Plato's Ideas with God, represents no 
real departure from the Platonic standpoint, The 
actus purus of Thomas replaces Aristotle's conception 
of energeia, and it is this "thingliest of things 
(�iendste des Seienden), the pure intelligible light 
which makes things be and lets them be known. 11 ( 2o
)
Professor Thomas Langan shows that, with such a 
conception of actus.puru�, truth becomes problematic. 
11 0n the one hand, it becomes confused with the 
transcendental presence of the present, so that the 
godhead becomes truth itself made into a thing; on the 
other hand,· since there remains·the problem of explaining 
what it is for a human being to know, the truth of the 
human existent comes to be conceived as a conformity 
between the intellect and the things of creation." (Zl)
What Heidegger would find lacking in such a conception 
of truth is the failure to let things be seen from 
themselves. 
The hold of the Church and Scholastic philosophy on 
man was gradually weakened by the developments in more 
modern times, for example, the invention of the printing 
press, the voyages of discovery, the invention of 
gunpowder, the rise of science, etc. These imbued man 
with a new confidence in himself as the measure of all 
things, As/ ... 
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things. As such, the meaning of Being undergoes a 
profound change with the advent of modern times 
(Neuzeit). The bond of faith that tied mediaeval man 
so firmly to interpreting truth in terms of theology 
gave way to interpreting it anthropocentrically 
in modern times, so that truth was not just conformity 
between knower and known, but became certitude. 
This process had already begun with Plato who had 
reduced truth as disclosure of Being to a relationship 
between knower and known (Ideas). 
Whereas mediaeval man gained certitude through dogma, 
the lure of eternal bliss, and faith, for modern man 
11 ' • • • This is possible only to the extent that self­
liberating man guarantees for himself the certitude of 
the knowable. '" (22) Certitude has now firmly
become human certitude. "'man sets himself up as the 
measure of all criteria which measure and gauge 
(calculate) what can qualify as certain, i.e., as true, 
i.e.; as real'." (23) The authority of the Church gave
way to the authority of man,which authority Descartes
proceeded to establish on the basis of his methodical
doubt in order to establish an indubitable ground on which
the edifice of human knowledge could be constructed, In
the mathematical method he found.the certainty on which
he could model the rest of human knowledge.
The cogi to/ ... 
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The cogito ergo sum, when.he finally arrives at it, 
possesses the same degree of certainty that a 
mathematical proposition such as "A triangle has three 
angles" has. 
0 
• • •  man must decide for himself what for him is 
knowable ., what is knowledge and what is certitude, 
It is the proper task of Descartes to elaborate the 
metaphysical ground of the new anthropocentric liberty 
by suggesting an answer to this triple question," (z4) 
The cogito ergo s.� forms for Descartes the urtshakable 
basis on which ·he does this. Knowing ("I am") conforms 
with self-certitude, with known ("I am"). The 
cogito not only forms the ground of all.certainty, but 
also is the-condition for all other truths. 
This change in the meaning of truth brought about a 
change in man's relation to the world. The cogito-sum, 
as the subject of truth, no lo.nger lets beings show 
themselves as they are in themselves, but becomes a 
co-agitatio, an aggresive,·grasping of beings. Beings 
receive their meaning from the domain of the subject­
object polarity. They are either subjects or objects. 
Man is not man as such
_, 
but he is a _§-ubject who subjects 
the world to his will. Beings now receive their truth 
by being/ ... _ 
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by being objects to a subject. "Beings are submitted 
more and more to man's control, made victims of his 
calculations, his designs, his cultivation. 
Scientific research becomes an indispensable form of 
the general conquest. This is the drive of technicity, 
whose origin may be found in Descartes. 11 (25) In 
Heidegger's view, Descartes' Weltanschauung has 
embedded more firmly that deep sense of alienation which 
twentieth century man experiences. In his attempt at 
authenticating man, Descartes has turned him into a 
subject who in turn places values on things which become 
the basis of his relationship with them and with his 
fellowman. The truth of Being (that is, aletheia, 
or non-concealment) has no place in such a world-view. 
For Immanuel Kant, the Cartesian investigation into 
the ground of certitude for human knowledge did not 
penetrate deep enough. Also, Descartes' rationalism, 
like the empiricism of Locke and Hume, limits the scope 
and depth of any inquiry into the foundation of human 
knowledge. Kant's own Weltanschauung sought to find a 
middle way between the extremes of rationalism and 
empiricism, since, in his view, man is a being who 
participates in both dimensions. 
His inquiry/ •.. 
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His inquiry into the limits of human reason led him 
to conclude that pure reason cannot give knowledge of 
God, Freedom, and Immortality, s,i.nce, in terms of 
knowledge, man is necessarily limited to· the 
phenomenal world. However,. within the sphere of 
practical reason, he visualized a new ground for the 
possibility of metaphysics. The ideas of pure reason 
assume a practical significance - that of being the.aim 
of human moral striving. Man's.reason can free him 
from the bonds of nature and direct his. will to be 
guided by the dictates of.the moral law •. With such a 
conception of man, Kant fulfilled one of the highest aims 
of the enlightenment, that is, m.an as a f�ee, and 
autonomous being guided by his reason. With his 
combination of the realms of nature and freedom, and his 
vision of man as acting according to his reason, Kant 
hoped.to overcome the extremes of rationalism and 
empiricism and provide man wit.h an integrated foundation 
on the basis of which he could live and act authentically. 
From Heidegger's po-int of view, however, the Kantian 
critique continues the polarity between knowing subject and 
known object that had begun early in the history of meta­
physics and ha-d reached one of its peaks in Descartes. Truth 
had been undergoing a process of gradual subjectivation 
insofar as/ ... 
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insofar as the criteria governing knowledge of objects 
and hence truth itself is seen to reside in the subject 
who knows. The Being of things is not disclosed from 
their own being, but from the "subjective roots of the 
transcendental horizons of consciousness." (Z 6) It
is disclosed by an inquiry into "how the existent can 
bring to be a world of meaning, a world of time, a 
history in which 'things' can be with significance. 11 (Z?)
This is the significance of the Kantian critique - that 
it undertakes the most detailed investigation into 
"the rules governing the subject's placing (stellen) 
the representation (Vor-stellung:) before (�) 
himself. tt (z3) The object is seen as totally
dependent on the consciousness of the subject. 
The mathematical thinking that Heidegger deplored 
in Descartes is true of Kant as well, in Heidegger's 
view. " '•· ,The mathematical is that basic attitude to 
things in which we represent things to ourselves only 
as what they are already given ... ' Mathematical 
knowledge is, therefore, knowledge of the a priori, 
a 'knowledge about the fundamental presupposition of 
all knowledge' .. , a knowledge that 'lays its own 
foundations and grasps its limits in the process'". 
This kind/ ... 
(29)
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This kind of mathematical thinking transforms the 
subjective individual into the ground of all that can 
be and all that can be known. Even Being becomes an 
object to be known ., conditioned by the same subjective 
criteria that govern all things ., instead of being 
revealed as something unconditioned. For Heidegger, 
Kantian philosophy, even more so than Descartes' .,
nmakes man the measure of all things." (3o) Kant's 
investigation of things is really an investigation of 
man. " ' .•. The question: What is a thing? is the 
question: Who is man?"' (3l) So, for Heidegger, 
1fthe critique of pure reason is humanism pure and 
simple: a circling around man as the absolute 
foundation and perfectly sufficient grom1cl of all 
truth and Being. n (3z)
For Heidegger,the transcendental idealism of Kant is 
not sufficient. Kant is to be credited for the fact 
that he established human temporality and finiteness at 
the centre of 11.a' new analysis of man as transcendental 
horizon." (33) But what Kant failed to complete, in 
Heidegger's view ., is an existential determination of 
such a horizon. " ... he stopped with a consideration of 
the transcendence that makes knowledge possible. He did 
·n·ot seek into the Being which is revealed historically
within the/ ... 
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within the transcendental existence of Dasein. 
Kant made no effort to get beyond the metaphysical 
nature of man, by recalling the historical destiny 
made possible by the temporality of his transcendence. 
Thus, though Kant puts the form of Time at the center 
of knowledge, he has missed the truly temporal nature 
of Being itself.tt (34) This is the failure that
Heidegger hoped to rectify by surpassing the Kantian 
Critique of Pure Reason with his own Sein und Zeit. 
For Hegel, the Kantian attempt to find a new ground 
for metaphysics posed innumerable difficulties. 
distinction between the realms of phenomena and 
Kant's 
noumena, of appearance and thing-in-itself had resulted 
in a polarity between subject and object which in turn 
gave rise to several other bifurcations, for example, 
the separation of reason from desire, duty from 
inclination, intellect from feeling, and so on. In 
order to bridge these polarities and make life whole 
again, the Kantian gap between thought and being had to 
be bridged. This Hegel does by positing one universal 
structure of Being, namely, Absolute Spirit. 
For Hegel/ ..• 
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For Hegel,Life is the medium where contradictions 
(or discord or bifurcation - En.tzweiung) which form 
the source of the need for philosophy, come about and 
are overcome in the "Whole11, the 11 Universe11, and in the 
11 Infiniten , It is Hegel's deep conviction that 
Reality in itself is estranged. In his Logic he wrote: 
nall things are contradictory in themselvesn . (35) 
This estrangement and contradiction are reconciled through 
the healing power of Love (in his early writings) and 
of Reason (in his mature works), Universal Reason is 
the real ground of the worl<l. Reason externalizes 
itself and this externalization manifests itself in 
science and history. For Hegel, the resultant external 
world which is subject to Reason, constitutes reality, 
Thus,what is reasonable is real. and what is real is 
reasonable. As the Truth, Spirit (Reason), in the 
dialectical process, goes through various stages -
the mechanical,physical, and organic (in science); the 
oriental, classical, and the Christian ( in history). 
The Hegelian triad of thesis, antithesis, and 
synthesis united the antithetical in the Concept where 
the tension between subject and object, finite and 
infinite, is overcome. 
"The Pure Concept in its logical form is Truth, in 
its qntological form Being, in its ethical form Goodness, 
in its/ ... 
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in its aesthetic form Beauty� and in its religious 
form God." (36) Thus as Concept, Universal Reason
comprehends everything. The dialectical process of 
the Spirit's self-emancipation and return to itself 
as Itself constitutes the history of the world which 
has a direct bearing on the spiritual development 
of man who "In the Christian culture of the 19th 
century, ,,, as the torch-bearer of the Absolute 
Spirit ., in whose consciousness the self-emancipation 
of the Spirit manifested itself, had reached his 
greatest freedom". (37) As the Grossmensch 
(Jacob Hammes), man transcended his individualitv 
through his rationality and merged with the Whole. 
Thus the State is an expression of man's rational will, 
and the individual is free when his own reasonable 
will merges :with the general will. 
Hegel saw the Prussian state as that arena where 
the individual could express his highest freedom. In 
rationalizing the status guC?_, Hegel rationalized the 
conflicts and contradictions that were present in 
his time. Hegel regarded Prussia as having superseded 
Napoleon as an instrument of freedom. In fact, the 
Prussian monarchy is the culmination of the Spirit on 
its march to freedom. Through his total concept of 
the Absolute Spirit Hegel missed actual and 
contingent reality/ ... 
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contingent reality, thus giving rise to a new form 
of alienation. 
"Through man's ability to arrive at the.� 
Concept by abstraction, the coincidentia oppositorum 
is realised and reality and truth (which before 
had been separated in that the real world represented 
the self-estrangement of truth in the form of 
antithetical concepts) fall together.n(3B) In 
the pure concept, therefore, the principle of 
identity is fulfilled. Hegel's dialectical· process 
of the Spirit's.returning to.itself unites the real 
world and the subject, thinking and being, and in so 
doing, overcomes man's actual situation,. thus landing 
him in real alienation. Hegel's systematization has 
resulted in man's self-transcendence where the 
absolutization of the self represents the negation 
of actuality. Hegel's preconceived model leads 
man away from his authentic nature. Any such 
absolutization overcomes man's actual, historical, 
contingent nature. Hegel's dialectical method fails 
to give man's finitude•its full meaning and throws 
him into a.new form of alienation. 
Heidegger himself/ ... 
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Heidegger himself sees in Hegel the culmination 
of traditional metaphysical thinking which 
constituted the Absolute from the world of existing 
things. In his attempt to authenticate Dasein 
(his word in Sein und Zeit for man), Heidegger would 
have us not be oblivious of Being as such and of the 
ontological difference (the difference between Being 
and beings). Heidegger sees any attempt at 
constituting Being as landing man in alienation and 
as an attempt to cheat time. In other words, any such 
constituted Absolute is an attempt to give finite 
being eternal time. Hegel's characterization ·of Being 
as substance and subject is inadequate for Heidegger 
in any attempt at an understanding of Being and the 
existential nature of man. That reality did not fit 
Hegel's system is borne out by actual events, 
including events in the field of philosophy, that is, 
the vehement controversy that was started on Hegel's 
thinking in the light of the problems and conflicts 
raised by it and in the light of the actual changing 
conditions of life. 
Karl Marx, like Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, 
Feuerbach, etc., objected to the contradiction between 
theory and reality that the Hegelian system had posed. 
The abstraction/ ... 
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The abstraction of A purely idealist consciousness 
was a serious threat to the "real needs" of man which 
could only be based on a radical transformation of 
material reality. The ideal reality envisaged by 
Hegel had no bearing on the actual lives of the 
majority of people. As such, the Hegelian exhortation 
to blend one's will with that of the Spirit was 
leading man into the wilderness of alienation. In 
any case, Hegel's philosophy saw the culmination of 
a philosophical tradition that had begun from 
Descartes. The tradition could no longer continue 
in the same direction. In order to remain meaningful 
and relevant to man, philosophy would have to be 
transformed from a theoretical concern to a practical 
one. In this way, it would be brought in line with 
economics and politics, thus catering for the true needs 
of men. 
With this transformation of the Hegelian 
speculative idealism into a theory where economic 
factors are the sole determinants of history, Marx 
hoped to rescue man from alienation and return him to 
an authentic existence, that is, an existence in line 
with the historical law. He envisaged his socialism as 
the means by which man could he freed from a long history 
of alienation./ ... 
- 36 -
of alienation. Central to his vision of an 
authentic existence is his vision of man as a free 
and creative agent, one that is in control of his 
natural and social environment. In Marx's view, 
all other forms of alienation ., for example, 
religious alienation, where the individual projects 
his energies into God, or political alienation 
stemming from Hegel's demand that the individual submit 
his will to that of the State, would only vanish if 
economic alienation were resolved. 
The alienation of labour, in Marx's view, 
constitutes the essence of alienation. . Only on the 
basis of free labour relations can man live·a truly 
human, creative existence. "Labour as the bridge 
between subject and object eventually resolves-all 
conflict and contradiction that still exist between 
man and his surroundings and between man and man, Labour, 
in Marx's philosophy> may be said to be of logical, 
epistemological, metaphysical, aesthetical and ethical 
significance. n (39) Capitalism has organiized 
relations in such a way that man is alienated from the 
products of his labour which b_ecome commodities to 
be sold at a profit by the capitalist owner. Such a 
separation further alienates man from his own self, 
since labour is not only a coercive activity that 
enriches the/ .... 
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enriches the capitalist, but in its true sense, is the 
ground ·for the possibility of human self-
realization. A re-organization of labour relations 
under communism would create the proper condition 
for human existence, a state ·where man consciously 
and co-operatively controls his economic and social 
existence, the gap between private and social 
interests having vanished. 
In the light of the changed circumstances in the 
late nineteenth century, (the rise of science and 
technology, the growth of industry, etc.), 
Marx's theory of how to overcome alienation and 
return man to authenticity appealed to those who, 
frustrated by Hegelianism, saw in Marx's philosophy, 
the possibility of deriving true values from a 
material and economic reality that was increasingly 
becoming more and more important. But in Heidegger's 
view, Marx's philosophy displays the same forgetfulness 
of Being that characterizes philosophy and 
metaphysics from the time of Plato. The Marxian ideal 
of man as an active subject in the world is a further 
instance of the technicity that had its origin in 
Descartes - the view of man as subject and 
controller of the objective world of things. The 
collective aspect/.;. 
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collective aspect of socialism does not eliminate 
the subjectiv:i.zation of truth that Heidegger 
deplores. In fact, it further alienates man by 
merging the individual into the anonymity of 
das Man. Despite its different emphasis and 
starting point ., Marxism remains for Heidegger, a 
hwnanism. Such a 11 humanization 11 of truth has 
resulted in the alienation of man. 
The alienation of man, we stressed, Heidegger 
saw as arising from Plato's separation of the realm 
of Being from the realm of Time. The result of the 
separation was that man was now preoccupied with 
beings., rather than with Being as such, which became 
in traditional metaphysics that which is the most 
general, or that which·is the supreme being. 
Heidegger sees in Hegel's Absolute Spirit the 
culmination of this preoccupation with beings, which 
forms the source of his Absolute. Positivistic 
scientism dissolved the individual into a set of 
functional relations. Hegel's idealism failed to cope 
with -.the realities of life. Scientism, ,-.rhich hoped to 
solve all man's problems ., had its unbounded optimism 
shattered by the creation of more effective and more 
destructive war/ ... 
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destructive war weapons. Science has put in the 
hands of man the possibility of wiping·out the entire 
hwnan race. Thus, "The experience.of anxiety revealed 
to man his self-estrangement and alienation from the 
world. It roused in him the need to re-examine the 
nature of his existence in the world and to reassess 
the relation in which he stood with the world. In 
other words, man, again, from the new existential 
situation in which he found himself, asked the old 
questioh about the authenticity of his existence. -11 (40)
In framing his question about the authentic nature 
of man, Heidegger moved away from the theoretical 
constructions of the world by the theor-eticians of 
metaphysics and science, and started from man's "very 
being-there. 11 The objectification and reification of 
Being remains a reduction of the source of beings to an 
abstraction that is derived from beings. Such an 
abstraction remains a being, but Being as such is not 
a thing, but, for Heidegger ., is the ground of all 
things. Such a ground, of course,is accessible to 
Dasein, for it is within the power of Dasein only, that 
the ontological difference (the real distinctio� 
between Being as such and beings) comes about. Thus, 
by 11 transcendence",Heiclegger does not mean the being 
of beings, but 11 Being understood as the emergence of 
the difference/ ... 
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the difference between Being and beings; that this 
difference emerges with There-being's transcendence 
(' ... we name this ground of the ontological 
difference •.. the transcendence of There-being'}". (41)
Hence
.,
Heidegger begins his long journey by an analysis 
of Dasein. 
To retrieve that which is authentic, Heidegger 
uses the method of phenomenology which takes a being 
from out of its hiddenness and lets it be seen from 
its unhiddenness, to let it reveal itself as it is. 
This, for Heidegger,would constitute the primary 
meaning of truth. Therefore ., for him, ontology and 
phenomenology are not two separate disciplines, but 
one. In showing where Heidegger departed from Husserl's 
thinking, Professor Kockelman's says ., "Heidegger made 
it clear that for h1m the stumbling blocks in. 
Husserl's philosophy consisted in the transcendental 
reduction as 'bracketing of Being'
., in the 
'reduction' of man to pure consciousness, and 
finally, in the 'reduction' of Being into Being-object­
f or. n (42) 
Heidegger's concept of alienation appears, in 
essehce
., 
to differ radically from all other con.ceptions 
of alienation. For example, Heidegger dissociated 
himself from/ ... 
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himself from the philosophies of life� of existence, 
and from Sartre's "existence precedes essence." In 
his Letter on Humanism ., Heidegger tries to surpass 
the humanism and subjectivism of traditional 
metaphysics by showing that the structure in man 
which characterizes him as man is his relationship 
to Being, that is, he sees man as ek-sistence, 
that is
., 
man stands out into the truth of Being, In 
so doing, but in keeping with the spirit of the age, 
when phenomenogical description and hermeneutic 
analysis was the fashion, Heidegger sought to reduce 
metaphysics to the description of the experience of the 
metaphysical (Being} by man in his Dasein. In other 
words, in his attempt ·to overcome alienation, 
Heidegger seeks to abolish philosophy as theory and 
as constitutive metaphysics. Or else, he seeks to 
merge philosophy (metaphysics) with the event of 
Being unconcealing itself through man. '!'he problems 
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C H A P T E R T W O 
HEGEL'S METAPHYSICS AS AN · EXAMPLE OF HOLZWEG. 
Hegel's philosophy revolves around a group of 
concepts, at the centre of which are alienation and 
reconciliation, the different ways in which traditional 
logic and dialectical logic operate, Spirit, Seif­
consciousness, the State, Freedom� and Reason as the 
real ground of the world. 
These concepts animate his philosophy, which 
wrestles with the problem of contradictions which Hegel. 
sees in life. Life now becomes the medium whereby 
these contradictions arise and dissolve. In his 
Difference of the Fichtean and Schellingian System of 
Philosophy, Hegel wri�es: "When· we consider more 
closely the particular form that a philosophy bears, 
see how it springs on the one hand from the living 
originality of the spirit who in it··has restored through 
himself the.rent harmony and given form to it through 
his own deed; on the other hand, from the particular 
form of the bifurcation (Entzweiung) from which the 
system issues. · Bifurcation (or discord) is the 
source of the need for philosophy ... »Cl)
This bifurcation/ .•. 
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This bifurcation results in oppositions like the 
Whole and the Part: the Univer�e and the Particu.lE.r 
Objects, the Infinite and the Finite, which can have 
"real" meaning only when united in· the 11Whole 11 , the 
"Universe", and in the "Infinite" which is both the 
object of study· of philosophy and philosophy itself. 
The complexity of the problem issues from the 
attempt.to comprehend the all-embracing unity and to 
show how such unity is•. possible. -
From the same work quoted above, Hegel says; 
I 
"To sublimate such oppositions that have become fixed 
is the sole interest of reason. This interest does 
not mean that reason i$ against opposition and_ 
limitation in general;;for necessary bifurcation is a
factor of life which forms itself through eternal 
opposing, and totality is possible in the highest 
liveliness only through restoration out_of the highest 
separation� . Reason is only against the absolute 
fixation of bifurcation by the understanding. 
Here is a clear statement of the need for philo_sophy. 
However ., .it is a complete misrepresentation of Hegel 
to think that he saw the restoration of harmony as the 
ultimate end. This is only half the truth: there is 
the continual striving for harmony. The other half of 
the truth is that "bifurcation is a factor of life 
which forms/ ..• 
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which forms itself through eternal opposing" 
(my emphasis). To clinch the argument we need only 
draw attention to the vital role that Hegel assigns 
to his idea of "Becoming" and "Infinity•t. We shall 
discuss these during the course of this chapter. 
However, we could·mention here that Hegel holds 
i 
that there is an Absolute beginning and an Absolute 
.I 
end, but he adds the qualification that both are empty: 
the Absolute is always. in the process of overcoming 
itself and.passing int
<:> 
an other. Therefore,Hegel 
,. 
speaks of the Absolute in the sense of the eternal 
. ' 
cycle of becoming, the· eternal now. This cycle of the 
eternal now, taken as a concept, comprehends every-
thing, for example, th� infinite and the finite, the 
necessary and the contingent, form and matter, 
permanency and periodicity. In it all contradictions 
a re merged · ( a uf gehoben) . As a concept which is 
comprehended in man's mind, the principle of identity 
has been fulfilled. Eberhard Grisebach draws 
attention to the point that such·a dialectic remains 
constitutive, and, as such, leads to the alienation 
of man by blocking the path to real experience. 
In his/ .•• 
-..... . 
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In his Difference of the Fichtean and 
Schellingian System of Philosophy (his first real 
publication), Hegel draws attention to two 
presuppositions of philosphy. The.first is the 
Absolute itself which Reason produces by·liberating 
consciousness from any limitation. The second 
presupposition is the emergence of ·consciousness 
out of totality, in.other words, bifurcation into 
being and not-being, ·into finitude and infinity. Thus, 
philosophy comes into existence out of the alienation 
of man.. Hegel views i�1 a positive light such 
alienation whose neces�ity is absolute. The original 
unity of all particulars is not a mystical truth, 
but is one that is given by logic, by reason. And, 
reason is the power th�t leads man to higher levels 
of reconciliation. The task that confronted Hegel 
was, not only to make his logic fluid and alive, but 
also to make it such that the living self could think 
itself in it. This logic is the "logic of life" or 
"the logic of Spirit". 
The loss of unity and the alienation that goes 
with such a loss, naturally, result in the conflicts 
that characterize human experience, £or example .,





...... .f" . 
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between man and nature. The conflict sets up nature 
as an alien, hostile force that man must tame. The 
harmony and the unity that was lost gave rise to 
the alienation of man from nature. This conflict can 
be categorized in.the genral form of the conflict 
between subject and·object, which can be brought into 
harmony only by the most universal concept. Only a 
totality will issue the ultimate principle of 
knowledge which will recover the harmony that has 
been lost. 
-; 
What emerges from:"all this is that Hegel's 
interest is not primarily historical, but ., rather .,
extends to a deep philosophic concern. 
.i 
"The need for 
philosophy arises when;the unifying power (fu
Macht der Vereinigung) has disappeared from the life 
of men, when the contradictions have lost their 
living interrelation and independence and assumed 
an independent form." (3) Philosophy is now 
confronted with the task of gaining a detailed 
analysis of the conflicts that confront man in reality 
and also to demonstrate their reconciliation ., bearing 
in mind that all oppositions are resolved and yet 
preserved in Reason, which again points to an 
eternal. opposing. Ho·wever ., in leading man to authentic 
existence and/ ••. 
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existence and to freedom, we need to ask, with 
Professor Rauche, has not Hegel led man astray with 
his preconceived model. Any such model misrepresents 
the authentic nature of man by absolutizing one 
aspect to the detriment of the others, and to the 
whole being. Thus, the Hegelian model stands in 
conflict with the contingent individual. 
The glaring chasm;between subject and object, 
which problem Kant had· bequeathed, was the butt of 
Hegel's criticism of Kant. In fact, Hegel rejected 
Kant's idealism becaus'� it set the existence of 
"things-in-themselves",' apart from "phenomena".· Even 
worse was that these "-.things" were completely 
,i 
unknowable and untouchkd by the human inind;·which 
I 
meant that they were untouched by reason - they were 
beyond the grasp of reason. 
The implication of such a bifurcation was that 
Reason now becomes a purely static, subjective factor 
with no control over a fixed, objective structure of 
Reality: hence the split between Understanding and 
Sense, between Thought and Existence, between 
Subjectivity and Objectivity. Hegel was later to call 
this split "alienation" (Entfremdung) of mind, whereby 
thought is alienated from reality. This means that 
t-ruth is/ ...
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truth is an ideal which exists in thought only, 
while the actual world exists separately and is 
outside its sphere of influence. 
To state the matteir in Hegelian terms, what Kant 
had done was to find his categories·in the traditional 
classifications of judgements. They were well-defined, 
self-sufficient, final� timeless, and gave rise to 
the problem-ridden separation of duty from inclination, 
intellect from feeling, reason from desire. Hegel, 
on the other hand, did·not see these conc�pts as 
self-sufficient, but, t-ather, as essentially interrelated, 
and it was his task "to make fixed thoughts fluid". (4) 
i 






the Kantian gulf between 
thought and being by positing one universal structure 
of Being which "comprehends'' or "gra�ps11 all the 
different stages of its existence, This task is 
performed by Reason which bridges the gulf between 
subject and object, thus restoring their unity. It is 
in this that Reason's reality consists: to make fixed 
thoughts fluid, when they can be called "Begriffen
(Concepts), which is closely related to "Begreifen" 
(to comprehend), another important term in Hegel's 
system, since it behoves philosophy to·reach out and 
comprehend what/ ••. 
r 
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comprehend what has developed, or to grasp the truly 
�. The dialectics of the Concept make it possible 
for him to recognise true being in a particular thing 
or event (Dingheit), in which the universal gives 
itself its particular form (Gestalt). 
In a way, we may say that, in the Hegelian system, 
concepts are·derived, whereas traditional logic 
arranges accepted concepts in conformity with rules, 
whose validity consists in their propositions resulting 
in tautologies. Diale�tical logic would not give rise 
,: 
to tautologies, since that which is given in sense, is 
already apprehended in:consciousness. In other words, 
one cannot separate what is given in sense from the 
operation of the mind �lready performed upon it. 
Genuine concreteness consists in that concreteness 
which is grasped by.the mind that has grasped the 
universal in the given particular. It is in this grasp 
that the truth is united to the object. 
Here we come to the whole purpose of Hegel's 
logic: to grasp the object as it is in•itself. This 
means ·that the dialectic does not exist apart from the 
object. In his Scienc·e of Logic Hegel says: " •.• it is 
the nature of the content and that alone which lives 
and stirs/ .. ,, 
- 54 -
and stirs in philosophic cognition, while it is this 
very reflection of the content which itself originates 
and determines the nature of philosophy." (S) The 
Concept divides itself into categories (definitions), 
and thinks itself in tenns of them, because they 
constitute the opposites that are found in reality. 
The categories, which are derived from the Absolute, 
are linked together by·: the Absolute, and in so 
doing, the Absolute unfolds and exhibits its own 
content. Reality, which we saw to be antagonistic, 
separate into ·its bein� and its ought •. The reln.tion 
;i 
between the given and the possible ., a very definite 
relation which is derived from the content of reality .,
points·to the negation:of the real's immediacy as its 
very essence. So, reaiity advances according to the 
possibilities that are manifest in it. In fact, that 
which is possible in a given reality is actually the 
condition of another reality. The validity of all 
given reality lies.in their very possibility to create 
new fonns of existence. Possibility is the essence of 
reality. It is not an arbitrary, speculative act that 
is imposed on it from the outside. A failure to 
recogn.ise the essentially dynamic character of that 
which is real resu1ts in a dead objectivity which is 
an alien and untrue world. And yet., the object of 
philosophy is/ •.. 
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philosophy is the world in its true form {"insight 
:into the real state of the case" (6l) ., so that the
truth that gives form to the very existence of 
things does not exist apart from the object ., as is the 
case with formal logic. 
Truth is not merely an epistemological process, 
but an ontological necessity. Such a thinking 
I 
characterizes the diff <rrence between traditional logic 
and Hegelian logic. The difference is of crucial 
importance because the,concern of philosophic truth 
is the existence of ma:p. Philosophic truth cannot be 
put into one single proposition. "Philosophy, on the 
contrary., does not deal with a determination that is 
. I 
non-essential, but with a determination so far as it 
is an essential factor. The abstract or unreal is not 
its element and content, but the real ., what is self­
establishing� has life within itself, existence in its 
very notion. It is the process that creates its own 
moments in its course, and goes through them all; 
and the whole of this movement constitutes its positive 
content and its truth." (7) The categories ., rules, and 
forms of Traditional Logic are considered false, as they 
conveniently leave out the contradictory nature of 
reality. The contradictions .which are contained in 
reality give/ ..• 
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reality give rise to a situation where the content of 
one category is unfolded by that of another. In 
other words, dialectical logic reveals one category as 
another (A= not yet A). In fact, the idea of progress 
plays an important part in Hegelian logic. Every 
being has to overcome its negative tendencies and give 
rise to a new manifestation of being, thereby 
achieving its true form and content. 
The structure and meaning·of the propositions of 
traditional logic are �Juite different from the dynamic 
and active movement in�erent in dialectic;il logic. The 
traditional proposition has a subject serving as a 
fixed base which has a:predicate attached to it. These 
predicates, which are �ixed !tdeterminations" ., are 
"accidental" properties. Hegelian logic does not have 
such a fixed subject ., but is one which is actively 
developing into its predicate. The subject turns into 
its predicate. The predicate is a form of the subject� 
Hegel uses the proposition "God is Beingtt to illustrate 
the working of dialectical logic. (8) In this 
proposition, "God" the subject, does not support 11 Being" 
the predicate; but rather, it is the Subject ttGod" 
that really passes into· 11 Beingtr . "Being" is not 
predicate as such, but the "essence" of God. God is not 
identical with/ •.. 
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identical with Being, but becomes Being. Truth does 
not rest in the proposition, but it is just this 
whole dynamic process that represents ,the truth. 
The significance of such a dialectic has far 
reaching implications. What Hegel has drawn attention 
to here is the separating of truth from concrete 
reality., of forms of -yhought from their content. The 
serious intention of the Hegelian dialectic now becomes 
,I 
apparent: to reflect the actual process of reality. 
In his pointed criticism of formal logic, Hegel writes 
in the Preface to his Phenomenology: . "The pigeon-holing 
process· of. understandi11.g retains for itself the 
necessity and the notion controlling the content, that 
which constitutes the Joncrete element, the act1,1ality 
and living process of the subject-matter which it 
labels: or rather ., understanding does not retain this 
for itself, on the contrary, understanding fails to know 
it. For if it had as much insight as that, it would surely 
show that it had. It is not even aware of the need for 
such insight; if it were, it would drop its schematizing 
process, or at least would no longer be satisfied to 
know by way of a mere table of contents. A table of 
contents is all that understanding gives, the content 
itself it does not furnish at all." (g) 
While .dialectical/ .•. 
, 
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While dialectical logic moves towards unifying 
theory and practice, traditional logic saw the truth 
in objects which are independent of the subject. While 
the attitude of the advocates of formal logic do point 
beyond a purely epistemological framework, but only in 
that they feel a sense of security in the knowledge 
that what they know and what they are handling are 
objective facts only, �he problem for the adherents of 
dialectical logic, tru�y embraces ontological, 
religious, political and historical considerations. 
Dialectical logic must ,rescue man from the grip of 
the destructive alienation that the dead objectivity 
of formal logic has larided him in by pointing to the 





The fulfilment of self-consciousness will show 
up the world as it essentially is. In other words, 
self-consciousness points to the truth of man himself 
and to the truth of his world: the Universal is
pre-eminent over the particular. The particular, no 
matter in what form, can never embody the whole truth. 
We may note here that the Hegelian logic goes
beyond the very limits that. Kant had drawn to confine
any future/, .. 
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metaphysics. (IO) Hegelian Logic is Ontology. Its
basic concern is "What is the ground of being?" which 
question Western philosoP,hy began with, and which 
occupies the centre of Heidegger's concern. Heidegger, 
of course, is not impressed with Hegel's attempt to 
reflect the actu,1 process of reality. Heidegger rejects 
the Hegelian approach as still being involved with 
Being as substance and as subject. As such, these 
categories are not adequate for an understanding of the 
Being of man and things,·since categories categorize 
the nature of things and are inappropriate for the 
existence of man which are characterized by 
existentialia. 
As we have already established, the·essence of the 
dialectic is in its constant movement., is in its·state 
of flux. But the resultant new modes of being, the new 
manifestations, preserve in them their antecedents. 
The German language is fortunate in that it offers in 
the one word Aufhebung (Verb -auflfuen; participle -
aufgehoben), a distinct advantage over the English 
equivalents of superseding and preserving. On the words 
"Aufheben" and "das Aufgehobene (das Ideele)", Hegel 
himself has said no less.than that it "is one of the 
most important concepts of philosophy, a basic 
determination which/ •.. 
' 
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determination which recurs practically everywhere. • •• 
What sublimates itself does not thereby become nothing. 
Nothing is immediate; what is sublimated, on the other 
hand, is mediated; it is that which is not, but as a 
result, having issued from what had being; it is 
therefore still characterized by the determinateness 
from which it comes. Aufheben has .in the (German) 
-------




and at the same time also 
making cease, making an end. Evert conserving includes 
the negative aspect that something is taken out of 
its immediacy, and thus out of an existence that is 
open to external influences, to be preserved. 
- Thus what is aufgeho·t� is at the same time conserved
and has merely lost its immediacy but is not for that
reason annihilated." (tl)
To pursue this line still further, we may draw closer 
attention to what Hegel says of dialectical philosophy. 
In his Logic, he writes that it is " 'not we who frame 
the notions, , It (12) but that their formation is an
objective development which he only reproduces. 
Dialectical development can never be an activity that 
is imposed on the subject from the outside. "The method 
whereby, in philosophic science, the concept develops 
itself out of itself is expounded in logic and is here 
likewise presupposed/ ... 
... 
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likewise presupposed. Its development is a purely 
immanent progress, the engendering of its 
determinations." (13) We may add here the 
observation that the universal is not something that 
is abstracted or separated from the world of things. 
That being the case, it now appears unreasonable to 
use Hegel's dialectic as a formal scientific method 
for making predictions lor the future state of affairs, 
as Marx had done
., 
and a;s history subsequently proved 
him to be wrong. 
What Hegel did say was that "Contradiction is the 
root of all movement a1id life" and that "all things 
are contradictory in tl�.emsel ves11 • Contradiction is 
0 the truth and essence iof things."(l4) There is 
nothing that exists that is true in the form in which 
it is given, but must advance to newer modes of being 
in order to·realize its potentialities. However, any 
such negation does not displace the actual identity of 
the object. The potentialities of the objects or events 
are unfolded in their new forms which progress toward 
the truth. 
It isn't as if there were two worlds - one finite 
and the other infinite; the finite being the created 
world ., and the infinite being the world Beyond. There 
is only/ ..• 
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is only this world where being is continuous with 
becoming, where the existence of every being has to 
be overcome because of its inherent pot�ntialities, 
for another being which shows its own limitations. It 
is in such a movement that we must find the true 
meaning of finite and infinite. The finite must 
achieve its own determination by the activity of 
perishing. In fact, finitude is the essential 
character of the world., If the finite is to find its 
truth it must do so in its own finite existence. Truth 
does not exist in some·, be:'lrond. Their finitude is their 
truth. So, in perishing they are actually developing 
their potentialities. : The .- infinite makes it possible 
for the potentialities,to realize themselves and so 
reach their true being�. When the finite recognizes 
its negativity, it comes to know its truth, and so 
exists in its true form. The negative and the positive 
elements will no more oppose each other when the 
subject makes the negative a part of its own unity. 
Finite existents must become subjects for the purpose 
of fulfilling their potentialities, which are given 
in the Concept. Here ·we arrive at the truth of finitude: 
it consists in that identity of existence and Concept. 
Hegel, we·may note, comes·to his idea of infinity through 
the finite - the continuous perishing which points to the 
continuous negation of their finitude. Hegel says: 
11the finite/ •.. 
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"the finite in perishing, in this negation of its 
self, has reached its Being-in-Self, and therefore 
has here collapsed into itself . .•. Thus it passes 
beyond itself only to collapse again into itself. 
This self-identity, or negation of negation, is 
affirmative Being, or the Other of the Finite, which 
is supposed to have the first.negation as its 
determinateness; - this Other is the Infinite."(lS) 
When.the relationship between Being·and man is 
given its full weight, we find that the gap between 
Hegel's and Heidegger'� conception of the relationship 
is quite irreconcilabl�. Hegel's conception of the 
relationship between man and Being implies that the 
finitude of man is overcome, fo�man is the place 
where the Absolute combs to itself. But, on the other 
hand, Heidegger's conception of the relationship between 
man and Being establishes that both are finite. For 
Heidegger, the idea of infinity must be seen as the 
error of traditional metaphysical thinking. Being as 
such is finite because "Being is" only through an 
understanding·of Being. Being is not within the "power 
of timell which results in Being being infinite (Hegel), 
but, rather, it is the case that time is within the 
"power of Being" insofar as time is the horizon for an 
understanding of/ .•. 
r 
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understanding of Be�ng which becomes finite 
(Heidegger in Sein und Zeit). 
Hegel attributes to the Understanding, which sees 
the finite only, the stubbornness of not allowing the 
negativity to show itself; to the Dialectics, the 
force of letting the inherent potentialities 
(antitheses) unfold; 
comprehending these. 
· and to Reason, the power of 
I 
J:f Hegel uses Dialectics 
(everything can be treated as an -instance of 
dialectics) to point out and.to overcome alienation:, he 
uses Reason as a reconciling and integrating power. 
The aim of Hegel's logic now becomes apparent. All 
I 
.I 
dialectical tendencies ,must be exposed when we shall' 
arrive at the truth, the reasonable, the philosophical 
result. But, absolute result �r knowledge can only come 
into proper focus by showing up the inadequacies of our 
consciousness, which Hegel demonstrated by his 
dialectics. So, conscious experience now has to pass 
through its various forms until that stage has been 
reached where the conflict between subject and object 
would exist no longer. The phenomenal project that Hegel 
undertook was to show up the inadequacies of our 
Concepts in the past,. and to bring the dialectical movement 
up to/ ... 
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up to its present standpoint: the. Prussian State !,_ 
Being, as we indicated earlier ., is also a Concept, 
which is the form in which Hegel speaks .of it in his 
Logic. Since the Logic concerns itself with Being, 
we now have a logic of Ontology and a logic of 
Metaphysics which expresses the genuine relationship 
of all of reality to e�ch other. This points to what 
the Concept really is .:.. it is Reality itself ., or 
better still Life itseJ.f. The Reality, Being, has 
existence by being more than a mere category. It 
·, 
exists by preserving itself through its self-
alienation. It does this by embracing nothing
(Nichts). Being can o:i1ly exist by passing into its 
I 
opposite. Being is not Being without this negation or 
antagonism. Through this opposition and self­
alienation, the timeless inactivity of the category Being 
is destroyed. Being, by this act of self-
alienation, now comes into its own and expresses 
its essence: it has "no Determinate Being."(l6) It
exists by nthe negation of every determination of 
Being." (t7) It is the negation of all.being. Such 
a negation would'not have any determinate being. In 
other words, it is no thing - nothing, which Hegel 
arrives at by showing that in detennining being(�) 
as something/ ... 
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as something (Seiendes) we use the same cupola "is" 
whose very definition we wish to grasp. Here we 
arrive· at a deadlock because one cannot define being 
as something, since it is everything. Everything is, 
but l?eing is not something. It is "pure 
indeterminateness and vacuity. ti (lS) This 
indeterminate being posits the negation of being: the 
absence of all detennir:iation points to non-being. The 
nothing (Nichts) whic�1 results, of course, is a non­
being being. Hegel overcomes such a state of affairs 
by using his dialectics. Both being and nothing are 
superseded and preservrd by the more comprehensive 
Becoming. (Werden). Becoming preserves both their 
truths as each immedia·tely disappears in its opposite. 
I 
.l 
However, just as Being and Nothing are superseded, 
so too, Becoming suspends itself when it actualizes itself 
in the world. In the process of actualization, Becoming 
becom:es something ., at least for a "moment. 11 (l9) The 
something contains both Being and Nothing in itself. 
11 'This unity of Being and Nothing, as.being the 
primary truth,is, once and for all, '.the basis and 
the element of all that follows: therefore, besides­
Becoming itself, all further logical determinations ... 
and in short all philosophical concepts, are examples 
of this unity.'" (20) Thus Hegel;s logic 
demonstrates that/ ... 
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demonstrates that the unity of Being and Nothing ·is 
contained in the structure of all things, All the 
resultant syntheses, since they contain the power of 
negation, cannot help impelling the process forward, 
by starting it· all over again. 
The idea of becoming in the universe was explained 
by Aristotle in terms c,f the relationship between 
actuality and potentiality. Matter as such is not yet 
-what it later becomes. It is potentially moving. 
towards higher and hig�er forms, The aim•of becoming 
is reached when matter;:reaches its true form 
(actuality). Motion o:r becoming is the realization 
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the one and final cause of all things. But unlike Hegel, 
Aristotle's Absolute is only the cause of becoming, not 
the process itself. On the other hand, Hegel's 
Absolute is cause and process. The one is the other. 
Aristotle's Absolute is detached from the world but 
initiates becoming through Eros (all things desire a 
life, as much as possible
., like God's). 
Aristotle's Unmoved/ ..• 
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Aristotle's Unmoved Mover, like Hegel's Absolute 
Mind, is pure thought. .But whereas Aristotle's 
Absolute exists in unchangeable self-contemplation 
(thought thinking of thought), Hegel's Absolute moves 
through the world by dialectical tensions and 
resolutions towards self-fulfilment. The 
Aristotelian dualism seems to be overcome by Hegel 
because of the specific conception he has of the 
Absolute. (21) 
We may note that Hegel in attempting to define 
Being, (his Logic open� with a consideration of what 
Being is) found Nothing, and so found the negative_: 
character of Reality. :, Everything is only in so far 
! 
I 
as it comes into being,and passes away. Dialectically 
speaking, Being is Becoming. Something that is not yet, 
comes into being and passes into not-beirtg. Being (and 
Nothing) determine the content and development of Reality. 
The implications of such an interpretation have far 
reaching consequences for the problems of- freedom, 
state, religion, to which we now turn our attention. 
Hegel's views on Religion are determined by his 
idea of Becoming, His conception of God is of a 
"Becoming God". God _as God, God as Being only, is an 
abstraction which/ ..• 
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anst�action which arises from the formal, lifeless 
way of looking at things. God, in reality, is an 
active, spiritual being, whose essence consists in his 
unfolding. "Spirit, in so far as it is the Spirit of 
God, is not a spirit beyond the stars, beyond the world. 
On the contrary, God is present, omnipresent, and 
exists as Spirit in all spirits. God is a living God, 
who is acting and working.,. 
(22)
For Hegel, there is no conflict between the meta­
physical and the ratiorial. Hegel. attempts to establish 
by rational analysis, the very thing that Kant had shown 
to be beyond the limits of Understanding. For Hegel, 
the existence of God. i11 the world is a logical 
necessity. 11 • • • to thi1iking reason, God is not 
emptiness, but Spirit;· and this characteristic of 
Spirit does not remain for it a word only, or a super­
ficial characteristic; on the contrary,the nature of 
Spirit unfolds itself for rational thought, ... Thus God 
is conceived of as making Himself an object to Himself, 
and further, the object remains in this distinction in 
identity with God; in it God loves Himself.ff (23)
Hegel's own approach to Religion shows a develop­
mental tendency. He began with a bitter anti­
ecclesiastical attitude which he dealt with under the 
title The/ ... 
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title The Positivity of the Christian Religion, where 
he attacks the development of Christianity into an 
authoritarian system. There seems little doubt that he 
was inspired by the·beauty and the naturalness of 
Greek folk religion, and by the rational character of 
Kant's ethical teachings. The authoritarian, imposed, 
positive character of Christianity could only result 
in man's alienation since it reduces him to a state 
of servility. 
Hegel then moves dn to the ttenlightened11 attitude 
which he displays in his The Spirit of Christianity. (24)
In a radical and notic�able shift of position, 
Christianity is no mory the source of alienation (the 
r 
Jewish religion replac-es Christianity as the religion 
I 
that dehumanizes man. 'The Jews become the example of an 
alienated people, since they adhere slavishly to an 
external authority which they call God). In a 
romantic picture, Hegel presents a pantheism of love 
as the essence of Christianity. 
Finally, religion_comes to be the pictorial or 
imaginative expression (the Father - the Essence; the 
Son - Self-conscious Being; the Holy Spirit - knowledge 
of the former in the·latter) of the highest rational 
truth. This/ ... 
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truth. This imaginative representative of the truth, 
must be superseded and preserved by the self­
conscious Spirit - the highest illumination of which 
is knowledge of the Absolute Spirit knowing itself. 
Even though the religious roots of Hegelianism 
are deep, there is no doubt that he subordinates 
Religion to Philosophy� Whereas religious language 
is indirect, pictorial� and "presentational",
that of the philosophic Absolute assumes the 
rational form of the dialectic. Hegel comes to such 
a rational conception of God as he does with all 
other concepts - throu,gh mediation. Each mediation 
is a stage in the progression toward an adequate 
' 
I 
conception of God. Ne;> one instance of mediation 
shows up the whole Concept because that particular 
mediation is determined. Therefore, it is a part of a 
higher concept that is being determined. Since God 
actualizes Himself in the concrete, and.since the 
concrete is always in the process of becoming, God is 
a Becoming God. As �n actual concept, the conception 
of God is never completed. 
In his early writings Hegel saw life as having an 
original·unity. However, this unity -was an immature 
unity which because of its immaturity differentiates 
into·various oppositions, such as man and nature, 
humanity and/ ... 
. I 
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humanity and divinity, subject and object. Such 
·estrangements will continue to exist until life in the
one finds life in the other, until the finite life rises
to infinite life, until man shares in the life of God
through. love. The unifying power of love, rather than
the objectifying and analytic power of thought is
the answer to the separation of man from nature, of the
finite from the infini�e, and of subject from object.
Religion is the answer� not philosphy.
These early views•of Hegel do not change essentially 
from his later writings, for the immature unity that 
gave rise to the opposition between man and nature, now 
becomes the self-externalization of Spirit, which it 
I
later transcends by and through the activity of man. 
The Spirit develops as "the process of becoming an 
other to itself, i.e. an object for its own self, and 
in transcending this otherness." (2S) Alienation is
now overcome by philosophy, rather than by religion. 
Richard Kroner in his introduction to Hegel's 
Early.Theological Writings says: "Hegel's Pantheism of 
Love has all the characteristics of his future 
metaphysics. It aims at a reconciliation of opposites, 
tries to overcome one-sided rationalism, one-sided 
emotionalism, or/ •.. 
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emotionalism, or one-sided empiricism.. It is 
dialectical in its structure, although its method is 
not yet dialectical in the strict sense of the word."(Z6)
The task of restoring the original unity of all the 
differentiations of life, which was performed by lo.ve, 
is now performed, in his later writings, by Reason, 
which acts dialectically. 
Hegel links up nw9rld Spirit" (Weltgeist) with 
God through what he calls "comprehended history" 
(begriffene Geschichte) which recalls the Absolute 
Spirit as manifest ·in �eality, and so points to the 
knowledge of God. Such knowledge is necessary if the 
Spirit is to expose its dynamic character by the 
' 
f 
process of historically unfolding itself in and through 
the concrete. 
We may note here the etymology of the word ''Spirit". 
The German Geist, the Latin Spiritus, the Hebrew Ruach, 
and the Greek pneuma, "also means breath and wind, is 
essentially a moving force and the essence of life. 
Etymologically, it is also related to 'yeast' and 
'geyser;' and conceptually it is associated with the 
notion of a ferment and an eruptive force." (27)
In his/ .•• 
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In his Phanomenologie des Geistes, which Baillie 
.translates as Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel has this to 
say of the Spirit, "The living substance, further ., is 
that being which is truly subject
., 
or
., what is the 
same thing ., is truly realized and actual (wirklich) 
solely in the process of positing itself, or in 
mediating with its own self its transitions from one 
state or position to th:e opposite. As subject it is pure 
and simple negativity, and just on that account a 
process of splitting up what is simple and 
undifferentiated, ..• �rue reality is merely this 
process of reinstat_ing ,'.self-identity ., of reflecting 
!' 
into its own self in and from its other ., and is not an 
original and primal unity as such, not an immediate 
unity as such. It is the process of its o,m becoming, 
; 
the circle which presuJposes its end as its purpose, 
and has its end for its beginning; it becomes concrete 
and actual only by being carried out, and by the end 
it involves. 11 (ZS) In the Lesser Logic, Hegel says that 
the highest stage in the self-consciousness of Spirit 
is the realization that it is the truth of everything. 
Of .this truth which he calls Absolute Idea, he says: 
"'The Idea in its process makes itself that illusion, 
and opposes an other to itself; its activity consists 
in overcoming this illusion.'" (z9) Findlay adds: 
"In other/ ... 
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"In other words the imperfection of Teleology 
consists in the fact that it appears as a journey 
in which starting-point and end-poirtt are the things 
of importance, while the journey itself derives its 
importance from them." (3o) 
Spirit becomes an object; it alienates itself 
into an other, and then overcomes this otherness 
returning to itself from that act of alienation. 
The movement we call experience,(3l)and only when it 
becomes the property of consciousness can we speak of,' 
the possibility of . its,; attaining its truth. In 
religious terms, God the Father becomes God the Son 
(something other for Himself). Such an externalization
is superseded and preserved in the Holy Spirit. 
Hegel sees the ultimate form of Spirit as Absolute 
Knowledge, which is Spirit knowing itself in the form 
of Spirit. In other words ,; Spirit is not merely the 
goal.of its own activity, but it "is indistinguishable 
from that game itself." (3z) When Spirit gains self­
consciousness it will be conscious of all that it has 
ever thought. These, however, would be reflected as its 
own concepts, and not now as something other or foreign 
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self-consciousness would now constitute Absolute 
·Knowledge. All things that we are conscious of are
an externalization or a presupposition of our
thinking self--consciousness which will return to�
Subject. The Subject, of course, is the Universalizing
or Unifying Activity.
Where Hegel speak� of the necessity of Spirit 
alienating or externalizing itself only to return in 
truth to itself from this estrangement, Heidegger 
speaks of Being as ale�heia {lithe disclosure of Being"). 
Being is its self-disclosure. Heidegger sees man as.". 
alienating himself by becoming forgetful of Beirig through 
constantly losing hims-elf in the world of das Man. 
The contemplation of the Spirit in this world is the 
task of Reason which governs Reality, from its lowest 
level (nature) to its highest level (free, rational being 
who acts in self-consciousness ·of his potentialities.) 
In the true sense of the word, reality is no reality 
until it has become rational in itself. That which is 
real, for Hegel, is not what actually exists, but that 
which is in line with Reason. 11What is rational is 
actual and what is actual is rationa1. n C33)· To
illustrate this, the State is often used in what appears 
to be/ ... 
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to be the best example, but nevertheless, an often 
misunderstood one. Th� State can be called "Real" 
only when it is•in line with "the given potentialities 
of men and pennits their full development. Any 
preliminary form of the state is not yet reasonable, 
and, therefore, not yet real." (34) 
This puts a completely different colouring to the 
picture Sir Karl Popper creates when he interprets 
.) 
. 
Hegel as saying, "everything that·. is now real or 
actual exists by necessity, and must be reasonable as 
well as good. · (Partic�larly good, as we shall see, is 
I 
the actually existing Prussian state.)� (3S) In his 
disparaging analysis of,· Hegel's philosophy, Popper 
inverts the basic Hegelian process by attributing to 
Hegel the belief that things are good because they 
succeed. What Hegel really believed was.that things 
succeed because they are good. The operative thought in 
Hegel's 11 philosophy of State" is his idea of Freeqom. 
The content of Reason is the same as that of History -
the struggle for freedom, which at that point actualizes 
itself best in the Hereditary Monarchy of the Prussian 
State., That Hegel held the Prussian State in high 
respect, there is no doubt. That he did not see it as 
the idea of the State, his Philosophv of Right firmly 
establishes. In the Preface to that work Hegel says: 
"Hence what/ ... 
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"Hence what matters is to recognize and know the 
substance which is immanent and the eternal which is 
present beneath the temporal.and passing which appears. 
For the rational which is synonymous with the idea 
appears.(by entering through its actuality into an 
outward existence) in a limitless wealth of forms, 
appearances and configurations, and thus encloses its 
kernel with a variegat�d rind. Consciousness at the 
outset lives in this rind, but the conception permeates 
J 
. 
it in search of the inner pulse which beats in the 
outer configurations. ·:These endless manifold relations, 
this endless material �nd its regularities are not 




The essence of both man and history is Spirit. The 
Phenomenology is the unfolding of the Spirit in terms of 
the history of man. Hegel's original title of the 
Phenomenology� "Science of the Experience of 
Consciousness," is· important.as Heidegger shows, and 
which he takes as the theme of his essay on Hegel which 
is entitled Hegel's Concept of Experience. Hegel's 
thesis is that of these experiences which consciousness 
gives, there can be "scientific knowledge." For, 
experience is none other than what constitutes Spirit 
through which Spirit becomes "aware of lf or "conscious of" 
it. Hegel, in pursuance of this, uses the Phenomenology 
to demonstrate/ ... 
t 
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to demonstrate the process by which Spirit, through 
its O'Wil experiential aspect, becomes consci.ous of 
itself. The various experiences and events represent 
various stages in the development of Spirit towards 
attaining Absolute Knowledge of it. "The goal, which 
is Absolute Knowledge of Spirit knowing itself as 
Spirit, finds its pathway in the recollection of 
spiritual fonns (Geister) as they are in themselves and 
as they accomplish the o:rganizaticm of their spiritual · 
kingdom. Their conservation, looked at from the sid·e of. 
their free existence appearing in the form of contingency, 
is History; looked at from the side of their 
intellectually comprehended organisation, it is the 
Science of the ways in which knowledge appears." (37) 
Objects, as they appear in experience, will give 
phenomenal knowledge. It is the task of philosophy to 
_illuminate the totality and comprehensive knowledge of 
Spirit that posits and reveals itself. ·Not until it 
achieves that goal, not untii man is united with God, 
not until the gap between subject and object is bridged, 
will consciousness be anything, but art "unh�ppy 
consciousness. 11 What Hegel calls natural consciousness. 
is that stage of immediate or primitive sensation that 
is alienated from itself. It finds its truth in the 
fonn of/ ... 
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form of an object as opposed to the subject. This 
alienation is the force that pushes it along until 
"natural" and "spirittial" consciousness are reconciled. 
On its way to Spiritual consciousness, natural 
consciousness loses its own truth (of being merely 
natural consciousness). This "highway of despairtf(3S) 
that 1'natural consciousnessn traverses points, however, 
to its salvation, and �o to the salvation of man. It 
is not stretching a point, but expressing a truth, to 
suggest that Hegel,in his philosophy, attempts to 
construct man's authentic existence (by the act of 
self-realisation man fuses with the Absolute) and 
rescue him from his alienation. (39) 
Change gives rise to something new. It is Hegel's 
I 
contention that change is a progressive development, 
that there is a latent destinv, and a potentiality 
striving to realize itself. All particular conditions 
are overcome by the potentialities inherent in them in 
their effort to fulfil (or realize) themselves. For the 
self-conscious subject, being a historical.being, the 
State represents the universal interest which makes it 
possible for the individual to fulfil himself. The 
universal manifests itself in various forms� each of which 
represents a stage in the life of the State. And so, 
essentially, there/ •.. 
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essentially, there isn't a shift in such an outlook from 
Hegel's central theme: the dialectical relationship 
between Universal and Particular. 
The power of the State is not an abstract power
., 
but has its content in Universal History (WeltgeschichtJ. 
It is the right of World Spirit which is the 
Unconditional Absolute.: (4o) Thus it "is the universal 
Idea as a genus and as �n ab�olute power over 
individual states - the mind which gives itself its 
actuality in the proces:s of World-Historv." (41)
i; 
States evolve to highe� stages, which seems to me to be 
the true significance of the Hegelian triad, where he 
traces the course of f r;eedom through the Orient, the 
Graeco-Roman world
., 
to Jthe Germanic nations of the 
Protestant north. 
Thus the Hegelian foundation for tl;ie State is based 
on the reconciliation between individual and universal 
interests.· "·· .its strength lies in the µni�y of its 
own universal end and aim with the particular interest 
of individuals
., 
•.. " {42) Hegel believes that there is a
rational order in the world and that man has the capacity 
to understand such an order. (43) The aim of such an 




order would be to promote every individual's humanity 
and to make it possible for him to cu.1tivate freely, 
art, religion, and philosophy. Hegel has an 
idealistic conception of the State� ·His conception of 
the State, however, differs from that conception which 
sees the state as an institution (Anstalt). that 
exercises commands and orders, that enforces the law, 
He conceives of the state in an essentially 
Aristotelian sense - the State is the highest community 
(the Polis) where any genuine freedom can be realized, 
Just as the Church pro,�ides the religious community 
where man can come to know God, the State provides the 
political community where man can come to realize his 
highest freedom. In s�ch states the individual 
reconciles himself witl, the whole. His existence really 
comes into being through the power of the law. The 
common interest which it represents would see to his 
self-development. He finds his essence in the law and the 
law promotes his potentialities. Each individual can 
fulfil himself only as a member of a real community. 
Such a state is where, Hegel says:"A man counts as a man 
in virtue of his manhood alone, not because he is a Jew, 
Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian, &c," (44) 
In view/ ... 
, 
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In view of the above convictions and outlook, 
Hegel would thoroughly disapprove of the actions of a 
fanatic motivated by an objectionable ideology and 
would approve of the actions of, say, a person who has 
the courage of opposing Idi Amin in his attempt to 
secure freedom from such a dictator. Ernst Cassirer 
writes, "There is, however, a clear and unmistakeable 
difference between his :, (Hegel's) idealization of the
power of the State and,that .sort of idolization that 
is characteristic of our modern totalitarian systems, n (4S) 
. 
' 
Hegel accepts only those power• states that can guarantee 
the individual freedom:and allow the development of his 
potentialities to the full. The Hegelian state is one 
that conforms to universally valid laws and to Reason. 
The law is the Shibboleth through which one catches out 
·1-
the enemy from the friend.
For Hegel, Napoleon was a world historical figure 
who carried out the ideals of the French Revolution. 
Napoleon reflects the higher knowledge and morality of 
history, and so was able to turn the achievements of the 
French Revolution into a social system that united 
individual freedom with Universal Reason, thus fulfilling 
the historical need of the time. It was for this that 
Hegel admired Napoleon who he saw as the soul of the 
world. 
However, Individualism/ ... 
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However, Individualism led to the Terror of 1793, 
where each man's freedom destroyed any reasonable 
conception of society. "Community", in the positive 
Hegelian sense, was destroyed. Hence, we find the 
attempt to save the social system and oppose, in 
some measure, the rights of the individual. Marcuse, 
in an incisive analysis says� 11 • • •  the socio-historical 
roots of this 'universalism,' showing that its 
base was the lack of a ;'community' in individualist 
society. One might interpret his dialectic as 
the philosophic attemp-f? to reconcile his ideals with 
an antagonistic social:reality .... Time and-again 
the concrete social implications of the concept of 
universality break through his philosophic formulations, 
and the picture of an �ssociation of free individuals 
united in a common interest comes clearly to light."(46) 
Marcuse points to the interpretation that the 
terror of anarchy was at the back of Heg�l's 
insistence upon the connection between truth and 
universality which would.exist in a true community. He 
says: "'True independence consists alone in the unity 
and in the interpretation of both the individuality 
and the universality with each other. The universal 
acquires through the individual its concrete existence, 
and ithe/ ..• 
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and the subjectivity of the individual and particular 
discovers in the universal the unassailable basis and 
the most genuine form of its reality ... '" (47) In 
keeping with the points raised above, Hegel 
considered Hereditary Monarchy as the ideal form of 
government. The monarch represents the whole. 
not tainted by social antagonisms. For Hegel, 
hereditary monarchy was the Christian state that 
He is 
came into being with U�e German Reformation. And, he 
believed that the sovereignity of the State would 
preserve society (middie class society). Professor 
Rauche draws attention ;·to Hegel rationalizing the 
status quo of. the Prussian State, and so rationalizing 




Hegel's system is a certain model which seeks to cope 
in a rational manner with the existing conflicts and 
problems of the age, he rationalizes the existing 
conflicts and problems in Prussia. In doing so,Hegel 
missed actuality and thus led man into alienation 
and unauthentic existence. 
However, Hegel's belief is that freedom is not 
actual without the State. The State is the actualization 
of freedom as it alone is responsible for and makes 
possible the continuc1l progress of Spirit: the 
actualization of/ ..• 
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actualization of man's Spirit depends on the State. 
But,by elevating hereditary monarchy into an ideal 
state, what Hegel had done was to replace the idea 
of social contract with the idea of the State as an 
objective whole. The implication of such a situation 
is that State is separated from that very community 
of individuals that Hegel wished for. And since 
Hegel saw individuals as a material part of the 
State, the harmonious reconciliation of individual 
and state seems impossible, if not utopian, ,because 
that very individual, (because of his individualitv), 
would always come into ::conflict with the State. This 
' . 
must have led Hegel to say that the individual can be 
sacrificed for the sake of the community. In his 
Philosophy of Right Hegel writes:i: "Whether the 
I 
individual exists or not is indifferent to objective 
ethics, which alone is enduring, and the power 
through which the lives of individuals are ruled." 
----
(49) 
·Such a viewpoint is damning when one applies the
sel.f-same criteria and judgement that Hegel himself 
used - history. History,since Hegel, and especial.ly in 
the twentieth century, bears testimony-to the 
sacrifice of the individual-for a principle, for some 
"eternal justice, ... against whom the vain striving 
of the/ ... 
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of the individuals becomes only a fluctuating play. 11 (SO)
Lenin wrote, "'One must be prepared for every 
sacrifice, to use if necessary every stratagem, ruse, 
illegal method, to be determined to conceal the 
truth, for the purpose of penetrating the labour unions 
and of accomplishing, despite everything, the 
communist task."(Sl) The reality and pain of being
sacrificed for an eternal justice is certainly no 
' 
fluctuating play. 
In the final analysis, and in the face of such 
evidence documented above, it does appear that Hegel 
has seriously compromised his highest philosophic 
ideas in his criticism,of civil society for a strong, 
·; 
powerful state wherein ·,the individual will actualize
his freedom, in becoming Universal.
B e  that as it may, to come to a better appreciation 
of what freedom means for Hegel, we must take him on his 
own terms ... This becomes doubly important when we 
consider that, for Hegel, the supreme mode of access 
to the Absolute was through freedom. Now Reason, we 
have stressed, exists through the process of its being 
made real; in other words, through its realization. 
And, all modes of being, Hegel emphasised, are modes of 
realization. Of such realizations, it is only man who 
knows what/ ... 
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knows what he is. And, only in this sense is he 
real. He alone understands the process of 
becoming. He alone nnderstands potentiality and 
;eossesses knowledge of Conceets. ·Man exists as a 
potential that is continually actuali:z:ing itself, 
according to Reason: "We encounter here the · most 
important category of reason, namely, freedom. 
Reason presupposes freedom, the power to act in 
accordance with knowledge of the truth ., the power to 
shape reality in line with its potentialities. 
Freedom., in turn ., presupposes reason, for it is 
comprehending knowledge, ·alone, that enables the 
subject to gain and to wield this power. The stone 
does not possess it; neither does the plant. Both 
lack comprehendirtg knowledge and hence real 
subjectivity. n (S2) Such world historical figures as
Alexander the Great ., Caesar, Napoleon, carry out the 
universal task of advancing freedom, even though, in 
their particular existence, they may have been motivated 
by personal ambition. The advance they give to rational 
truth lifts· them above their particular determin.ations .. 
"The History of the world is·none other than the progress 
of the consciousness of Freedom; ••• " (53) 
Hegel 1 inks/ •.. 
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Hegel links universal, freedom, and Spirit by 
concluding that t}:le essence of the Universal is 
Spirit and the essence of Spirit is Freedom. The 
various forms or qualities of Spirit exist only 
through Freedom. The true subject of history (the 
Universal) is the realization of the self-
consciousness of Freedom. The content of freedom 
comes from the knowled�e of truth. This knowledge 
and self-consciousness ,;make up the basis character 
of the subject. In other words, the truth about 
reality must be conceived as subject: The true form 
of objectivity is subjectivity. The Hegelian 
dialectic is at work, for, when all objects lose 
their independent objectivity, when they are 
comprehended by the subject, then perfect freedom is 
attained. The world as objective world is the form 
through which the subject gains self-realization. 
The subject takes all reality as its own and has no 
object but itself. · It is only then that subject is 
free. For subject that has an external object, the 
object must be regarded as something foreign. 
Thought is perfect freedom, since it has no.object 
but itself. In destroying reality and the 
permanence of what is, man's self-consciousness gains 
the Essence, the Concept, the Universal. These help 
man gain/ ... 
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man gain knowledge of the truth of things and not 
get taken in by the appearance of things - limited 
determinations that have not yet fully exposed.the 
appearance of things. 
Hegel also links Concept to Freedom. For, we 
showed how Hegel, in hi.s Logic, saw Concept as the 
unity of the Universal ,and the Particular, and how 
Becoming overcomes dialectically the tension between 
·'
Being and Nothing. Now, in the Philosophy of Historv,
Hegel provides a histo1�ical account of the link
between Concept and Freedom. The state provides the
arena where the individual subject comes into union
with the community ("whole"). The progress of thought,
the comprehension of the Concept, is linked to the
progress of freedom ., which has three main stages.
The Orient knew that only� man was free; in the
Graeco-Roman world some men were free; and in the
Germanic-Christian world all men are free. This last
form-of society is best expressed by Constitutional
Monarchy,
Hegel believes that history is the story of the 
development of human freedom. But history is the 
story of the development of human freedom in terms 
of a /� .. 
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of a definite preconceived model, namely, the 
movement of the spirit, into which man is harmoniously 
blended. In other words, human freedom is subject 
to the self-emancipation of the Spirit, It is 
true that this spirit inhabits in man's conscious­
ness as the mysterious subject - object being 
(Jacob Hammes), but the: blending of every 
individual's mind with:the spirit does suggest a 
Greater Man. This Greater Man, constituted at the 
expense of the contingent individual, is an 
abstraction. 
However, Hegel says that when man as man knows 
that he is free, that he is not.separated from the 
truth, then he will actualize his potentialities. 
"Thus, essence and existence are actually interrelated 
in philosophy, and the process of proving the 
truth there has to do with the existing object itself. 
The essence arises in the process of existence, and 
conversely, the process of existence is a 'return' 
tt> the essence, 11 {
54)
Hegel.believes that his metaphysical conception 
of freedom is not governed by an external process, 
but is the very history of man. Freedom is the 
activation, the self-realization, the self-fulfilment 
of man's inner tendency. Hegel holds that it is not 
an imposed/ ... 
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an imposed truth but one that is inherent in man's 
very reality, whose potentiality he must 
consciously actualize. 
The problem of such a system like Hegel's is that 
it is� experiential horizontal, taking us to the 
systema;cic science by way of the Wel tgeist. Hegel 
at no time suggested ot;· even faintly considered 
that his system was a n}odel. Rather, he saw his 
as the model. So, regardless of whether Hegel would 
ha.ve approved or disapproved of what seems to be the 
Communist offensive (b�inging the world under one 
roof or culture), Hegel must bear some responsibility 
for it, since the driving force or motive of the 
Hegelian system is unity, the Universal which is the 
expression of Universal Reason, and, by implication, 
cultural unity through the unifying power of 
dialectical philosophy. 
Even though one may thoroughly disapprove of any 
plan to bring the whole world under one socio­
political organization, one may ask whether such a 
scheme is feasible or desirable. There are 
geographical, cultural, religious, historical, etc., 
differences that make such a fusion into one all-
embracing system/ ... 
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embracing system seem impossible. In any case, 
-it is one fallible man's idea of what is the truth,
and starting from such a premise, it seems
unreasonable to absolutize any one approach and
impose it on the rest of mankind. In a perceptive
analysis, Professor Rauche asks the following
pertinent questions, "And yet, what else was Hegel's
blending of the individual with the state but an
act of self-transcendence ., i.e., an absolutization
of the human self? Was it not ·man who ., in his mind .,
formed the concept of cl;bsolute truth? And was not
the conception of a hi�torical logos, with which man
could blend through his rational consciousness,
an immanent truth? In other words, did not man know
I 
the movement of the historical logos, because he
I
had himself constituted it by the dialectical
method? 17 (SS)
History exposed as unrealistic such metaphysical 
idealizations as the Truth, the Just ., the Good, the 
Beautiful, the Real. In the face of man's inhumanity 
to man, in the face of conflicts that assumed 
nightmarish proportions ., and in the face.of Hegel's 
refusal to recognise the limits of human thinking 
( which must/ •.• 
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(which must be seen as a consequence of his search 
for the Universal, the Infinite, the Absolute), his 
conceptions could not hold their ground and were 
thus rejected as an excellent example of Holzweg. 
It is in the light of ·this whole tradition (the 
search for Being) that Heidegger's own approach to 
the problem of metaphysics must be seen. By 
rejecting any constitution of the Absolute from the 
position of man's finiteness, and , by depriving 
man -of an absolute that provided him with his 
traditional values, Heidegger hoped to arrive at the 
ground of man's being,:-starting from Dasein's
(Heidegger's term for human existence) very being 
in the world. Such an approach would really 
constitute, for him, man's authentic existence, 
unauthenticity be:i,ng man's landing himself into 
alienation by any attempt to come to terms with the 
world through metaphysical constitutions. 
We have already shown that, according to Hegel, 
the world process is governed by the unfolding of the 
Rational Logos. Reason is the ground of the world. 
We would like to put forward the suggestion that, 
given a lively imagination combined, as in Hegel's 
case, with erudite scholarship, one can construct an 
equally comprehensive/ .. , 
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equally comprehensive system, devoted to explaining 
the world process as being governed by an irrational 
purpose. That this is so points to the sobering 
realization that Hegel's conceptioh of the universe 
is a private, individual attempt at comprehending 
the universe - in other words, it does not represent 
The Truth,'but ·a truth whose validity can and was 
challenged by his successors. 
Judging from Hegel's conception of the status of 
his own philosophy ., it.appears to be a special kind 
of philosophic conceit;-for a philosopher to believe 
that his solution or vision is all-explanatory. Such 
a conception, if forced on the rest of mankind, can 
only lead to a further. alienation, since it does not 
take into account that man is a multi-faceted being. 
So, a theory that sets out to rescue man from 
alienation ., if absolutized., will result in an 
alienation that could be worse. 
However
., despite the criticisms that can be 
levelled against Hegel, an understanding of our times 
would be difficult ., if not impossible without a 





clear knowledge of his philosophy. As Carl 
Friedrich puts it, "Marxism and Fascism, especially 
in its Italian form, no less than existentialism 
and pragmatism are clearly unthinkable without 
Hegel. This does not mean that they are Hegelian, ... 
But it does mean that a knowledge of Hegel is 
perhaps mot'e essential than that of any philosopher 
of the past for anyone ,who wishes to understand 
·, 
the intellectual crisis of our time." (S6)
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C H A P T E R T H R E E 
ALIENATION AND THE· DECLINE OF CULTURE DURING THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY AND THE FIRST HALF OF THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY. 
Hegel was the first to analyse the concept of 
alienation as such (in the Phenomenologv of Spiri:t) 
in all its manifold implications, and his analysis 
bestowed philosophical respectability on the concept 
to such an extent that it became. one of the key 
problems confronting Hegel's successors. Hegel's own 
understanding of alienation became the springboard for 
further discussions - either inviting radical opposition 
which, however, could not totally disentangle itself 
from Hegelian overtones, or agreement but with 
reservations or modifications, The problematic nature 
of the whole question of alienation is evident from 
the fertile, though often contradictory, discussions on 
the topic conducted in the several disciplines that 
Hegelian philosophy influericed. 
We shall discuss the problem of alienation and the 
decline of culture in the nineteenth and the first half 
of the twentieth century in terms of 
{a) Religious Alienation: the serious problems 
facing religious/ ... 
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facing religious thinkers who were confronted by Hegel's 
significant pronouncements on Christianity and 
Philosophy, and the attempts to resolve these problems. 
(b) Ideological Alienation: the attempt by Marx
to define alienation in terms of an analysis of 
economic and social relations and the problenl.s arising 
from these. 
(c) Functionalistic Alienation: the attempt by
classical.and modern positivism with their unbounded 
optimism and confidence in the powers of science, to 
interpre�- reality purely in terms of functional 
relations and thus rescµe man from the alienation of an 
abstract and speculative metaphysics. 
The discussion of the above is necessary since the 
above mentioned types of alienation created the situation 
_and the intellectual climate from which Heidegger 




{a) Religious Alienation, 
In discussing religious alienation we propose to 
limit ourselves to the two main trends of natural 
religion on the one hand and unique revelation on the 
other. As a result of Hegel's mediation of Philosophy 
and Christianity, theological thinking was facing 
some of its acutest problems. Hegel, in his 
philosophical development, had accepted and rejected 
a number of positions concerning the relationship 
between Philosophy and Christianity. He finally 
came to the conclusion that religion was inadequate 
for achieving the unification of life, chiefly because 
0£ its tendency to distinguish between the real 
world and an otherworldly dimension. "'-vha t this 
meant theoretically to Hegel was that religion, by 
itself, does not have the power to realize the full 
potencies of life and bring them into a liberating 
synthesis," (l) Reconciliation of the conflicts of 
experience can only be achieved by Philosophy since 
"the principle of unification is supplied by a 
philosophical view of the totality of. life." (2)
Religion, then, is only an intermediate stage in 
the dialectical journey of the Spirit and must be 
interpreted in terms of philosophical categories. All 
of Hegel's subsequent pronouncements on relig:i.on are 
now to/ ... 
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now to be viewed in the light of the primacy of 
philosophy. Hegel's theory of religion not only 
tried tb overcome the earlier separation of 
religion from philosophy, but also began the steady 
erosion of the Christian belief in God as "wholly 
other11 , which development precipitated a number of 
interesting developments in theological thinking, 
for example, the growth of a so-called liberal 
theology (Strauss
., 
Harnack, Troeltsch) as well as its 
subsequent replacement by a new awareness of the 
uniqueness of the Biblical message (Kierkegaard, 
Barth, Bultmann, etc.) 
If, according to Hegel, religion is to be given 
its proper form in Hegel's reconciliation of it with 
philosophy - this has serious implications for 
traditional Christian doctrine. Hegel could not 
accept the idea that God is mysterious and 
.impenetrable. God only appears. to be 1thidden 11 from 
the point of view of a limited perspective. His 
philosophy of religion claims to remove the veils of 
mystery from the divine being. God stands fully 
revealed. The historical Christ is no longer a unique 
personage, but merely an imaginative symbol which 
enabled man's mind to grasp "the ultimate truth that 
Divinity and./ •.. 
I 
J 
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Divinity and Humanity are one in essence, that the 
life of man is the life of God in temporal form, and 
that the two natures, the Divine and human, can only 
realize themselves through vital unity with each 
othern . (3) 
Similarly, the Crucifixion and Resurrection of 
Christ are also imaginative representations pointing 
to the fact that, viewed in the light of his finitude, 
man is subject to mortality and decay, "yet view him 
in the light of his unity with the Infinity, and 
straightway he rises.and mounts to a lofty and 
positive participation in the· ·pantheistic world-
process. 11 ( 4
)
Hegel was actually the last philosopher to propose 
the unity of philosophy and theology. Thinkers who 
succeeded him insisted on the necessity of a 
distinction 0$ separation in the interest of both 
philosophy and religion. Such thinkers made a break 
from the Hegelian tradition in two directions - one 
being a cultural-historical or more anthropological 
conception of Christianity, for example, as found in 
Strauss and Feuerbach, and the other which stressed the 
importance and uniqueness of the original message of 
Christianity, as/ ... 
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Christianity, as represented by Kierkegaard. 
To begin with the former trend - thinkers like 
Daub and Marheineke shared Hegel's intention to 
elevate faith to the realm of speculative understanding. 
But with a historical union of God and man, the problem 
arose of explaining the divinity of Christ and why one 
should have faith in him. Strauss was the one to 
show the impossibility of reconciling 11 logical 
pantheism and the New Testament messagen, (5) He 
demonstrated decisively in his Life of Jesus that 
Hegelian philosophy and Christian doctrine were not 
concerned ·with the same things. nstrauss now made 
it his business to prove that the Gospel narratives 
are a collection of·myths gradually formed.in the 
earliest Christian communities, a wreath of adoration 
woven round the Master's head by worshipping fancy. 1 ( 6)
Strauss does not deny that the historical Jesus 
existed, His conception of the status of Jesus, quite 
apart from any considerations of Divinity, is that 
Jesus "was the first to perceive that God and man are 
one. Later this wasperverted by the Church into the 
dogma that God and man are one - in Jesus Christ", ('l) 
Strauss' latest/ ... 
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Strauss' latest book Der alte und der neue Glanbe 
sees him ending in materialism, under the 
influence of scientific positivism, moving away from 
the attempt to reconcile faith and idealism. "His 
'new' faith is an ethics of 'modern' man, tinged with 
religion. tt (B) Christianity has been transformed 
into a humanism. 
Feuerbach also began as a Hegelian but later 
rejected the Hegelian identity of phi.losophy and 
Christianity. For Feuerbach, that which Hegel 
elevated to the infinite in religion and philosophy, 
is nothing other than the finite which has been 
mystified. The true essence of Christianity as well 
as true philosophy should no longer begin with God 
or Absolute Spirit but with man. ttFor Feuerbach, this 
leads directly to the complete dissolving of religious 
and philosophical theology in the 'universal science' of 
anthroplogy. The Christian dogma of the Trinity and 
Hegel's dialectical trinity is replaced by the principle 
of the essential unity between I and Thou, between 
man and his fellow man.tt (g) 
Like Nietzsche, Feuerbach felt that Christianity was 
no longer relevant in the light of new scientific and 
political developments. It was time for a new philosophy 
which was/. .. 
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which was not Christian but was religious in so far 
as it celebrates man as divinity. As far as who 
Christ might have been, for Feuerbach, he ·was no more 
than 11 an idealized conglomerate of all the 
excellences admired by man". (10) Christ might have 
existed historically, but imaginative faith has 
embellished the facts of history. Strauss and 
Feuerbach once and for all eliminated the notion that 
11 Christian faith and speculative philosophy are 
somehow identical in nature", (11)
The end of the nineteenth century.saw the 
culmination in theology of the cultural-anthropological 
trend, despite the unease that.such an approach·caused. 
Harnack
., 
for instance, tried to distinguish between 
the "faith of Jesus and the faith•in Jesus", trying to 
show that "faith. in Christ is a distorting 
development of the faith of Jesus". (12) The tendency 
was to gloss over the uniqueness of Christ in return 
for a demand for Christianity to adapt itself to modern 
man and his new circumstances. "The attempt of a 
mediation between Christianity and the contemporary 
outlook of man becomes obvious from Harnack's lectures.u(l3)
(These lectures were delivered at the University of 
Berlin: 1899 - 1900) 
With Ernst/ . . . 
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With Ernst Troel tsch, i-10wever, liberalism in 
theology can be said to have reached its peak.� 
Christianity is now seen not as the ultimate stage in 
human religious development but merely as one 
historical expression of revelation and redemption. 
Troeltsth's historical relativism, then, abandons the 
belief in the uniqueness of the New Testament message. 
His own philosophy attempts to reconcile the· 
Christian conception of God with the Hegelian 
philosophy of Absolute Spirit. That is why he 
conceived the philosophy of history� culture, and 
religion as forming an integrated whole. 
The ravages of the two world war�s, the horrors 
of the concentration camps, the economic slump that 
caused great.misery and suffering.soon undermined the 
optimistic expectations of liberal theology. The 
attempt to reconcile Christian teaching with man's 
contemporary conditions in the hope of providing peace 
and prosperity to all men, gave way to a kind of despair 
that looked once again to the original message of the 
Gospel, quite apart from its accommodation to 
contemporary life. Thinkers like Karl Barth, under the 
influence of Kierkegaard, rejected the attempt.to 
secularize and humanize Christianity. Liberal 
theologians had attempted to socialize the Gospel and
create heaven/ ... 
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create heaven on earth, as well as to bridge the 
gap between man and God. Both, however, are doomed 
to failure. Belief in tl1e world and in cultural 
achievements results in an arrogance that leads man to 
believe that he is self-sufficient. But man can never 
save himself. Neither can he bridge the gap between 
man and God, for God remains "wholly other". 
The new theological trend stresses the weakness 
of the individual with regard to salvation, the 
11 otherness" of God, and the chasm between man and God. 
The new theology returnsto the truths of revelation 
as found in the Bible. Kierkegaard in his thinking 
embodies the main trends of this new theological 
orientation. The uniqueness of the individual's 
relation to God and a return to original Christianity 
is stressed by Kierkegaard. His influenc� on the 
representatives of the so-called dialectical theol�gy 
(men like Barth, Bultmann, and Gogarten) is inescapable.
These men represent a radical opposition to natural or 
cultural theology in favour of a return to the truths 
of revelation. Kierkegaard also rejected Hegel's 
mediation of Christianity and Philosophy. Like 
Feuerbach he hoped to rescue man from the alienation 
that such a mediation produces, but by a decisive leap 
into faith. The individual's personal decision to have 
a unique/ ... 
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a unique and solitary relationship with God is the 
only criterion f-cfr· being a Christian. The 
absoluteness and objectivity of the Hegelian 
mediation ignores the individual subject. Kierkegaard 
replaces Hegel's objective historical Christianity 
with an existential conception of the nature of· 
Christianity. The self-revelation of God is open to 
the individual in his faith, not to speculative 
reason. Hegel's identification of man with Divine 
Spirit is equally abhorrent to Kierkegaard because 
man only exists by the Will of God. Mackintosh says 
of Hegel's views on God: "Intellectually, it is on 
much too easy terms with the Divine". (14) Such a
claim could never be made of Kierkegaard for whom man
is a despairing sinner, utterly dependent on the
grace of God.
Karl Barth admits that Kierkegaard influenced his 
own development. He believes, like Kierkegaard, that 
lfman is made to serve God, not God to serve manu. (15)
Theological teaching is to be derived from revelation, 
not from human speculation. God is to be sought in 
what He has said, :not in what man says. "Theology is ... 
service of the Word of God. Its task is to 
scrutinize the proclamation of the Church relatively 
to its/ ... 
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to its agreement with the Revelation witnessed to· in 
Holy Scripture, and to correct it where it has gone 
astray, 11 (l6)
In the person of Christ, the Eternal Word of God 
was made flesh. Barth's theology tries to fight the 
damages of humanism which tries to think of God in 
terms of man, · or to know God by reason or mysticism, 
or to regard God as an aggregate of the best in human 
nature, and so nn. He does his best to show that there 
is a living God who has spoken to man and whose Word 
must be observed for salvation. 11His primary concern 
is to interpret faith itself, to let it show itself 
and speak for itself. His authentic intention is to 
exhibit the thought of the New Testament as such."(l?) 
Bultmann continues this line of thinking. Like 
Barth, he believes in the uniqueness of Christ, that 
God spoke through him. Without this belief 
Christianity will be no more than another philosophy of 
existence. Bultmann does not believe that one can now 
ignore talking about God and his activity and 
concentrate solely on talking about human existence. 
Like Barth, Bultmann agrees that the Word of God as 
revealed is the ground of Christian theology. 
" ... according to/ ... 
- 112 -
" ••. according to the New Testament teaching, God has 
in Jesus Christ intervened in the human situation 
and restored to mankind.the existentiell possibility, 
which had been lost through sin, of gaining his 
authentic being, that is to say, of becoming the child 
of God." (lS) The function that Heidegger ascribes to
conscience in returning man to Being, Bultmann assigns 
to the Word of God. "That function is to summon man 
out of his fallen existence and set him before his 
authentic possibility. 11 (l9)
Despite the religious overtones that one sometimes 
catches in Heidegger's quest for Being, he finds it 
impossible to.accept the.theological path as the way 
to Being. The God of religion is still caught up in 
the metaphysical tradition and as such is forgetful of 
or conceals Being. When, according to Heidegger, the 
individual travels the path to God, he is oblivious of 
Being, as he does not take note of the ontological 
difference, that is, that there is Being and that 




In discussing ideological alienation, we limit 
ourselves to Marx's ideological model, the model of 
the communist ideology. Hegel's attempt at total 
rational comprehension by means of the dialectical 
journey of the Absolute Spirit is rejected by Karl 
Marx as being responsible for the alienation of man. 
Such alienation is the consequence of urging man to 
blend his will with that of Spirit, with the result 
that he is content to live by the theoretical, the 
speculative, and the abstract, instead of facing 
the real events that determine man's history. In 
any event, the Hegelian synthesis, like other 
theoretical "solutions", serves to perpetuate the 
interests of those who already have power and ignores 
the needs of a fast growing proletariat. What is 
needed is a transformation of the status quo, not 
only a theoretical one but above all a practical one. 
This is the significance of.Marx's eleventh thesis on 
Feuerbach. The philosophers have only interpreted 
the world. Marx's theory, then, prides itself on the 
fact that it merges with reality. Unlike Hegel's 
abstraction, which is speculative, Marx would have us 
believe that his view is scientifi� and takes account 
of the laws of history and caters for the needs and 
interests of the many - the proletariat.· Hence, his 
belief that/ ... 
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belief that it cannot fail to eliminate the alienation 
of man. 
The question of alienation, then, is one of the 
significant concerns of Marx. Erich Fromm, in fact, 
views-Marx's philosophy to be, like existential 
philosophy,"a protest against man's alienation, his
loss of himself and his transformation into a thing."(2o
)
Fromm continues, "For Marx the history of mankind is a 
history of the increasing development of man, and at 
the same time of increasing alienation. His concept 
of socialism is the emancipation from alienation, the 
return of man to himself, his self-realization. 
Alienation (or "estrangement") means, for Marx, that 
man does U2i experience himself as the acting agent 
in his grasp of the world, but that the world (nature, 
others and he himself) remain alien to him. They 
stand above and against him as objects, even though 
they may be objects of his o-wr1 creation. Alienation is 
essentially experiencing the world and oneself 
passively, receptively, as the subject separated from 
the obj ecttr . (21) Therefore, central to Marx's
conception of alienation is the question, "To what 
extent is man in control of his natural and social 
environment rather than being subject to forces beyond 
his control?/ ... 
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his control?� The question of man's self-realization
.,
his being able to control his O"Wl'l. destiny, is one of 
the significant concerns pf Marx's writings. 
Professor Joachim Israel (22) characterises
Marx's analysis of alienation as revolving around 
three.aspects: 
(a) religious alienation which Marx discusses
in connection with Feuerbach's critique of religion. 
Marx accepts Feuerbach's thesis that alienation can 
result from false self-evaluation
., 
that is, man 
ascribes his best qualities to God and sees himself 
as wretched and sinful. Man, in fact,is alienated 
because he projects his positive essence into God. 
Marx., however ., believes that alienation experienced 
in religion points to a more disturbing form of · 
alienation - that found in the economic and social 
life. Man is made to feel so wretched in his economic 
and social life that he inevitably turns to religion 
for comfort. So the critique of religion must be 
superseded by a critical analysis of economic and 
social factors generally. 
(b) political/ ...
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(b) political alienation. Hegel had demanded
from the individual the submission of his will to 
that of the state, which is a manifestation of 
Absolute Spirit. But this results in a conflict of 
duty in the individual between his private and social 
loyalties. Marx hoped that
., 
under communism, where 
the state would have vanished, these two loyalties 
would coincide since the ·social order would not 
conflict with the individual's needs and desires. 
(c) economic alienation which deals with the
alienation of labour. The key to overcoming 
religious and political alienation lies in the over­
coming of economic alienation since this is the ground 
of all other forms of alienation, 
In Marx's view, then, the alienation of labour 
forms the crux of man's alienation, Alienation is 
actually the opposite of free and productive labour 
relations, since it is labour which constitutes human 
creative s�lf-activity. In unalienated labour� man finds 
fulfilment as species-being. In fact, unalienated 
labour
., 
and therefore unalienated man, is the goal of 
communism. By means of his labour, man "experiences 
himself as an active, conscious being, as an active 
subject as/ ••. 
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subject as opposed to a passive object.tt Hegel had 
also believed that man is alienated if his labour is 
alienated. But this he felt was inevitable since, 
firstly, human needs are always ahead of available 
economic means to satisfy them. Secondly, when one 
expresses an idea in material terms, this unavoidably 
results in the separation of man from the product of 
his labour. Marx, though influenced by Hegel's view of 
alienation, is critical of Hegel's reasoning. In Marx's 
view, the tension between needs and resources, far 
from being inevitable, is the result of historical 
factors. Then, only when objects become commodities, 
that is, socially oppressive factors over man, does 
alienation result. So alienated labour is not an 
unavoidable phenomenon but a phenomenon of history. 
Marx makes it quite clear that he is not opposed to 
the productive forces at man's disposal (modern 
technology for instance) to create the necessities of 
life. These do not constitute the origins of 
alienation.. Rather, the manner of production and 
distribution of a specific social system, that is, 
capitalism, is the reason for alienation. Alienation 
can be overcome by a re-organisation of productive 
forces, by allowing the productive forces to pass from 
the hands of powerful and wealthy individuals to a 
form of/ ... 
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form of societal control. Only with human co-operation 
can society function in the interest of all men. 
This is because man is a species being with social 
powers and obligations. However, in a capitalist 
society there are a number of factors which result in 
alienated labour. For example, the production 
relations of capitalism forces division of labour on 
man (1"esulting in a gap between manual and intellectual 
work} which inter·fers with the freedom of the 
individual since he can neither control it nor escape from 
it. Private control or ownership of the means of 
production also leads to alienation since the products 
of human labour are not owned by those who actively 
produce them. The transformation of human labour into 
a commodity which can be sold in exchange for money is 
also a factor contributing to alienation. Man's labour 
no longer expresses his creative power but becomes a 
commodity. The objects of his labour are also 
commodities, since he does not own them and even has to 
buy them back from the capitalist owners. The 
alienation·of labour, then, can be seen in terms of: 
(a) the relation of the labourer to the objects of
his labour, that is, the objects of man's labour 
become commodities which are sold at a profit by the 
capitalist bosses. The worker exchanges his product 
for money/ ... 
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for·money. Greater productivity on the part of the 
worker does not lead to an increase in his own 
wealth but in the wealth and power of the capitalist. 
Man is, in fact, alienated from the products of his 
labour. 
(b) the relation of worker to his o'Wll labour,
that is, since labour expresses the possibility of 
human self-realization, the separation of the worker 
from the object of his labour results, in fact, in his 
alienation from himself, his authentic being. The 
control of hi,s labour by another leads to his economic, 
psychological, and mental impoverishment. Instead of 
his labour expressing his personality and needs, it 
becomes a coercive activity. Reification is the final 
result, that is, the decline in value of all that is 
human, to be replaced by an overvaluing of things. 
Such a situation forces the individual into a role of 
passivity at the mercy of economic laws of capitalism. 
Since alienation is the consequence of specific 
historical factors and since alienation of labour is 
the ground of all other forms of alienation, Marx felt 
that a re-organisation of labour relations points the 
way to the transcendence of alienation in a new 
historical alternative/ ... 
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historical alternative, that is, communism. In his 
opinion, the contradictions of capitalist society are 
leading inevitably to its downfall. The mandate of 
the dialectic will pass unavoidably from the hands 
of the capitalists to the proletriat, Once it 
achieves political and economic power its task is to 
eliminati all elements of the capitalist order and 
this marks.the period of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. Orice this has been done, the age of 
communism would have been·reached. The first. phase of 
socialism would find men still hankering after certain 
features of the old capitalist system, but in the 
second phase true communism can be achieved. The state 
,vould have vanished since there would now exist no 
need for its coercive powers. Only a few administrative 
functions would be retained to protect public interests. 
In terms of labour relations, the proper condition 
for human nature would have benn achieved, that being a 
situation where man rationally plans economic production 
and co-operatively controls social and economic life. 
Man is an active,creative agent, not the passive victim 
of life and controls society in terms of his rational 
conscious 0 intentions. Th.f f freedom and dignity denied to 
the majority of men (the proletariat) would have been 
achieved. Man/ ... 
achieved. Man would no longer be at the mercy either 
of his environment or his social and economic relations. 
Rather, he would be in control of them. The 
socialization of production frees man from the 
necessities imposed on him by nature and opens up the 
realm of freedom. Marx describes this stage in the 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. 
11 Communism is the positive abolition of private property, 
of human self-alienation, and thus the real 
appropr•iation of human nature through and for man. It 
is, therefore, the return of man to himself as a 
social, i.e., really human, being, a complete and 
conscious return which assimilates all the wealth of 
previous development. Communism as a fully-developed 
naturalism is humanism and as a fully-developed humanism 
is naturalism. It is the definitive resolution of the 
antagonism between man and nature, and between man and 
man. It is the true solution of the conflict between 
existence and essence, between objectification and 
self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between 
individual and species. It is the solution of the riddle 
of history and knows itself to be this solution. 11 (23)
The finality as expressed here, especially in the last 
line, is belied by the fact that any one solution (in 
this instance the ideological solution) cannot be 
regarded as/ ... 
- 1i1_-
- 122 -
regarded as the final answer to the problem of 
alienation. 
The fact that Marx identifies alienation as having 
its ground in the economic and social sphere and 
that, ·once labour relations are transformed in the 
communist utopia, such alienation will�vanish, is a 
simplification that ignores the complexities of 
human alienation. Marx's reductionism overstresses 
the economic and points away from the fact that 
even in his proposed ideological utopia, the factor 
of alienation will not have been banished completely 
and that authentic existence would only have been 
achieved in terms of his theoretical presuppositions. 
In any case, the very 11 s_olutionn he proposes may be 
the ground for new forms of alienation, for example, 
the danger of the loss of individualism within the 
socialized or collectivized society. Heidegger, as we 
show later in our thesis, abhors such a loss of the 
individual's uniqueness in his analysis of the 
concept das Man. 
For Heidegger, the danger of Marxism (despite its 
humanism) is even more disturbing from the point of 
view that it "shares the same destiny as metaphysics. 
For example/ ... 
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For example, when we are told that Marxist humanism 
experiences the alienation (Entfremdung) of modern man, 
this is but an ulterior form of Nietzschean nihilism, 
sc. the forgottenness of Being". In.spite of the 
fact that it attempts to restore to man his dignity, 
it still remains within the old met:aphysical 
tradition in that the foundation of its "'interpretation 
of nature ., history., the world,'" (ZS)is still beings ., 
and not Being. "The essence of materialism ., for 
Heidegger, lies not in the fact that it reduces all 
reality to matter but that it is only another form of 
technicity, sc. obliviousness to the ontological 
difference. The same may be said of all forms of 
nationalism ., for that matter of internationalism -
collectivism of any kind - for this is simply the 
subjectiveness of man taken as a totality. None of these 
forms of modern man's homelessness can be cured simply 
by a humanism of another sort. It is metaphysics 
(therefore hun1anism) itself which must be overcome. 11 ( 26
)
It is this which Heidegger sets out to do. 




The precursors of nineteenth and early twentieth 
century positivism can be traced to the fifteenth 
and sixteenth centuries. As early as this, science 
assumed a new status because of the discoveries of men 
like Galileo s Copernicus, Newton, and Kepler, 
Galileo, for instance, despite the pressures of 
tradition
., 
was one of the first to interpret nature in 
a radically new way, in addition to championing the 
independence and supremacy of science in its own sphere, 
that is, physics. The naturalism he proposed explained 
the world in terms of natural and physical causes. The 
universe was conceived of as a gigantic machine, 
oper·ating according to impersonal and mechanistic rules. 
It was, however, also :rationally comprehensible and on 
the basis of comprehension, men could make predictions 
about it as well as control it. Professor Rauche 
observest ffThe functionalist alternative for coping with 
the crisis of truth may be said to start with Galileo's 
approach of describing the motions of bodies in 
mathematical terms, thus turning the concept of essence 
from a concept of substantial causality into a concept 
of functional causality. Galileo changed the 
Aristotelian question: What is motion? into the question: 
How does motion occur?" (Z?) 
In England/ ... 
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In England, Bacon and Hobbes stressed experience 
as the path to true knowledge. Men gradually become 
aware of the powers of science to transform human life. 
This fact is the origin of that optimism in the 
scientific method to bring nature under human control 
and create new freedoms for man. The empirical 
�tanschauung_ found its counterpart in the 
rationalist reaction of thinkers like Descartes. 
Descartes sought, by means of his resolutive method, 
the one indubitable proposition on which the rest of 
human knowledge could be based. This he discovered 
in the Cogito, an innate a priori principle. Locke, 
however, criticized this conception of innate ideas, 
stressing rather that the mind is a tabula rasa and 
that all knowledge comes from outside or from 
experience. The empirical and rational methods, despite 
their shortcomings, could not fail to influence all 
subsequent human thinking. Rauche writes: "While the 
rationalis:t approach was greatly conducive to the rise 
of cla.ssical metaphysics in the 19th century, the 
empirical approach gave impetus to the rapid development 
of the sciences and of positivist thinking. 11 ( 28
)
Positivism was here to stay as an attractive intellectual 
position for those who decried the abstractions of 
speculative metaphysics and were confident that the 
scientific method was the only authentic way to 
discover the/, •. 
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discover the meaning of reality. S.I.M. du Plessis, 
using Parodi's definition of positivism, says that 
it is"the scorn of metaphysics, the worship of fact, 
experience and proof, an unreserved confidence in 
science, the extoling of the blessings of science. 1 (29)
Nineteenth century or classical positivism displays 
this same supreme confidence in the scientific method 
to enable man to create a better life for himself, 
as opposed to speculative metaphysics, which was 
hopelessly arrested in its speculative abstractions. 
Comte's philosophy can be seen as the embodiment of 
classical positivism. It displays explicitly the 
great confidence in the scientific method together with 
the belief that.the positivist era represents the 
highest d�velopment of man. It holds the view, like 
later positivist development as well, that the 
scientific method can free man not only from the 
severities of nature but also from the alienation of .an 
abstract metaphysics that does little, if nothing, to 
advance human progress. 11 The sciences are regarded as 
instrumental to man's liberation from occultism, 
superstition, authoritarianism based on metaphysical 
grounds. The sciences are thus seen as instrwuental to 
man's liberation from oppression, exploitation and 
injustice. The/ ... 
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The sciences assume s9 a moral funct.:i., > they carry 
man in the direction of an authentic existence, as 
seen by positivism. 11 (30).
The failure of reason to establish an authentic 
life for man makes way for a positivist philosophy. 
In Comte's view, th:.ts development towards pas i ti vism 
is the consequence of a·natural law which he discovers 
by applying the scientific method to history. Comte 
proposes the Law of the Three Stages. The first stage 
is the theological, where things are explained in terms 
of a supernatural origin. This was followed by the 
metaphysical stage, which is charact.erized by the quest 
for the essences of things. The stage of positivism, 
which is in line with scientific development, is the 
highest stage of man's development, surpassing the 
limitations of the theological and metaphysical stages. 
In the positivist stage, the functional knowledge 
provided by the sciences enables man to progress and 
improve himself. The positivist Weltanschauung 
discards the search for essence as fruitless. "At 
the new positive stage, all at"bempts to arrive at 
absolute knowledge, such as inner essences (i.e. , all 
metaphysical enquiries),are abandoned as fruitless and 
meaningless. The question is no longer, why? but, how? 
Laws of/ ... 
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Laws of nature are substituted for absolute cause. The 
aim now is the discovery of constant or invariable 
relations obtaining between facts. It is in this that 
the scientific method consists. We cannot know what 
light and electricity are in themselves, but we can 
know the conditions under which they occur and the 
general laws that govern them. To explain light is not 
to ascertain its essence by analytical judgement, but 
it means to bring it under the laws of motion. The 
question is not why is there light at all, but how or 
under what conditions does light occur,tt (31.)
Positive knowledge is characterized by the fact that 
it is "real, useful, certain, indubitabl_e and 
exact." ( 32)
Despite the rejection of metaphysical elements by 
Comte, he nevertheless sets up Humanity as the goal 
or focus of positive development. Such a religion of 
humanity reveals his inability to escape from the 
metaphysical to the scientific objectivism he really 
desired. Also, the absolutization of this method and 
the blind belief in unlimited progress aided by 
scientific knowledge holds great dangers from the point 
of view of new forms of human alienation. 
The classical/ •.. 
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The classical positivism of the nineteenth 
century is seen by Professor Rauche as having a 
strong influence on the cult of scientism and 
functionalism which manifests itself in the twentieth 
century. "This new creed is founded on the 
absolutizction of the functionalist approach, which 
developed as a result of the rapid advance of
technology as an ally of the sciences." (33) Such a 
development reflects once more the total faith in the 
scientific method to create a brave new world. Neo-
positivism rejects all metaphysical and speculative 
endeavours as meaningless and even useless, 
considered in functional terms. Even the classical 
pesitivism of the nineteenth century with its obvious 
metaphysical overtones is dismissed. Traditional 
philosophy suffers from the paralysing affliction of 
speculating.and theorizing. Philosophy must be cured 
of this tendency and restored,'to its real function, 
which is merely analytical and clarificatory. 
In his Tractatus and his Philoso;e,hical 
Investigations Ludwig Wittgenstein clearly demonstrates 
the tendencies of such an approach, In his earlier 
book, the Tractatus, he sees the task of philosophy as 
recording the logical structure of the world by means of 
scientific language, This immediately rules out any 
metaphysical or/ ... 
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metaphysical or theoretical elements in philosophy. 
The world is a collection of facts and language is 
a reflection or a mirror of these atomic facts. 
"If our language can only record what is the case in 
either atomic or molecular propositions, it follows 
that these propositions are the truth-functions of 
our experience of the world. By making use_.of a 
meta-language, it should. be possible to trace the 
functional relations of these propositions more 
accurately and, by this logical description through 
symbols, obtain a more accurate picture of the logical 
structure of the world. 11( 34) Because he is embedded
in the world, man can only hope to record in language 
that which is. He cannot get outside the world and 
theorize about it. Realization of this frees man 
from the frustrations of trying to find ultimate answers 
for ultimate questions. "'Phenomena such as freedom, 
death, etc., do exist, but about these one cannot speak 
meaningfully since they belong to the realm of the 
ineffable. Traditional problems which have confronted 
philosophy are thus easily dissolved and even regarded 
as non-problems in terms of whether they can be 
rendered in verifiable propositions or not. Knowledge 
is limited to only what can be meaningfully described 
in the world. Even his own theorizing about the 
world and/ ... 
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world and about what constitutes meaningful language, 
Wittgenstein regarded as problematic, as a ladder 
to be thrown away after one has used it to climb up. 
By speculating on what constitutes meaningfulness, 
he is doing more than just recording natural events 
through the medium of language. 
In the Philosophical Investigations, however, 
Wittgenstein rejects the logical positivism of his 
�� because of the various problems involved in 
such a philosophical position. "There was still 
the dichotomy between scientific and. ordinary language. 
And there was still speculation about the world, its 
structure, the limits of its logical space ., etc. In 
addition
., 
there was still left the realm of the 
ineffable." (35) Wittgenstein now believes that a
more fruitful line of enquiry lies in the direction 
of investigating the usage of ordinary lartguage. He 
proposes the idea of language games where different 
types of activities such as science, art, philosophy, 
poetry, etc., have their own specific linquistic 
conventions. So the language of the ordinary man 
differs from that of the poet, whose language in turn 
differs from that of the scientist, and so on. Words 
only assume meaningfulness with respect to their 
correct usage in a language game. The quality of 
human existence/ ... 
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human existence and. the scope of the human 
experience is conveyed entirely through the medium 
of the appropriate language. 11 In the light of this, 
it becomes the task of philosophy to analyse the 
concepts of everyday language, to work out their 
functional meaning under various circumstances of 
life and to establish the truth.,.function of everyday 
propositions as expressing various kinds of human 
experience and activities, 11( 36)
Such a functionalizing of language ensures that 
there is no longer any room for the meaningless 
theorizings and speculations of the past, which only 
resulted in the posing of insoluble problems. 
Professor Ra.uche asks "whether this dissolution of the 
human personality into a set of linguistic or 
propositional relations and the levelling of the 
human individual with the functional world by the 
analytical method has not led to another form of 
unauthent:i.city and alienation in regard to man's life 
and existence0 ? (37) 'J.'he substitution of functional 
relations for essential questions does not really 
eliminate the important but problematic questions of 
hwnan existence. Rather, it leads to the disturbing 
situation where such questions are blithely dismissed 
as non-problems, and the whole question of alienation 
is regarded/ ... 
I 
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is regarded as having been satisfactorily settled in 
tenns of the analytical method. The analytical 
thinkers, along the model of the language games, 
have compartmentalized human activities and 
assigned the solving of human problems to specific 
activities such as politics, psychology, 
sociology, etc. 
Assuming that it were possible for the 
politician and for the sociologist to solve their 
particular problems, the baffling persistence of 
the pr·oblem of human alienation would still occupy 
man. In the light of this, Heidegger's analysis of 
human na:cure and his pointing out the way to 
authenticity can be regarded as quite significant 
areas of enquiry, because he raises once a_gain, in 
a new way, the whole question of what is man. Such 
questions of essence do not disappear when they are 
dismissed by some functionalist thinker or another as 
superficial or nonsensical, 
Heidegger was well aware of the dangers of 
scientism and functionalism. In his Introduction to 
Meta;physics he maintains that discussion of the 
11 nothing11 is only meaningless if one, unfortunately, 
11 supposes that scientific thinking is the only 
authentic rigorous/ ... 
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authentic rigorous thought, and that it alone can 
and must be made into the standard of philosophical 
thinking." (JS) For Heidegger, techn� originally 
named the highest form of poiesis, the essence of 
which is aletheia (unconcealedness). Thus, the 
question of Technology is really linked directly to 
the question of the essence of man. Aletheia,, 
poiesis, and techne have the most significant 
bearing on man-since they bring to light what is 
hidden. As the becoming Unhidden of the Hidden, it 
would be a grave distortion to see {-,echne as the 
knowledge or skill required to make things. In this 
dis-tort.ion lies the root of man's raping of the 
good earth. 11Techne does not in the least·mean a 
kind of practical accomplishment. Much more 
appropriately, the word names a way of knowing. To 
know means to have seen, in the widest sense of 
seeing, i.e. , grasping what is present as it is 
present 11• ( 39)Therefore,the scientific method could 
lead to the dehumanization of man and the despoliation 
of the earth. ffNo matter where and however deeply 
science investigates what-is (being) it will never 
find Being. All it encounters, always, is what-is, 
because its explanatory purpose makes it insist at
the outset on what-is. But Being is not an existing 
quality of/ .•. 
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quality of what-is, nor, unlike what-is, can Being 
be conceived and established objectiv61y." (4o) 
In the calculative thinking or method of science, 
beings become ob,ie_cts and Being becomes object:i.vitv. 
Since he deals with objects objectively, the 
scientist just does not experience Being, since 
Being is not a tlqualitytt or llcharacteristic n that 
is present in the objects with which he is dealing, 
as is mass, motion, energy. The meaning-giving 
horizon from which the scientist works gives things 
the opportunity to show themselves only in their 
material properties as bodies that move in a 
"space-time cqntinuum11 • The Heideggerian model, 
which presents his world-view, pictures the unity of 
the Fourfold (the Geviert - the heaven and the 
earth, the gods and men). "Contemporary man's 
technological 'things' bear his technological 'world' 
in their own distorted way - distorting man's 
earth, his heaven, his divinities, and, in the end, 
himself and his rnortality. n (4l)
In the Gelassenhe;it also, Heidegger points out 
his misgivings about scientific thinking, This 
emerges from his distinction between meditative and 
calculative thinking. The optimism and confidence 
in the/ ... 
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in the powers of science is a reflection not of 
meditative thinking but of calculative thinking, 
because it overlooks the ground in which the 
powers of science and technology inhere. Science 
threatens man in his relationship to Being. The 
specialized, verifiable knowledge of science is a 
threat to thinking of a more fundamental kind, that 
is, to think Being which forms the foundation for 
"authentic" life. In Heidegger's view, the grea·test 
danger is that "the approaching tide of technological 
revolution ·in the atomic age could sc captivate, 
bewitch
., 
dazzle and beguile man that calculative 
thinking may some day come to be accepted and 
practiced �--t?J-ie only way of thinking. . .. Then man 
would have denied and thro,-m away his own special 
nature - that he is a meditative being. Therefore, 
the issue is the saving of man's essential 
nature.n (4z)
Science and technology, undoubtedly, possess 
positive advantages, but one must guard against being 
made subject to their total control. With the aid of 
science and technology, man creates tools-which 
enable him to "humanize!! nature to a greater and 
greater degree. But "if man shapes the world, the 
world also/ ... 
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world also shapes man. It is for this reason that 
the world, though the necessary condition of 
existence, can also constitute a threat to existence. 
Man can become subjugated to his own creations.n 
And, "As man extends his instrumental world, he 
(43) 
tends· to be dra·wn into it himself, to become a part 
of it and even· a slave of it, and so to cease to 
'exist' in the full sense, that is to say, as fully 
personal and fully humart. 11 (44)
Heidegger himself says
., 
"It would be foolish to 
attack technology blindly ..• We depend on technical 
devices ... But suddenly and unaware we find ourselves 
so firmly shackled to these technical devices that we 
fall into bondage to them. 11 (45) The proper attitude 
would be to use technical investions but "also keep 
ourselves so free of them, that we may let go of 
them any time." (46) The idea of using things with the 
realization that they are not absolute but depend on 
something higher is for Heidegger, Gelassenheit or 
"releasement toward things." (47) He goes on to say,
"I call the comportment which enables us to keep to 
the meaning hidden in technology, openness to the 
mystery. Releasement to,v:ard things and openness to the 
mystery belong/ ... 
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mystery belong together. They grant us the 
possibility of dwelling in the world in a 
totally different way. They promise us a new 
ground and foundation upon which we can stand and 
endure in the world of technology without being 
. •1· db "t " (4B)1mper1 e y 1 . 
It is hoped that, with the above, I have 
succeeded in establishing the necessary background 
to Heidegger's thought. In order to appreciate the 
depth of Heidegger's criticism of the traditional 
way of thinking in the religious, ideological, and 
scientific spheres of thinking, which were all 
dominated by beings rather than by Being, it is now 
necessary to proceed to an analysis of what 
Heidegger actually said about alienation and 
authenticity. 
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·- 141 (a) --
I should like to get rid of tradition 
And to be completely original; 
This enterprize is,. however, enormous. 
And leads to many sufferings. 
I would consider it the highest honour 
To be able to create myself
., if I 
Were not, surprisingly, 
Myself the product of tradition. 
Goethe. 
- 142 -
C H A P T E R FOUR 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THOUGHT OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER 
In our chapter dealing with Hegel, we examined 
critically the culmination of metaphysics in the 
concept of Absolute Spirit. We drew attention to 
Heidegger's criticism of Hegel :, s metaphysics, which 
he saw as a Holzweg. In our Introduction to the 
Thought of Martin Heidegger, it is our intention to 
set the background from which we would now find it 
more meaningful to launch into a detailed, critical 
analysis of his thought, Naturally,.in keeping with 
the inten:tion of
.
this chapter we avoided going into 
the virtues and vices• of his analysis of Plato, .·Kant, 
Nietzsche, etc,. Serious doubt has been cast by 
Professor Rauche and others (for example, Professor 
Stanley Rosen) on Heidegger's interpretation of 
• 
Heraclitus' concept of logos and arche which he and 
the early Greek thinkers arrived at by starting from 
nature (das Seiende) ,. something that Heidegger 
rejects. 
Heidegger's single/ •• � 
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Heidegger's single-minded ( l) dedication ·and 
preoccupation is the question of Being(�). He 
opens his magnum opus wi�h a quotation from Plato: 
tt'For manifestly you have long been aware of what 
you mean when you use the expression 'being'• We, 
however, who used to think we understood it, have 
now become perplexed.'"(2) And so, it i� not
without significance that Aristotle says: "The 
question raised of old ••• the question that is raised 
today, that will be raised in all eternity and will 
ever baffle us, the question: ti to on - what is the 
Being of . a being - is just the question: tis he
ousia - what is the essence of a particular 
being. u (3) 
The-importance·of the Being-question and the 
justification of such a single-minded pursuit are 
revealed when we draw attention to the link Heidegger 
makes between the question of Being on the one 
hand, and the 11 spiritual decline of the earth" (4)
and the subsequent "annihilation11 (5) of his beloved 
. Germany ., of Europe, and of the world, on the other 
hand. 
Heidegger is in complete agreement with Ernst 
Junger that the whole is at stake. -- "'The . entire 
planet is/ ••• 
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planet is at stake • ., 11 ( 6) Therefore ., in raising
the question of Being, man is summoned to "a 
de�ision in history'', (7) ·thereby drawing the question 
of. authenticity to the h�art of the matter. It is 
such deep-seated concern for.the spiritual destiny 
of the world that motivates and animates Heidegger's 
thought. 
Heidegger is troubled by the fact that nations 
are losing their receptivity to the spiritual energy 
which enables them to take note of such spiritual 
decline and to act accordingly. It is to such a 
situation that Heidegger dedicates his-life, makes 
. . 
(8)a free sacrifice to uphold the truth of Being. · 
"To see this danger and point it out, there must be 
mortals who reach sooner into the abyss.'' (9) 
The cause of such abysmal darkness Heidegger 
attributes to the massive war, and its attendant 
consequences; to the total mobilization and global 
unification of every type of power {for example
., 
social and technical) ., and the resultant assault on the 
individual from such an· automatized·world; and to a 
general feeling of emptiness. Heidegger swnmariz·es 
.the·essential episodes of the darkening of the world 
as "the/ ..• 
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as 11 the flight of the gods, the destruction of the 
earth, the standardization of·man, the pre-
eminence of the mediocre. •tr "Da rkenirtg of the 
world means emasculation of the spirit, the 
disintegration, the wasting away, repression, and 
misinterpretation of the spirit." 
From such a position of bleakness, the crucial 
importance of Being (�) becomes understandable. 
It is also quite understandable that should·one be 
thrust against the question HWbat is Being?", one is 
naturally and justifiably perplexed. "Just what is 
Being?" - standing.in such isola-tion,·it does seem 
a foolish question, and its pursuit' a useless pursuit, 
It is after much soul searching and ski.lful 
questioning that Heidegger asks: "And yet a 
question,� question : is ·,being' a mere word and
its meaning ,a vapor or is it the spiritual destiny of 
the Western world?" (12) With this question, 
Heidegger wishes to penetrate to the original ground 
of metaphysics. Therefore, he regards the question 
Leibniz asks in his Principes de la nature et de la 
grace as of singular importance: "Pourquoi il ya ·
plutet guelgue chose gue rien?" - "Why is there ahv 
being at all and not rather Nothing?" (l3)
When we/ •.• 
(10) 
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When we ask these questions then the meaningful­
ness of the first one ("What is Being?") is revealed. 
These questions open up the ground for all·authentic 
questioning. For Heidegger, philosophy becomes the 
asking of these questions. It is this thinking 
which distinguishes man from all other beings. We
now see clearly the great emphasis Heidegger places 
on the distinction between Being and beings, and 
why Heidegger thinks that we are living in a 
world-night (Wel tnacht). In our pursuit of beings 
we forgot Being.- the pursuit culminating in the 
will to power. This will to power, Heidegger says, 
in his great.study on Nietzsche, represents man's 
wish for "absolute rule over the earth
., 
n (l4 )for .,
his relation to beings is now a "mastering advance 
into world conquest and world rule." (l5) 
And yet., it is through Being that things come into 
the open. It is through Being that the·horizon of 
knowledge
., technique, action, civilization gain their 
foundation. Heidegger says that before the discovery 
of Being everything· was embedded in a da ick
., 
u.nknollr11 
mystery. (16) The discovery of. Being must ., therefore, 
be regarded·as the momentous event, "(for perpetual 
renewal· in the past there has been, and in the present 
and future/ ... 
• 
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and future there must be, unless the proud 
edifice of knowledge becomes a•_:·Tower of Babel and 
man forgets the very foundations of his 
civilisation)". (i7) Such a thinking .of Being
remains more sober than scientific technology ., (IS
)
and reminds mankind of its role and place in this 
world. 
Germany., the "most metaphysical of nations"
., (i9) 
must take up the challenge to comprehend our tradition 
more creatively by moving into the primordial realm 
of Being and so saving the world ft'om total 
annihilation. By asking: "How does it stand with 
Being?" Heidegger hopes.to repeat (wieder...:holen) 
the beginning of our historical-spiritual.existence, 
thereby transforming. it creatively into a new 
beginning. Heidegger believes in the possib:il:ity of 
this, for ., the momentous event is the fundamental 
event. " •.. the beginning must be begun again, more 
radically., with all the strangeness, darkness, 
insecurity that attend a true beginning." (2o)
This, I wish to suggest ., explains much of the 
dithyrambic mysteriousness which pervades his latest 
writings� Clarity., correctness of vision,. and 
explicit details/ •.• 
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explicit details are not what· characterize true 
beginnings ., which are rather concealed and 
mysterious.·· This insight of Heidegger's into the 
nature.of.true beginning and the kind of writing 
which must be used to describe such experiences .,
would seem to allay criticisms levelled against 
him, of being a windy mystic; in his last writings. 
A mystical experience can claim to be a state of 
"knowledge" which is yet incommunicable in language 
that is explicit. H.D.P •. Lee, in his introduction 
to Plato's Republic, notes.the same of.Plato whose 
philosophical principles are expressed in the form 
of a myth. The poetical and allegorical are 
perhaps the most effective means of communicating 
mystical experiences. 
Heidegger sees the essential ambivalence of the 
Greek2E_ as the beginning of both metaphysics and 
Western thought. Taken as a noun on means 11 that 
which is" (being, Seiendes). Taken as a verbal 
adjective 2!!. names the process by which a·being (the 
noun)."�" (Being, Sein). In grounding metaphysics, 
this essential ambivalence must take precedence· 
over all other grounds, for, it names the difference 
between Sein and Seiendes, between Being and · 
being. It names the ontological difference. Thus, 
Heidegger can/ ... 
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Heidegger can say: "' .•. The forgottenness of Being. 
is the forgottenness of the difference between 
Being and beings.'" (21)
Originally, Being and beings were in a state of 
fundaJJ].ental ontological inseparability. The 
separation of Being from beings saw the birth of the 
traditional conception of metaphysics. In his 
Uber den Humanismus Heidegger describes Being as 
both nearest and farthest from him - nearest, because 
Being creates the possibility for him to come into 
his own and into a relationship with other beings; 
farthest, because Being is not a being. Here we 
draw attention to one problem·which Heidegger wished 
to overcome, namely, the ambiguity and ambivalence 
of the term£!!.· Hence, the necessityto think Being 
neither as a Being in gen)-al, nor as� supreme 
Being, but as the process of unconcealment •. Right 
from the beginning this has been Heidegger's. 
intention - to reveal Being, to draw it out of its 
concealment. 
It is from such an approach that we find an 
explanation for the revealing and �oncealing tension 
that exists in the relationship between Being and 
beings that/ ••• 
-- 150 -
characterizes their original unity. Being is the 
illumination that illuminates beings as beings ., and 
yet ., stays concealed in 'bhem. So ., Being has·it as 
that which gives beingsthe possibility to be and 
yet stays concealed in them. This concealed 
characteristic of Being in being ., Heidegger under­
stands as a "not" that draws together Being and 
beings, while.simultaneously differentiating Being 
from beings. The f not" is very much a part of, 
an intrinsic component of, Being, which illuminates 
beings. This is what Heidegger means by the 
Being-process or the process of truth, i.e . ., 
aletheia, which he translates as "non-concealment" 
(unverborgen). (23) "Being as the process of non­
concealment is that which permits beings to become 
non-concealed (positivity), although the process is 
so permeated.by "not' that Being itself remains 
concealed (negativity). To think Being in its truth, 
then, is to think it in terms of both positivity and 
negativity at once 11 ·{my emphasis). (24) 
But, this has not always been so, for, in the 
classical interpretation, Being was thought apart from 
beings. This differentiation led to quasi-problems· 
in metaphysics. The problem of philosophy.now 
concerned itself/ ... 
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concerned itself with the idea of Being as 
substantial reality. Traditional·analyses ., says 
Heidegger, had gone astray when they discovered such 
characteristics of Being as substantiality, 
materiality,·extendedness, side-by-sideness, and so 
forth. (25) These now become the horizon from which
the original ontological problems were understood. 
Heidegger's thought is a reaction to philosophy 
being rooted in things. Being(�) is reified; (26) 
man is abandoned to beings (Seiendes). The attempt 
is made to know Being through beings. Being then 
comes.to be that which:is most·general ., or that which 
is the highest being - the Supreme being. 
Heidegger regards the traditional characteristics 
of Being as inadequate for experiencing the uniquely 
human way of being, Man is not like a thing, His 
existence is quite different from that of a thing, 
for, his Being is manifest to him in advance as a 
relationship "in which· and from which he directs himself 
toward .  : •. ., relates himself to ... ., whatever specific 
beings he may meet." (27) Traditional metaphysics
differentiates not only Being and beings, but also 
draws distinctions among beings themselves;�the sense 
of defining/ ... 
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of defining and classifying them according to their 
essence. Man is put into the class of living beings, 
the animal who speaks. 'Fhus, the existence of 
man is understood from the totality of all existing 
things. In other words, _"I amTf is understood in 
exactly the same way as "is" is when applied to 
a thing. It is this undifferentiation that has 
landed man squarely in alienation. (28)
The further result of this is that the traditional 
problems of epistemology or the metaphysics of 
knowledge are rooted in such distorted understandings 
of the Being of man. This distortion becomes 
the barrier which prevents man from the original 
involvement of Being.in human nature. "If the 
question of Being is to have its own history made 
transparent
., then this hardened tradition must be 
lbosenedup, and the concealments which it has brought 
about must be dissolved . .  We understand this task as 
one in which by taking the question of.Being as our clue, 
we are to destroy the traditional content of ancient 
ontology until we arrive at those primordial 
experiences in which we achieved our first ways of 
determinirtg the nature of Being - the ways which have 
guided us ever since." (JO) 
If he/ ... 
(29) 
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If he is to overcome the tradition ., Heidegger 
believes that he must know the tradition ., by 
recalling.the meaning of that Being encrusted in the 
tradition. He must show the distortion and 
perversion (the pseudos), and so, attempt the 
difficult 11battle for the a-pseudes, the undistorted, 
unperverted. ". ( 31) The need to go back to 
historical roots stem from an awareness of the 
"extra-ordinary" and "revolutionaryn nature of the 
task, rather than from a desire to revive and restore 
classical antiquity and uncreative imitation. His 
true desire is to rethink what is still present (32)
today, by recovering creatively the Greek 
astonishment at Being ., and.the poetic experiences of 
the pre-Socratics as it concealed and revealed itself 
in physis.;. 
Greek words, 
aletheia ., and logos, among other 
(33)
Heidegger argues further that if there is an 
alienation and a separation then what was separated 
"must have-been rooted in an original bond between 
them." (34) It is his task to inquire into.this 
essential bond and to show where along the way the 
al�enation resulted. Heidegger attributes this 
alienation to the translation of Greek words and 
experiences into/.�. 
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experiences into Latin, thereby separating ourselves 
from the original essence of Greek philosophy. 
In fact, so seriously does Heidegger consider 
this appropriation that he sees concealed in the 
translation a "translation of .Greek experience into a 
different way of thinking. Roman thought takes over 
the Greek words without a corresponding, equally 
authentic experience of what they say, without the 
Greek word. The rootlessness of Western thought begins 
with this translation. 11( 3
6) 
The seriousness of this
conclusion .is further underlined when we take heed of 
Heidegger's consideration that the pre-Socratics 
dwelt in the experience of language. They were so 
closely united with Being that
., 
in their poetic sayings, 
they opened up a treasure of truly meaningful relations. 
It was the early Greeks who first raised the 
authentic question of Being, who first called Being 
physis. What, then, is physis? For .the early Greeks, 
physis was an "originating", a "bringing out", an 
"ex-posing", a "blossoming!!, an "emerging", or a 
pro-ducing". "· .. in short, the realm of things that 
emerge and linger on, •.. Physis is being 
itself; by/ ... 
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itself, by virtue of which essents become and remain 
observable." (37) Physis has the sense of an
occurrence that pro-duces or brings products to 
light. However, in the translation into Latin, physis 
loses its original Greek sense and now comes to mean 
"nature",· or ., rather, that which modern physics 
investigates. Instead of seeing the original Greek 
meaning of physis as the power to emerge and endure, 
we no� see it as a mere primitive science. 
The image of light is particularly important for 
an elucidation of our second important Greek word -
aletheia, which is usually translated as truth. 
Heidegger retains this sense of the word, for, in the 
same breath that he speaks of the emerging into the 
light, he speaks of the truth of Being. Heidegger, in 
his essay On the Essence of Truth, ( 38) asks a.fter the 
manner in which Being was first exper±enced by the 
early Greeks. The conclusion Heidegger comes to is that 
Being was experienced as a clearing. "The early Greeks 
experienced every presenting as a clearing or 
lighting. 'Presenting' (verbal) was. 'clearing' 
(verbal)." (
39)
"Clearing" becomes/ ... 
.... 156 -
"Clearing" becomes meaningful when thought 
verbally, and this has vast implications. For, 
the ' clearing" is· not something given. It is not 
a state, but a coming-forth that comes out of 
darkness. Heidegger sees the "'realms of darkness'" 
and the "'realm of light'", (4o)as equal partners, 
maintaining a·tension that characterizes our being 
in this world, which is a concealing and a clearing. 
If we take Hegel as an example of the traditional 
approach, then such a tension between light and 
dark does not really exist, for, in the final 
analysis., for Hegel, light must overcome darkness 
by virtue of reason. 
Logos is the remaining word in our trilogy that 
comprises the occurrence of Being as a "presenting 
process." The Greek origins of the word show logos 
as a gathering that lays forth and lays open. (4l) 
Logos, in the sense of presencing, presents itself 
as a.setting-apart or as a strife, which, in the same 
sense as Aletheia, must always be maintained and 
never reconciled. Logos maintains itself creatively 
by this strife and mobility. For, immediately the 
strife ceases, the world turns away, Being retreats 
from being. 
In recovering/ .... 
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In recovering the original meaning of logos, 
Heidegger quotes Heraclitus' eighth fragment: 
'"Opposites move back and forth ., the one to the 
other; from out of themselves they gather themselves.'" 
He points out that the conflict of opposites is 
·gathering, rooted in togetherness. This is logos.
Logos and polemos are one. For contrast,
Heidegger uses our everyday conception of Beauty.
Beauty is what reposes and relaxes, is what is
pleasing and pleasant. But, such a view of art,
is a matter for pastry cooks. The Greeks_ saw
Beauty as restraint, as a polemos ., that, in a single
work, gathers and maintains tension, just as life and
death, day and night, winter and summer, peace and
war, waking and sleeping, Dionysus and Hades are
gathered and maintained in a single unification. (i.3 }
The distortion·of these original meanings was a 
gradual process, reaching its peak when physis was 
transformed to�., logos to statement, and when 
correctness was given more prominence than 
unconcealment. As a result of this, Being 
solidified-itself to one word ousia - in the sense 
of permanent presence •. Heidegger states that with 
Plato truth passed over from its essential .meaning of 
unconcealment, to/ ... 
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unconcealment, to that o-f conformity and correctness 
or vision, with the result that Being was reduced 
to being {eidos). We have already drawn attention to 
the point that Being cannot be apart from beings, 
but also that it manifests itself sufficiently as 
itself to allow us to distinguish it in its 
difference from beings. With regard to this decline ., 
Heidegger asks: "Where does Plato's determination 
of presence as idea have its binding character from? 
With regard to what is Aristotle's interpretation 
of presencing as energeia binding?" ( 44)
Heidegger locates the answer wholly in the move­
ment away from the Parmenidean experience of 
aletheia ., which Heidegger now, in his latter 
writings, translates .exclusively as unconcealment. 
"Unconcealment is, so to speak, the element in which 
Being and thinking and their belonging together 
exist.". (45) Aletheia was named at the beginning of 
philosophy, but since Plato and·Aristotle, philosophy, 
as metaphysics, thinks beings as such ., onto­
theologically. That which is most Beingful in a being 
is exalted to the Idea, the true Being., and original 
Being is degraded to what Plato calls me on (what 
really should not be and really � not). (46) 
Idea now/.,.
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� now takes on the form of paradeigma 
(model). This means that what appears is now.no 
longer physis (the merging power), but the 
emergence of the copy. The vital consequence of 
this, Heidegger says, is that the original disclosure 
of Being now comes to mean, as we have stressed, 
correctness of vision. Truth is now seen as a proper 
viewing of the Ideas. Truth is now the conformity 
between the subject (as the being that sees) and the 
o�ject {as copies of the Ideas that are seen).
Being loses its significance as the source of light 
and becomes that which is seen. Logos, as the 
gathering which was the·event of unconcealment, now 
deteriorates into statement, as the place of truth, 
in the· sense that it can be either true or false. 
Truth which was originally unconcealment, or the 
happening that was Being, now becomes a property of 
logos. 
·Method and logical reasoning grow in importance
as that by which beings can be manipulated to serve 
the aims and calculations of man. The creation of such 
an anthropomorphic world of Ideas, became the 
warehouse not only of truth, but also of values. Such
a humanization and reification of Being was mistaken 
for Being/ ... 
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for Being itself. Notwithstanding this, man 
himself is reified - he is a being among other 
beings; no more is he a unique existence whose 
Being is made manifest in a disclosing way to him 
as that which he alone possesses. 
Aristotle also poses the question of meta� 
physics, ("what are beings as beings?"), in such a 
way that he, to_o, separates essence and existence, 
with the consequence that metaphysics, in its 
transcendence of beings to their Being (meta - ta -
physika), attempts to pin down the permanently 
present (ousia). Heidegger maintains that this idea 
of substantiality (47)has not loosened its grip on 
Western philosophic thought. Heidegger sees his 
task as the attempt to recover the original meaning 
of Being as unconcealment. 
Descartes, (4B)continuing that tradition begun by 
Plato, further solidified the idea of man as the 
ground ·of truth. Heidegger contends that with·the 
liberation of man from the clutches of the church, man 
replaces the God of Christianity and institutes 
himself as absolute subject, which he does by interpreting 
truth as certitude� hwnan certitude. Faith in· the 
Christian God/ •.. 
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Christian God was replaced by the cogito-sum, 
which became the ground for all other truths. Man 
decides what and how the world is to be an object 
of cognition. "'Descartes does not allowbeings 
in the world to manifest their mode of Being on 
their own, but, by means of an idea of being ••• 
which is of undisclosed origin and undemonstrated 
justification, he prescribes to the world what it 
can 'really' be, ,n (49) 
The implication of this is that, not only has 
the essence of truth undergone a radical change, 
but also that relationship between man and 
world. The cogito-sum becomes the subject, and the 
cogitatio the object. of the ·subje·ct. When we consider 
that what is now true is that\whichis certifiable, 
then beings gain the possibility of their truth by 
entering into the subject-object world. They are 
either subjects or objects, with the result that 
beings cannot now show themselves as they are, but 
become objects for 0 human manipulation and use or 
misuse. With such an outlook, Heidegger believes that 
philosophy.is humanized and subjectivized ., culminating 
in Hegel"s Absolute Idealism (which we analysed in 
Chapter Two/ ..• 
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Chapter Two of our study). 
In pursuing this.line of thought from Plato to 
Hegel., Heidegger points to the rise of beings to 
the oblivion of Being. This obliviousness to the 
process of Being is what Heidegger sees as 
nihilism or metaphysics. (5o) Nietzsche has not 
escaped the metaphysical circle, for, in trying to 
go beyond metaphysics, he uses categories that are 
still very metaphysical:. "Being as a universal 
present-ative subject (Will); truth-as-conformity­
become-certitude." (5i) And, in his Nietzsche 
study., Heidegger says: "Metaphysics is 
anthropomorphy - the shaping and viewing ·-of the 
world in accordance with man's image. 11 ( 52) As .a 
consequence, we see the rise of modern technology. 
Nature is no more seen as that which sustains man
., 
"Which he ., in his dignity., cultivates in a harmony that 
discloses the meaning and truth of both man and 
nature. Instead ., nature is seen as a provider of 
energy which is an exploitable commodity. The supreme 
result of our exclusive preoccupation with beings, 
{having forgotten Being) ., is the destruction of·· our 
beautiful earth. Under the domination of the will to 
power, nature is objectified. Such an objectification 
of nature/ ••. 
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of nature replaces the genuine apprehension of 
Being. That thinking which sought a union with 
nature now attempts to dominate it. 
Heidegger sees in the nihilism of Nietzsche, not 
the overcoming of metaphysics, but its consummation. 
"Nietzsche can not think the essence of nihilism 
(metaphysics) until he re-collects that Being is 
the process of emergent truth." (53) It is in
this sense that Heidegger speaks of the overcoming 
of metaphysics and nihilism by thinking of Being 
as the process of aletheia out of which the 
ontological difference arises, thereby recovering 
the original sense of Being and giving to beings 
their true perspective. Thus, Heidegger's entire 
effort to overcome metaphysics has its source.in the 
very structure of-aletheia, By overcoming the 
tradition, we overco�e our alienation and gain, in the 
sense of O'Ml (eigen), ourselves • .  Whether this is 
possible or not we shall discuss later. What is of 
importance now, is the significant links Heidegger 
makes with the overcoming of metaphysics., the essence 
of Being, and the question "Who is man?" Surely· 
this is the crux of the problem. In his important 
essay, The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics, 
Heidegger says:/ ••• 
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Heidegger says: "When we think of the truth of 
Being, metaphysics is overcome."_ But 11 Such 
thinking ••• does not oppo&e and think against meta­
physics either. n (54) Therefore, in grounding 
metaphysics properly., Heidegger is attempting to 
open the ground for·our being human. (55)-What is 
at stake is nothing less than our humanity. We 
cannot stress sufficiently that we consider this 
the heart of any matter to which Heidegger devotes 
his intensely alive thought. 
That this is not a matter for anthropology is 
obvious ., for man cannot be studied in the way zoology 
studies animals. Man is linked with the.question 
of Being. He is understood from and within the 1_' 
question of Being. Man ., who is required by Being as
the arena for its disclosure ., gains his essence from 
the disclosure. And Being., of course ., is not a thing. 
Neither is-it a category ., nor the essence of the 
totality of things. Being is the process of 
illumination., or clearing ., or unconcealment taken 
t<:>gether with the inseparable function of concealment ., 
which "create" the world-in the two-fold sense of 
revealing and concealing. 
In advising/ ••. 
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In advising a young studertt (Mr. Buchner) who 
asked Heidegger whence thinking about Being receives 
its directive, Heidegger opined that to think Being 
means "to respond to.the appeal of its presence, 
in a response that stems from and releases itself 
toward the appeal .. But this means to exist as a human 
being in an authentic relationship as �mortal to 
other mortals, to earth and sky, to the divinities 
present or absent, to things and.plants and animals; 
it means, to let each of these be - to let it 
presence in openness, in the full appropriateness. 
of its nature - and to hold oneself open to its being, 
recognizing it and responding to it appropriately 
in one's o\Vll being, the way in which one oneself goes 
on, lives; and then ., perhaps, in this ongoing life 
one may hear the call of the language that speaks of 
the being of all these beings and respond to it in a 
mortal language that speaks of what it hears." (56)
Heidegger draws his creativeness from his 
willingness "to stop, listen, hear, remember, and 
respond to the call that comes from B-�ing. n (57) 
For, the way to Being, as we have already demonstrated, 
is blocked by tradition. Thus, ·. a method has to be 
found which will clear away these barriers and 
preconceptions, and/ ••• 
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preconceptions, and let a thing be just the being 
that it is. Only by thinking Being can we open our 
vision to the thingly in :the thing. To 
illustrate more concretely the meaning.of this we 
may use Heidegger's thinking on the world of 
art. (5B) In its own particular way, the work of 
art opens up the Being of beings, by pointing to 
its truth. "In the art work, the truth of what is 
has set itself to work. Art is truth setting 
itself to work. 11 ( 59) And, "The work as work in 
its presencing, is a setting forth, a making."(6o) 
Heidegger says that in setting forth, "The work lets 
the earth be an earth. '' ( 61) 
Heidegger says that it is the method of 
phenomenology that can recover that which is 
authentic, since it penetrates to the root of the 
matter. The original Greek "phenomenon", 
Heidegger defines as "that which shows itself in 
itself, the manifest",. (62) and "logos", as "to make 
manifest what one is 'talking about' in one's 
discourse ••• it lets us see something from the very 
thing which the discourse.is.about." ·{63) When put 
together, phenomenology means "to let that which 
shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in 
which it/ •.. 
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which it shows itself from itself," and Heidegger 
adds, "But here we are expressing nothing else 
than the maxim formulated. above: 'To the things 
themselves ! ' ''
Thus, phenomenology does not decide the object 
of its study or its subject-matter. What 
phenomenology does is to reveal the how with 
which� is to be studied gets handled or brought 
"to show themselves." If Heidegger is to achieve 
his intention of laying bare Being itself� then he 
must do it in the right way, by first bringing 
forward beings themselves, but with the kind of access 
that essentially and genuinely belongs to them. This, 
Heidegger considers, is the only authentic point of 
departure on the way to Being. So ., "Ontology and 
phenomenology are not two distinct philosophical 
disciplines among others. These terms characterize 
philosophy itself with regard to its object and its 
way of treating that. object." (65) Without such a 
fundamental phenomenological attitude, the whole 
question of Being would not have been possible. For 
the actual point of departure referred to above, 
Heidegger takes the hermeneutic of man� The analysis 
and interpretation of human existence becomes the 
"guiding-I ine / ... 
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"guiding-line for all philosophical inquiry at 
the point where it arises and to which it 
returns. 11 (66) 
Among Heidegger's priorities are the use of the 
word "existence", and the adequacy of the word 
"man" in his thought. The word "existence", 
Heidegger reserves exclusively for man. Trees are, 
dogs are, even God is, but only man exists, for, 
he is in such a way that his Being is always 
already disclosed to him in an understanding way. 
Man is not something "Being-on-hand" (Vorhandenheit). 
Man's essence lies in his existence. 
The word man, however, is inadequate because it 
gathers individuals and puts them into a class f·rom 
which their essence is drawn. The point is that man 
is not like a sheep or a house. He is open to 
different ways of being himself. We have an 
alienated view of the individual when he is seen as 
a representative of the class!!!!!!_• What makes it 
possible for an individual to exist as a person is 
not his class, but his understanding of himself in 
his Being. This is the authentic view of the 
individual. 




'v:' I ; 
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It is for this reason that Heidegger dispenses 
with the word trman". The word he chooses to get 
at the authenticity of the individual is Dasein. 
The word not only points to the unsubstantial 
character of the individual, but also to a being 
whose "there" (or better still, whose "here 11 -
�) is always already disclosed. What distinguishes 
Dasein is that he exists in an understanding 
relation to his Being, in such a way that he 
exists as an l'Understanding of Being." (67) 
Therefore, in't- being the "There" of Being, Dasein 
gives beings the possibility to be, and so 
liberates them from their.state of concealment. 
Thus, Dasein cannot be understood as a category 
of either substance or subject. With the new way of 
understanding, Dasein must be seen as an ability or 
a possibility to be,revealing its essential 
involvement with Being. Dasein designates "that 
which should first of all be experienced, and 
subsequently thought of, as a place - namely, the 
location of the truth of Being." (6S) The "shelter" 
(unter-kunft) for Being reveals the intimate 
connection between Being and Dasein. (69) It is this 
unique privilege that distinguishes Dasein from all things: 
- 170 -
in his being a Dasein lies his comprehension of 
Being. With this, Heidegger establishes the 
fundamental ontological character of Dasein. 
The problem now.becomes fascinating. For, when 
we consider that, in grounding metaphysics, .we must 
ask the Being-question, we find inextricably linked, 
that,in the very posing of the question, the 
finitude of the questioner is betrayed. The status 
guestionis for Kant is: "what are the conditions 
which render possible the ontological synthesis 
(transcendence-} of finite reason?l1 but for 
Heidegger: "what is the relation between the radical 
finitude of man and the comprehension of Being as 
such?II (7o) Therefore in asking, "What is Dasein?" 
we must answer that Dasein is transcendence, i.e., 
"a being in which the comprehending of Being comes-to-
pass in a radically finite way. 11 { 7l) • Furthermore, 
transcendence·is the underlying presupposition for 
the understanding of all our concern for beings. 
Through this radical finitude, Dasein opens up the 
horizon of Time. 
And so
., 
the choice of this incredibly beautif9-l 
word "Dasein" for the individual puts into clear 
focus the/ •.• 
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focus the entire problem of alienation and 
authenticity. 11 • • • Dasein is its possibility ., and 
it 'has" this possibility, but not just as a 
property (eigenschaftlich), as something present-at­
hand would. And because Dasein is in each case 
essentially its own possibility., it£!!!,, in its 
very Being., 'choose' itself and win itself; it can 
also lose itself and never win itself". Thus ., 
the phenomenology of Sein und Zeit is very much 
involved with what Heidegger calls re-solve. 
In his essay., The Way Back into the Ground of 
Metaphysics, Heidegger says: "As long as man 
remains the animal rationale he is also the 
animal metaphysicum. 11 (73) In another essay, 
What is Metaphysics? he says: "While man exists there 
will be philosophising of some sort . .  Philosophy, as 
we call it, is the setting in motion of metaphysics; 
and in metaphysics philosophy comes to itself and 
sets about its explicit tasks. Philosophy is only set 
in motion by leaping.with all its being ., as only it 
can, into the ground-possibilities of being as a 
whole." (74) 
What Heidegger/ .•. 
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What Heidegger intended to do in his attempt 
to "overcome metaphysics" was to establish the real 
ground of metaphysics. Only then would it be possible 
for man to act authentically. By the "real ground 
of metaphysics", Heidegger really means to answer the 
question, "Why is there any being at all and not 
rather nothing'?" or "What is Being'?" The resultant 
thought, Heidegger hoped, would be the abolition of 
metap1:1ysics as traditionally conceived. The question 
of whether Heidegger succeeds in his enterprise, and 
whether such an abolition is possible is examined 
later in this thesis. 
In the meantime we note that Heidegger hoped that, 
with his return of metaphysics to its original 
ground; he might help bring about a transformation 
in human nature. His overcoming of metaphysics is 
really a recalling of Being itself. The thinking that 
Heidegger attempted in Sein und Zeit was a 
preparation for the overcoming of metaphysics by 
going beyond traditional understandings to the root of 
philosophy by "rejuvenating the hidden resources which 
it retains from a much older and more profound 
traditionn•, (75) which means that the implication of
Heidegger's overcoming the tradition, is not its
abolition, but/ ... 
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abolition ., but appropriating it more originally 
by providing it with its ontological '' 'birth 
certificate'"• (76) But ., in all his criticisms
of the tradition (because of its concealing ways) .,
he engages in dialogues with past philosophers 
on the question of Being. Therefore., in continuing 
his own thinking on Being, he remains within the 
compass of Western Philosophy., giving due respect to 
him for his creative "retrieve" (�iederholung) of 
the original experience of astonishment that the 
pre - Socratics felt, when they first asked: 
"What is what is?n It is to Heidegger's great credit 
that Western tradition continues in sµch richness 
in his thought. 
"What philosophy essentially can and must be is 
this: a thinking that breaks the paths and opens the 
perspectives of. the knowledge that sets the norms and 
hierarchies ., of the knowledge in which and by which 
a people fulfills itself historically and culturally .,
the knowledge that kindles and necessitates.all 
inquiries and thereby threatens all values." (77) 
Notes/ ... 
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N O T E S 
1. Heidegger believes that most great men are
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We are too late for the gods and too 
early for Being. Being's poem 
just begun, is man. 
Heidegger. 
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C H A P T E R F I V E 
HEIDEGGER'S CONCEPT OF UNHOUSED MAN : ALIENATED MAN 
(a) Man's Flight into "das Man" and the Problem
of Authentic Existence as Revealed by
such a Flight.
One of the fundamental issues that we raised in 
our last chapter was Heidegger's concern for who man 
is. The choice of the word "Dasein11 , .we pointed out, 
was.most apt when we consider that, in order to be 
what it is:, Dasein must transcend to its "there", in 
other words, the world. Hence,Heidegger's Dasein 
analytic moves to a consideration of Dasein's being 
in the world. Such a disclosure of world is very 
much a part of and a movement towards our understanding 
of Being as such. The disclosure of world and the 
"there}" of Dasein, through which Being manifests 
itself, are inseparable. Dasein and world exist in 
such a way that Dasein makes it possible for the other 
things in the world to be what they are. 
Dasein, then, must be seen as the ontic­
existentiell (l) condition creating the possibility 
for discovering beings that are Vorhandenheit and 
thus can "make themselves known as they are in 
themselves (in seinem An-sich)"(Z) and as they are 
for the/ ... 
r 
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for the use of Dasein {Zuhandenheit). Being in the 
wprld involves Dasein in being concerned with the 
world. Such a lighting up process (Lichtung) is 
not so much, a property of Dasein ., but rather its 
innermost constitution. "Dasein is its 
disclosedness."(3) This means that, without
illumination ., Dasein just would not be what it is. 
The disclosure of world and the "there" · (illumination) 
of Dasein
7
in their togetherness, constitute what 
lleidegger calls Dasein's "Being-in-the-world." (4) 
With such a disclosure of world, Being, too, is 
disclosed, which means that with the illumination 
of Dasein as Being-in.:..the-world, •goes the 
coip.prehension of Being. By looking at man and world 
in this manner, for Heidegger, the primordial 
structure of Dasein's Being cannot be grasped by the 
traditional ontological categories. Man does not 
exist in such a way, that he has, by way of an 
appendage, a relationship with the world. Neither 
the environmentalist's, nor the biologist's, nor the 
geographer's, nor the psychologist's, explanation of 
man's relation to the world is adequate for Heidegger. 
Their explanations confine themselves to aspects 
which are ontic and remain trapped in the ontic, 
whereas Heidegger's thought emerges from the ontological 
structure of/ ... 
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structure of Dasein and world. 
Man always exists as �being already_in the world. 
Heidegger sees world as "that 'wherein -' a factical 
Dasein as such can be said to 'live'. 11 (S) World 
as Spielraum,(6)is the place within which Dasein's
potentialities confront him·. When Dasein comes into 
existence, he comes to a knowledge of his 
existence. Simultaneously with this understanding 
is given the understanding that he is in a world, not 
in the spatial sense, but in the ontologico­
existential sense.· · "Daseih is never 'proximally' an 
entity which is, so to speak, free from Being-in, 
but which sometimes has the inclination to take up 
a 'relationship' towards the world. Taking up 
relationships towards the world is possible only 
because Dasein ., as Being-in-the-world ., is as it is.''(?) 
The significance of Heidegger's pointing to our 
Being-in-the-world is that, in his conception of the 
world, he draws attention to the fact that the world's 
disclosure to man is part of Dasein's understanding 
of Being, so that, on. the basis of this ., we are to 
resolve the problem of alienation and authenticity. 
World, in opening meaning, opens truth, gives (8)
truth the/ ... 
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truth the possibility to be. In other words, world 
and truth are inextricably bound together with 
Dasein. Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is 
equivalent to Dasein as Being-in-the-truth. (9)
The complexity of Heidegger's task lies in the 
point.of departure for his analytic, that is ., Man, 
but he has to be careful that he does not fall into 
the same trap that the philosophers of the past had 
fallen into.· In fore-imaging the world, Heidegger 
must lay bare the essential structure of the world in 
such a way that both man and world appear as they 
are, that is, in their authentic character. 
Professor Heinric.h Ott recalls that Heidegger 
"once told me that there are three equiprimordial 
dimensions of thought : the relationship of man to 
himself, the relationship of man.to his fellow men, 
and the relationship of man to the world. He added, 
'my own thought moves along the third road. "'(lo)
It is of profound importance to Dasein that the 
world is a threat to his existence, and that any 
knowledge of abstract theories concerning the world 
is really irrelevant. "Pure beholding, even if it 
were to penetrate to the innermost core of the Being 
of something/, .. 
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of something present-at-hand, couln .rtewe� discover 
anything 1.ike that which is threatening." (ll)
The measure of success that Heidegger achieves,lies 
in the fact that he sees the radical finitude of 
Dasein as of singular significance. From such an 
outlook, it is now possible for him to authenticate 
Dasein, world, and their relationship. Heidegger 
sees nworld" as a horizon within which Dasein comes 
into contact with instruments in a set of relation­
ships which give them the possibility of gaining 
meaningfulness, thereby attaining its own Being, 
its authenticity. The ontological aspect of beings 
lies in their discoverability in an "owned" or a 
"disowned!! way, i.e., Dasein creates the possibility 
for their being understood� the things they 
fundamentally�-
The existential-ontological structures in which 
the Being of the "thereu manifests itself, Heidegger 
characterizes as Befindlichkeit (state of mind), 
Verstehen (Understanding), and� (Discourse). It 
is significant that Heidegger identifies these 
moments of disclosure as moments of truth. 
Befindlichkeit Heidegger/ ... 
- 185 -
Befindlichkeit Heidegger sees as finding oneself 
already in a world. Befindlichkeit points to that 
initial self-awareness of Dasein that it has been 
thrown(geworfen) into a world .. Befindlichkeit is 
responsible for Dasein confronting the facticity 
of its "thereness". Its own Being is still to be 
achieved and here lies its significance for 011r 
problem, for, in the achieving, the problem of 
alienation and authenticity is resolved. The thrown­
ness (Geworfenheit) (
lZ) of Dasein, therefore, refers
both to the fact that Dasein already is, and to the 
fact that Being has to be achieved. 
It is remarkable that in this connection 
Heidegger isolates.the individual to the exclusion of 
filial ., parental, or, for that matter, phyletic 
affection. Yet, Heidegger could speak ., in another 
context, of 11 the spiritual decline of the earth", 
and of the fact that nations are losing their 
receptivity to that spirituality that could bring 
(13)
them back into the truth of Being. (I4) That Dasein
is "left to itself", and "has to be what it finds 
itself?I, and 11 has to fend for itself lt is a distortion 
of the reality which is close to us - the individual 
does draw some comfort and care from him who is nearest. 
Man has found the need to organise himself into a society. 
Therefore/ ... ,. ,. .I .. r 
! -·--- ' • 
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Therefore ., it is surprising that, while Heidegger 
recognises that Dasein's Being-in-the-world i$ 
also a Being-with�others ,· (lS) and while he
recognises that his own Dasein shares the world .with 
other Daseins,(l6) he fails to give consideration to
the socializing and civilizing effect that contact 
with others does and must have to a lesser or 
greater degree. We wish to emphasize that Heidegger 
strays from his intention of providing a 
phenomenological hermeneutic of Dasein, which would 
have taken into account these effects, and we presume 
a larger variety of factors, when leading from 
Dasein's Being-in-the-world to Dasein's being 
absorbed in the world of its everyday concerns, 
thereby not being itself. (l?)'
Heidegger's characterization of Befindlichkeit 
as that part of Dasein's disclosure of thrownness, as 
the disclosure of Being-in-the-world, and as 
submission to that world. which is disclosed, (lS) is•·
valid up to a point as many assumptions are. The fact 
that he says that Befindlichkeit is primordial, (l9)
gives his assumption no more priority than the basic 
assumption of Hegel, Marcuse, or Sartre. As we have 
already argued, far from Dasein being "disclosed to 
itself prior to all cognition and volition, and 
beyond their range of disclosure", (ZO) disclosure 
or the/ ••• 
•
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of the world occurs simultaneously with Dasein's 
coming into the world, and that such a coming is 
not merely a thro'Wilness, .but that, with the coming, 
is given the comfort from which Dasein can and 
should draw strength without losing dignity and 
without continually falling captive to that power 
which more often than not robs him of his 
individuality. 
For Heidegger, the illumination of the ttthere11 
is performed by Verstehen (Understanding), which 
functions as a project (Entwurf). That which is 
projected is �asein itself as the ultimate point of 
reference. In Verstehen, Dasein projects the world 
which Heidegger understands as the totality of 
relationships. The total meaningful result of this is 
that Being itself is disclosed. (Zl) Thus Verstehen
projects the transcendence·of Dasein to Being by which 
Heidegger understands authenticity, as against the 
traditional preoccupation of gaining access to Being 
through beings. In other words, Heidegger considers 
Kant's "Int:uiti;.ontt ... •. and "thinkingtt as derivatives 
of understanding, and even Husserl's "'intuition of 
essences' ( 'Wesensschau' ) · is grounded in existential 
understanding • .  We can decide about this kind of 
seeing only if we have obtained explicit conceptions 
of Being/ ... 
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of Being and of the structure of Being, such as 
only phenomena in the phenomenological sense can 
become." (22)
At·this stage of his thought the ontological 
significance of Verstehen lies in the fact that 
Dasein projects the horizon within which anything can 
be, or discloses for-the-sake-of-which it exists. (z3) 
As long as Dasein is, Dasein will always understand 
itself in terms of its possibilities. The projection 
of its ownmost potentiality-for-Being characterizes 
the 11 thereness" of Dasein in its transcendence to 
Being. 
Befindlichkeit and Verstehen are the two 
constitutive ways of being the "there" of Dasein, 
which are illuminated by� (Discourse). That Rede 
is not a property of an entity·· that is present-at­
hand (vorhanden) but an existential way of being, 
belonging essentially to Dasein, points to the 
realization that, in illuminating the possibilities 
of Dasein, it serves to illuminate the fact that as 
Being-in-the-world, it is cleared (gelichtet)(24 l in
itself, in such a way that it itself is the clearing. 
Heidegger can now say with some justification that 
"Dasein is its disclosedness", from which it follows 
that· in/ ... 
• 
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that in his·pursuit of Being, Heidegger will have 
to analyse Dasein in its everyday manner. 
11 Understanding can devote itself primarily to 
-
the disclosedness of the world; that is ., Dasein can, 
proximally and for the most part, understand itself 
in terms of its world." ( 25) Now, the fundamental
possibility of Dasein is its existence. (26) To 
illustrate this more concretely, we note that stones 
and tables do not have to be because they are not 
disclosed to themselves and so are not faced with 
any compi.tlsion to be. But Dasein has to exist,� 
has to be, and the ultimate possibility of his 
existence is Death. Verstehen, in the sense that it 
uiscloses possibilities to Dasein, confronts Dasein 
with a demand that it has to carry out, its way of 
life being authentic or unauthentic, in its 
choosing. Thus Verstehen discloses Dasein in its 
existential-ontological nature. (27)
If we accept Heidegger's basic assumption - that 
the question of Being is the question - then his 
analysis of the existential Verstehen reveals the 
most satisfying part of the Dasein analytic. However ., 
in terms of his intention�he.set it out in his long 
introduction to Sein und Zeit ., we find that Heidegger ., 




too, inspite of his phenomenologica1 hermeneutic, 
remains within.the same circle of humanization and 
subjectivization that he criticized the tradition 
for. For Heidegger, Verstehen projects the modes 
of Being of all beings in the world which makes the 
world at all possible. Dasein,in its ontological 
aspect,projects the horizon within which beings can 
be what they are. 'Thus,the ground of all phenomena 
is Dasein, and by implication, Being-in-the-world. 
In his phenomenological approach to phenomena, 
Heidegger fails tb let that which shows itself in 
itself be seen from itself, for the simple reason 
that phenomena are in a non-understanding way while 
Dasein exists essentially in an understanding way. 
In reducing metaphysics to the description of the 
experience of Being from the basic position of 
Being-in-the..,;world, Heidegger cannot avoid separating 
man from world. In disclosing Being, Heidegger, 
though he claims not to start from das Seiende, as 
traditional philosophy had done, does not really move 
away from such a stal".ting point, for, in shifting 
the accent, the dichotomy between Understanding and­
Non-understanding, Existence and Non-existence, remains. 
A way out of this dilemma would have been for 
Heidegger to have remained silent. That he has not 
done so attests to the incredible power that philosophy 
exercises. Heidegger's model of Being is but-one 
solution offered/ ... 
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solution offered by a philosopher in a time of need. 
The fact that any solutions offered in regard to the 
problem of alienation and authenticity remain 
problematic and controversial draws our attention 
to the fact that right here in all this controversy 
lurks the clue which we shall have to work out fully, 
by the end of this dissertation. 
J;n the meantime, it is important to note that 
Heidegger sees in yerstehert the appropriating of 
what is understood. In this appropriating he sees 
its capacity for getting interpreted, and so here, 
he latches onto the theme of language,of which he never 
lets go, for "this phenomenon has its roots in the 
existential constitution of Dasein's disclosedness. 
The existential-ontological foundation of language is 
discourse or talk."(ZS) 
As the articulation of intelligibility,�· 
illuminates the intelligibility of Being-in-the-world 
by way of language which, Heidegger says, maintains 
itself in the way of concernful Being-with-one­
another. In this we locate the possibility for 
authenticity, for in poetical discourse, 11 the 
communication of the existential possibilities of 
one's state-of-mind can become an aim in itself, and 
this amounts/� .. 
- 192 -
this amounts to a disclosing of existence.n (z9)
Therefore,as a mode of disclosure, Rede is as 
original as Befindlichkeit and Verstehen. 
Heidegger now comes to some of his most important 
pronouncements: that Dasein has language, that· 
Dasein is what it is because of language, and that 
Dasein �, in and through language. As Heidegger 
proceeds, we find that language becomes the most 
important single factor in his pursuit of Being. It 
is within this phenomenon that he will eventually have 
to resolve the problem of alienation and authenticity, 
and therein lu.,ks .the danger and the possibility for 
successfully overcoming alienation, or failing to 
overcome the alienation by constructing another model 
of Being. 
Heidegger suggest:sthat the items constitutive for 
discourse are its content and its communication: What 
the discourse is about and the communication which 
are not mere properties but existential characteristics 
rooted in the state of Dasein's Being, which give him 
the possibility of disclosing the world and Dasein 
itself. Rede lets something be seen in its Total 
Meaningfulness in existentiell situations. This 
Total Meaningfulness as originally projected by 
Verstehen is that par.tof a three-fold unity encompassed 








Befindlichkeit disclosing Dasein's thro"nness and 
its relationship to other beings in the world ., and 
Rede functioning as the articulation of the process 
of disclosure in the sense of its transcendence and 
of its finitude. Therefore, through his phenomenological 
hermeneutic of language, Heidegger hopes to expose 
that Total Meaningfulness revealed and concealed in 
language. 
However ., when Grammar looked for its foundation in 
the logic of�., it based itself not on the 
ontological disclosure of Being, but on the present­
at-hand (Vorhanden) and thus became the science of 
language. Heidegger sees,as one of his essential 
motivations ., the re-establishment of language on more 
primordial ontological foundations, through liberating 
Grammar by calling into account the existential 
structure of Rede, thereby tearing the truth out from 
its concealment; not by simply improving on what has 
been merely handed down, but by showing the 
ontological roots of :riasein. Heidegger says: nWhether 
it prospers or decays depends on the fate of this 
ontology"(3o)of Dasein. 
This ontology and the fact that language results 
from Dase in' s/ ... 
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from Dasein's original thrownness in this world seems 
quite fair. When we analysed the existential 
Befindlichkeit, we pointed out that Dasein's 
disclosure of itself prior to any cognition and 
volition is an assumption. We find a similar 
assumption made when Heidegger speaks of Dasein's 
articulation of its meaning-giving projects as 
coming from an Understanding which is pre-linguistic. 
lt is·our contention that here is involved an 
impossible situation, as Understanding and Language 
are inextricably interwoven. 
As we have stressed, Heidegger believes that it 
is through language that man is exposed to what is 
Open (Offene), as Being reveals itself to Dasein, 
and as non-Being hides and conceals the truth. The 
implication of this is that language does not 
function as a tool that man possesses in order to be 
able to communicate
., but it is language that gives 
Dasein the possibility to stand within the truth of 
Being. (3l� Therefore, it is only Dasein as such that
can discover meaning in the world. In this way 
Heidegger establishes the inter-dependence of man and 
world. (32) 
It now/ ••• 
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It now behoves us to ask in what way the 
original understanding of �1..£ reveals 
meaning. Heidegger provides the answer that it is 
through the fundamental mode in which Dasein 
ek-sists (i.e., stands out of itself), not in the 
sense· of a subject-object relai:-,ionship, but as 
co-existing with things in the world in the sense 
of practical concern with things and with other 
(33) Daseins. "A bare subject without a world, 
never 'is' proximally, nor is it ever given.n(34) 
Descartes:< Cogj.to ergo sum comes in for some heavy 
criticism from Heidegger for this very reason. 
Dasei� existence is but an existence-in-the-world. 
Existence is not merely like being a match in a 
box, but is an existent that is concerned with his 
existence. However, it is just this practical concern 
with things and with his fellowmen that lands the 
individual into alienation. In his pursuit after 
things and in his involvement with his fellowman
.,. 
Dasein forgets his uniqueness. Dasein forgets that which 
enables him to be the Dasein that he is, that is, his 
understanding of Being. 
It is to Heidegger's great credit that he proceeds 
with his analysis from just such an ordinary, everyday 
existence of/ ... 
4 
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existence of Dasein. Only after having exposed 
Dasein's forgetfulness can he proceed with this 
fundamental pursuit of Being. Heidegger's task is 
now to explore the familiar and then, by distancing 
himself·from such familiarity, drive himself to his 
uniqueness. · Herein lie.s his. second immediate 
task - to locate that which will give him access to 
his uniqueness. It now emerges that Heidegger, by 
gaining the Being of Dasein, hopes to reach Being 
itself. That Heidegger does provide such an access 
we shall examine in the second half of this chapter. 
In the meantime,it. suffices, to point out that 
in his concept of das Man, Heidegger draws attention 
to the fact that Dasein understands itself 
proximally, and for the most part, in terms of its 
ontic preoccupations, having forgotten its ontological 
foundations. (35) In making use of such a situation, 
Heidegger points to Dasein's authentic self : to 
move away from the.identity of subject and object to 
the genuine unity that Sorge (Concern) gives. (36) 
Dasein must see itself not as an "'I think"' but as 
an "�I think: something"', (37) which points to its
Being-in-the-world. Dasein is always in close 
contact with the things in the world. Therefore, 
Dasein is both existentiell and existential, ontic 
and ontological. When one in this union is 
emphasized to/� .. 
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emphasized to the exclusion of the other, the 
result is the alienation of man. Authenticity can 
be achieved by delivering Dasein from the world 
of everydayness (Alltaglichkeit), not by severing 
itself completely from its essential relationship 
with other beings, but by recognising itself for 
what it is : Dasein is finite. In his finiteness 
each man is unique. He cannot change place with 
someone else. No one can carry his Being for him. 
But in his everydayness, he is not himself. 
In his authentic relationship with beings, 
truth is disclosed as such, Being is illuminated, 
and non-concealment comes-to-pass through the 
"Thereness" of Da-sein. In his involvement with his 
everyday trivialities, Dasein.forgets his finite 
transcendence to Being, the re-collection of which 
(Wieder-erinnerung) is now the task of Heidegger's 
fundamental ontology. It is from this everydayness 
that Heidegger recovers the ontological foundation of 
finite transcendence which he identifies as Time. 
This re-collection will now form the existential basis 
for all Dasein's existentiell activities, after 
Heidegger had extracted the e:x:istential dimension from 
the existentiell/ ... 
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the existentiell by isolating from its ontic 
comportment with beings, that mood which will take 
us to the authentic, unique individual. The 
tremendous emphasis Heidegger places on this is 
revealed by his stating that, "by exhibiting the 
positive phenomenon of the closest everyday 
Being-in-the-world, we have made it possible to 
get an_ insight into the reason why an ontological 
Interpretation of this state of Being has been missing. 
This very state of Being� in its everyday kind of 
Being, is what proximally misses itself and covers 
itself"!:!£.· ... there is ontologically a gap 
separating the selfsameness of the authentically 
existing Self from the identity of that "I n which 
maintains itself throughout its manifold 
Experiences."(3B)
So, what Heidegger means by authenticity is to 
choose or to resolve (Entschliessen) to be o�e's 
ownmost potential self, alienation resulting from the 
failure to choose its ownmost potential self by 
losing its uniqueness in the everyday world.. This 
constitutes its fallen (verfallen) state. Therefore, 
Heidegger can ask: "When Dasein is absorbed in the 
world of its concern- that is, at the same time, in 
its Being-with towards Others - it is not itself. 
Who is/ ... 
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� is it, then, who has taken over Being as everyday 
Being-with-one-another?"(39) Heidegger provides 
the answer that, "The 'who' is not this one, not that 
one, not oneself (man selbst), not some people 
{einige), and not the sum of them all. The 'who' 
is the neuter, the 'they' (das Man)," (4o) This 
"they", which answers the question of the 11 who" of 
everyday Dasein, is the nobodv to whom every Dasein 
surrenders himself in Being-among-one-another 
(untereinander). Das Man maintains its averageness 
by controlling and levelling down every way in which 
the world and Dasein itself gets interpreted. 
Heidegger is careful to point out that this 
structure of diso'.Wlling oneself is given ·with the 
structure of Verstehen (Understanding) which projects 
possibilities of Being. Verstehen does not exist in 
a vacuum. It is based on projects that determine 
how Dasein should relate to the world. In projecting 
itself into its self-disclosed possibilities, Dasein 
becomes what it is and gains its authenticity or 
loses itself in the world of das Man. Therefore 
Being-in-the-world is in itself seductive (versucherisch). 
In being/ ... 
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In being tempted away from its ownmost self, 
whose authenticity lies in its uniqueness, Dasein 
becomes estranged (Entfremdung) from itself. 
Heidegger sees the fall as a whirl (Wirbel), as 
a "dragging away from'' the authentic self and a 
"dragging toward and into" the public self. 
Heidegger's point is that Dasein does not exist in 
a static way, but is constantly on the alert to 
prevent itself from falling into forgetfulness, is 
always appropriating its own disclosure, is 
invariably struggling to disclose authenticity ., is 
forever on the way to Being. Truth is not some 
objective state that one attains and remains in 
eternally. Truth is a constant struggle for that 
revelation that must be wrested from concealment. The 
Dasein who·has discovered his authentic self is 
called upon by Heidegger to sacrifice himself to a 
creative repetition of the past possibilities 
(Wiederholung). 
Verfallen, which is one of the ways in which man 
can-he-in-the-world, in the sense of disowning 
himself, is characterized by Gerede· (Gossip), 
Neugier (Curiosity), and Zweideutigkeit (Ambiguity). 
By Gerede Heidegger refers to that average 
explanation of existence and world where any genuine 
understanding is/ ... 
• 
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understanding is not attempted, but presupposed, in 
that Dasein understands everything without probing 
deeply into anything. In the falsification of 
speech, everyone moves on the same level of 
generality. The Public Good achieved belongs to 
everybody and nobody since all move within the 
world of commonly accepted interpretations, thereby 
disrooting Ver<stehen in such superficiality, By 
Neugier Heidegger refers to Dasein's greed for 
novelty which distracts it and in which it scatters 
itself, Dasein is interested in things merely to 
see what they look like, and not to understand what 
is seen, Its thinking is a calculative one 
discovering nothing, but exploiting whatever meaning 
someone else has given. (4l) It is a perversity that 
replaces the genuine experience. Dasein tries to 
get his "kicks" not by participating in the real 
experience himself, but by talking about it. By 
Zweideutigkeit Heidegger refers to the difficulty 
experienced in distinguishing between what is revealed 
in Verstehen and what is concealed. The ontological 
difference as such is glossed over. 
Dasein's alienation lies in his desire to see, 
learn, and do, through which he loses himself by being 
absorbed in the publicity of das Man, Another 
significance of/, .. 
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significance of such an analysis points to the 
fact that distances (4z)in time and space shrink.
But, such an abolition of ,distance brings us no 
nearness. Heidegger can still persist in asking, 
"What in the thing is thingly? What is the thing 
in itself."(43) After the scientists have done with 
the thing by breaking it up into its constituent 
molecules ., they still fail to "reach the thing in 
itself until our thinking has first reached the 
thing as a thing." (44) 
Heidegger has declared often enough, and quite 
plainly, that in all his analyses of authenticity 
and unauthenticity, he is making no moral judgement 
about whether human nature is corrupt (�runk with 
sin° ) or incorrupt, but is engaging in a 
phenomenological description of Dasein. To 
illustrate how seriously Heidegger believes that his 
approach is amoral, I quote but. two references. "In 
relation to these phenomena, (the disclosures of 
das Man), it may not be superfluous to remark that 
our .own Interpretation is purely ontological in its 
aims ., and is far removed from any moralizing critique· 
of everyday Dasein, and from the aspirations of a 
'philosophy of culture'." (45) and "It follows that 
our existential-ontological Interpretation makes no 
ontical assertion about the 'corruption of human 
Nature'." (46) Such was Heidegger's intention.
However, the/ .•. 
( 
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However, the fact that he uses concepts like 
eigentlich, uneigentlich, verfallen, das Man, 
Schuld, Unschuld, Freiheit.Ewn-Tode, etc., conclusively 
point to the fact that Heidegger is myopic, to say 
the least. While Heidegger recognizes that most 
men live in a state of unauthenticity, in showing 
that man has a choice to exercise, he (Heidegger) 
is firmly on the side of authentic resolve which is 
gained by facing ·up to that extreme possibility of 
Dasein, that is, Death. In being fully conscious of 
its extremest possibility, Dasein will realize that 
the world of das Man is beset with traps that lead 
him away from his authentic resolution. (E�tschlossenheit). 
Having found authentic resolution f.!:2!!! the 
analysis of das Man, Heidegger proceeds to point out 
that in Being-to-death, (47) Das�in's relationshipS with
other Daseins are dissolved, and that Dasein is 
isolated upon itself. In such a situation it appears 
that all dialogue is not only meaningless, but is at 
an end. SurelY, in this isolation it is the living 
Dasein that is destroyed, in that, in the "authentic 
movement" to death, Dasein is really moving towards 
nothing. The fact of death is very real and there is 
no point/ ... 
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no point in denying its seriousness. However ., we 
cannot admit of the total dominant power that such 
an attitude must exercise. Gaining such an 
authentic existence has no real meaning and provides 
no real guide, In the face of such nothingness and 
in spite of the solemn truths that Heidegger 
illuminates, we suggest that Dase:i.n can give his 
existence some meaning by entering into a 
more genuine dialogue with his fellowman on the basis 
of our real, historical situations. While we deny 
neither the value of Heidegger's investigations nor 
the seriousness of the results of his inquiry, we 
think it necessary to point out that my fellow Dasein 
and I share a common fate which surely points to the 
fact that there are other respects in which we are 
similar. Professor Versenyi makes a similar point, 
but surprisingly says that Heidegger does not offer a 
way to authentic existence, (4B) This seems to be an 
understatement for Heidegger is continually pointing 
out the way to authenticity. As we have already 
stated, authenticity lies in Heidegger's conceiving 
Dasein as the aletheia of Being. In Sein und Zeit, 
authenticity lies in resolutely recognizing that 
Dasein is a Being�to-death. In his later writings .,
Heidegger is at pains to point out that Dasein's 
rehousing lies in seeing his.existence as 
ek-sistence, (49) In his Was heisst Denken'?
Heidegger shows/ ..• 
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Heidegger shows in lecture after lecture the kind 
of searching and questioning that is required so 
that one can be on the way to Being. How 
Professor Versenyi coul·d miss the intention of the 
Poet (Holderlin) in his Sayings, and that of the 
Thinker (Heidegger) in his Thought, is a little 
astonishing. 
However, the fact remains that as long as Dasein 
is alive, Dasein comes into contact and conflict with 
other Daseins. In fact, my fellow Dase:ia,, as 
Professor Versenyi rightly points out, is an important 
dimension of the projection of my own possibilities, 
That man more often than not falls into the world of 
das Man whose trivialities now preoccupy him is a 
fact. The past provides ample evidence of such fallen 
states, and considering that man is finite and 
fallible, no doubt, he will fall again in the future. 
Would not the dignity of man then arise from his 
examining this chaotic world we are thrown irtto, and 
out of this chaos, organizing a home for himself? 
This organizing activity could be the source and essence 
of his existence in the world. Out of such an attitude 
there would arise the implication that any utopian or 
final solution/ ••. 
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final solution to the problem of man is unauthentic 
in the extreme, taking into account man's 
historical ·situation and man's limitations. 
For Heidegger, the finitude of Dasein and the 
Nichts which discloses Dasein's finitude are not 
negative concepts. These open the horizon within 
which,not only Dasein himself, but also beings, 
derive their meaning. The original meaning comes from 
the mystery of that impossibility that closes all 
other possibilities. The freedom that results from 
heroically facing up to this truth reveals Dasein 
as it is and beings as_they are, and so retaining the 
ontological distinction between Being and beings. 
In this splendid freedom Dasein exists authentically 
and uniquely, thereby recovering our true and 
original hwnanity. Through such a situation, 
Heidegger hopes to preserve the mystery of beings. No 
more will they be defiled. Instead, Dasein will hold 
beings as Holy �<las Heilige). Heidegger is quite firm in 
pointing out that such a hold does in no way carry the 
implication that things will now be seen in a new, 
clean, fresh way. (SO) This does not present a departure 
from the traditional "calculative" way of thinking. 
The new/ ..• 
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The new thought, the truly authentic, the originative 
element(das Anfangl�che) can only issue from the 
freedom of Dasein. Calculative thinking always turns, 
in the end, to dominate man, for example, through 
technology. (Sl)
It is now time to ask whether such a view of man 
does not demand man's transformation. Is there to be 
a transformation of Dasein? Heidegger answers in the 
a.ffirmative, for he requires that Dasein now become,
in his authentic state, the lonely shepherd of Being, (S
2
)
Dasein's l'anguage being the house of Being. (More of this 
later.) However, the background of Heidegger's 
analysis of unauthentic existence is his perception, 
namely, the destruction of our humanity, our essential 
human relationships. Our unnecessary, wasteful 
consumption of the resources that the earth provides, 
the levelling that the mass media effect, the 
irresponsible meddling of the scientists with the very 
structure of cell and atom, cannot be lightly 
disregarded. 
The attention Heidegger focuses on these and the 
eloquence with which he brings the problems to the fore 
attests to his great skill. The immensity of the 
problems presented/ ..• 
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problems presented niakes it necessary for us to 
examine carefully the dissolution of them. The 
uniqueness which characterizes each Dasein could give 
man the possibility to explore his individuality. In 
the very real danger of the individual being swamped 
by the levelling down process of das Man, there is 
naturally the need to reassert the individuality of the 
human being. But, in going to the other extreme, are 
we providing a genuine solution? Too much 
individuality is jus;t;< as, i.f not more, harmful than 
an.Uimpersonal collectivism." It is to Heidegger's 
credit that he draws attention to the impersonal, the 
mechanical, the dehumanizing, and to seek to rescue 
the individual from such a plight. But Heidegger 
remains stuck in the concept of individuality. It is 
an equally tiring positim.1 when tradition, custom, and 
habit are all thrown out as unauthentic. 
While we have no intention of drawing attention 
away from the merit of Heidegger's attack on tradition, 
we wish to focus on the highly dangerous situation that 
can arise when conventional morality must give way to 
an authentic individual consciousness. To avoid 
confusion, we wish to point out that we certainly do not 
champion conventional morality because of the 
debilitating. effect that would result, and readily admit 
the necessity/ ... 
- 209 -
the necessity that such a morality be continually 
challenged. Therefore, seeing that Heidegger is not 
only the child of tradition, but also the child of 
his own times, and seeing that Heidegger himself 
affirms the being of others, is it not rather 
ineffectual to place so great an emphasis on 
individuality to the exclusion of the societal character 
of all human beings'? Man is certainly not man without 
the others, which implies, and quite rightly, that the 
world is a common world. However, in appropriating 
this common world, man has often led man astray, and the 
idea of a society of hµman individuals has been betrayed. 
Heidegger has done a singular service in pointing out 
where humanity has gone wrong, and we can fully 
appreciate the background and the noble motives of the 
attempt to authenticate Dasein. But, as we have already 
asked: is a pure, individual existence desirable, if at 
all attainable? Is it existence in the first place? 
We often wonder whether the replacing of convention and 
tradition by the mystery of das Heilige presents the. 
answer to our dilemma? Quite simply, can any man provide 
us with a final solution? ±a- Ms at�em�t t-e comprehend 
m&fl., :she world a-a-a- i4;.s myote12ies a-R4. se provide� � 
-a- Haa-1 selution? In his attempt to comprehend man, the 
world and its mysteries and so provide us with the means 
whereby we can live authentically, Heidegger.provides a 
valuable and a unique dimension of human thought and 
striving, and so still remains within the tradition. 
(b) Anxiety and/ ...
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(b) Anxiety and Care as Ke� Concepts of Man's
Authentic Existence.
In the previous section of this chapter we 
critically examined Heidegger's concept of "Unhoused 
Man" and the problem of authentic existence as 
revealed by man's flight into das Man. We saw that 
Heidegger's phenomenological analysis of Dasein 
revealed the existential-ontological structure of 
man as Befindlichkeit, Verstehen, and Rede, We have 
taken the liberty of moving away from normal practice 
by schematizing these in order to show more readily 
their implications, their interconnections, and their 
essential unity, which we felt would somehow be lost 
if written in successive paragraphs. In the following 
section our purpose is to examine in what manner 
"anxiety" and "care" constitute key concepts of 
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Heidegger states the formal existential­
ontological structure of Sor,ge (Care) as follows: 
"the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being­
already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities 
. 15,,, 
encountered within-the-world)." \ JJ The "ahead-
of-itself 11 points to the ontological character of the 
existence of Dasein, which is always reaching out 
beyond itself, relating to his innermost ability to be. 
The s�lf of which Sorge is ahead, is always the 
scattered self of das Man. "Being-in-the-world" we· 
showed as Dasein's thrownness, "Already" reveals 
Dasein's impotence to undo the fact that Dasein already 
is. "Being-alongside-beings11 always points to Dasein, 
scattering himself in his preoccupation with beings. 
By Sorge, Heidegger therefore means that we are 
forever looking beyond th� present while conditioned 
by our past. The present is the place for our future 
preoccupations an.d past conditionings. As a result of 
his Dasein analytic, Heidegger arrives at Sorge which 
means Time, and Time is the horizon from which the 
question and the authenticity of Being can be settled. 
Unauthentic time, Heidegger sees as a sequence of 
indefinite "nows" (Jetztfolge). The future is the now 
that is not yet; the past is the now that was and is 
no longer., and the present is the now that is before me. 
Dasein, however ,/ ... 
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Dasein, however, is not a thing, but as transcendence, 
he exists as an anticipatory-drive-towards-Being. 
The structure of Dasein's transcendence,therefore, 
reveals that Dasein's authentic existence consists in 
t\\.,._.lc the coming (Future) of Being to a self"already is
(Past), revealing the Being of beings with which he is 
now concerned (Present). Such a fundamental unity 
Heidegger calls Temporality,(54) making possible the 
unity of Sorge, which discloses Dasein's 
Being-towards-authenticity. (The three constituent 
movements or directions he.calls the three ecstases.) 
"Temporalitv reveals-itself as the meaning of 
authentic care." (S5) 
Everytime the word Sorge is used, Heidegger hopes to 
awaken the individual to the truth of Being as revealed 
by either the poet or the thinker ., the poet in his poem, 
naming the Holy., the thinker care-ful,ly listening to 
the voice of Being and pronouncing the Holy. As- such, 
Dasein is re_scued from the anonymity of das Man. The 
call of conscience, which comes from Dasein itself, 
reveals Dasein's potentiality for Being� This leads 
Heidegger to analyse that-which the call of-conscience 
makes Dasein understand. The call of conscience draws 
Dasein to its Guilt (Schuld) or Debt, which is a
fundamental part/ ... 
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fundamental part of Sorge. Heidegger makes full 
use of the double meaning contained in this German 
word: Schuld means both �o be guilty and to be in 
debt, to be owing. Only by recognizing his guilt 
can Dasein come to choose himself in the 
existential sense. Dasein's responsibility and 
authenticity lies in understanding the call of 
conscience, and. acting according to the chosen 
potentialities of Being, since Sorge points to the 
basic structure of his own existence. Thus the call 
of conscience saves Dasein from alienation by 
pointing to his freedom to choose himself and not 
lose himself in the das Man. 
Dasein, through Sorge, takes hold of reality as the 
projection of the world horizon, and because it does 
so from the position of its finitude, comes to a 
knowledge of its own nothingness which is revealed by 
Angst (Anxiety), by its Grundbefindlichkeit 
(fundamental or basic mood), Through this moo.d 
Heidegger lays bare the possibilities for Dasein coming 
to an authentic knowledge of itself. 
In such an achievement, Dasein needs Being. For 
Dasein, this need is its unique concern. Heidegger asks: 
"Is there/ ... 
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"Is there in Dasein an understanding state-of-mind 
in which Dasein has been disclosed to itself in 
some distinctive way-ztt· (S6) and he answers in the
affirmative, finding such a state-of-mind in !ngst 
(Anxiety). Anxiety is quite different from fear, 
for fear is always "fear of " Such a threat comes 
from a definite direction. But what is it that 
anxiety is anxious about? Heidegger answers that 
anxiety is anxious about nothing - it is anxious 
about no-being in particular. It is anxious about 
non-being, not an absolute nothing, but one grounded 
in 11 somethirig11 in the sense that Angst discloses 
place itself : world. In disclosing the nothing, Angst 
gives things the possibility of showing themselves as 
things and not as nothing : no-thing. Any particular 
thing can be seen as the thing it is only when the 
totality of things has been revealed. 
It is now possible for Heidegger to ask what Dasein 
is anxious l2£.· Dasein, he says, is anxious for itself, 
cut off from all contact with others, left completely 
to itself in this world. We clearly discern here 
the problem of authenticity� Dasein is anxious for 
itself in its drive-toward-Being. Angst reveals Dasein's 
anxiety about and anxiety for the disclosure of its 
authentic self, in its transcendence to Being. Angst 
disturbs Dasein/ ... 
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disturbs Dasein from the false sense of security 
given by das Man. Angst reveals the total 
insignificance of things. The dwelling place of the 
ontic is not Dasein's true abode (Unheimlichkeit) (57)
Dasein ., Heidegger says ., takes flight from the not-at­
homeness in the face of the uncanniness that lies in 
Dasein as a thrown Being-in-the-world. ''From an 
existential-ontological point of view: the 'not-at-
homeness' must be conceived as the more primordial 
phenomenon. 11 (SS ) This� is of fundamental
importance to the understanding of Being and so to 
human existence. In revealing the NOT, what Angst 
actually reveals is Dasein's finiteness and, in a 
sense, his impotence. This NOT is revealed to each 
one alone as arising from his very Being-in-the­
wor1d. 
Angst,as a single concrete experience of Dasein, 
discloses the Being of Dasein and brings Dasein face 
to face with his Being by revealing a threat to his 
existence. Heidegger strikes home the truth that 
Dasein -' s Being cannot be found in judgements and 
propositions on objects to be anxious about. Angst 
reveals the stark truth that man is a thrown Being-
in-the-world. It is his very Being-in-the-world 
that anxiety/ •.. 
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that anxiety is anxious about. (59) Heidegger
advances the view that because of such a state of 
affairs, the world offers no comfort. In fact, "The 
'world' can offer nothing". (60) Angst draws Dasein
away from the public explanations of das Man in the 
way of disownment (Uneigentlichkeit) and 1findividualizes" 
him by genuinely freeing him for being his own self as 
a possibility. Heidegger here points to the profound 
importance of Angst: It brings Dasein before the 
finite freedom of his Being-in-the�world. Different 
moods may reveal different possibilities of Dasein, 
but, says Heid.egger, it is Angst, and only Angst, 
that brings Dasein before itself as a single, human 
individual. 
In drawing Dasein together again from the dispersal 
caused by das Man, Angst reveals Dasein as a whole 
"in an impassioned FREEJ?.OM TOWARDS DEATH - a freedo1:1 
"lvhich has been released from 'the Illusions of the 
'thev', and which is factical, certain of itself; and 
anxious. 11 ( 6l) and that in Angst ., "Dasein finds itself
face to face with the -'nothing' of the possible 
impossibility of its existence," (62) Death gives
Dasein the possibility for authenticity. Death 
11 is eigentlich {'authentic') because it is eigen 
( 
)u(6:n 'my own' • �nly after Angst has revealed the 
fundamental structure/ .•• 
" 
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fundamental structure of Dasein, can we hope to live 
an authentic existence and thereby solve the Being­
question and so overcome·metaphysics as understood 
in the traditional sense. 
In revealing Dasein's essential finitude, freedom 
challenges the individual to Being and to be himself. 
In this lies the pre-eminence of Dasein. Dasein 
creates the space for the light of Being. Dasein 
opens the horizon of time, ·creating the distance from 
whj_ch beings can be genuinely understood. Animals 
and plants are in a sense dissolved in living, but 
Dasein reaches out beyond the living. The finitude of 
life is disclosed to him. On the basis of such a 
disclosure it is possible for him to understand his own 
Being, as well as the Being of other persons and things. 
Dasein is always a transcendence, "Understanding of 
Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's 
Being. Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is 
ontological."(&4) 
For Heidegger, the authentic (eigentlich} means the 
recovering of Dasein, from its trivialities and bringing 
it before its· original possibilities which, later, 
Heidegger sees as finding expression in the "poetic". 
In an/ ... 
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In an authentic existence, Dasein would relate to 
things in a creative, original way, disclosing 
Dasein's existence-in-truth. 
However, is listening, hearing and hearkening 
(Horchen) to the voice of Being adequate enough when 
the concern of Dasein is not only with the very 
authenticity of man as such, but also with the very 
world itself, which gives man his support and 
sustenance? What is there to distinguish the true 
call from the false one? Heidegger is optimistic 
in his claim that.each one of us can hear or can be 
taught to hear the call of Being, We find it difficult 
to accept such an equalization of all mankind and hold 
the view that the poet is a rare human being, 
possessed of rare·insights, and that those who can 
catch the message or the Saying of the poet are equally 
rare individuals. It is a myth, �nd probably a 
hangover of the democratic myth underlying a school 
education, that everyone, even if only with a little 
help, can understand the poet. The truth is that only a 
few get a glimpse of what the few great poets in their 
greatest moments only 11 hint 11 at, 
There is no doubt that the brilliant eloquence and 
the power with which Heidegger expresses his concerns 
in so/ .•. 
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in so many of his books, essays, and dialogues 
would reach those sensitive human beings who have the 
capacity of responding to him and that there are those 
who can respond to his incredibly penetrating 
analyses of the poems of H'olderlin, Angelus Silesius, 
Sophocles, Stefan George, and a few others. 'Most 
probably, in their own way, these poets have felt the 
keen sense of alienation that Heidegger is troubled by. 
In ca1;rying on a dialogue with those poets, and I 
suppose, with the few that rise above the mass today, 
and in view of his damning exposures of das Man in his 
Sein und Zeit, has not Heidegger created a brand new 
dichotomy - that between the poet and thinker who live in 
the proximity of Being, and so, within reach of 
authenticity., and the public (das Man) who wallow in 
their trivialities< 
The call of conscience, which arises from nothing 
and can give !!2. knowledge of how man can save himself and 
the world, but merely calls up Dasein's o-wnmost 
potentiality for Being, makes us wonder whether just such 
a call to authenticity, in view of Dase in' s condition in 
the world of das Man,is strong enough against the power 
of the politician and the business tycoon, inspite of 
how unauthentic their life style might be in the eyes 
of Heidegger. Heidegger admits often enough that no 
standard can/., . 
.( 
- 222 -
standard can be arrived at whereby Dasein could _come 
to a decision of how to answer the call to 
authenticity. All Heidegger could teach is the art 
of questioning more originally, and of grasping or 
gathering the meanings of words in their truly 
originative element (das Aifa.nglicJ:i.e). When presented 
like this, no doubt, the picture is pessimistic, and 
when we find that page after page of questioning ends 
only in despair, we ask in all seriousness, whether 
one could work out the whole question of authentic 
human existence on only _Mlgst and Nichts, not 
withstanding all the value they hold for the fundamental 
question of Being; or whether we should not take into 
account man in a larger variety of factors, which 
could form a firmer foundation for accommodating the 
uniqueness of the human individual more thoroughly. In 
isolating ,Angst as Dasein's Grundbefindlichkeit, 
Heidegger has robbed himself of the possibility of 
appreciating the contingency of the human individual and 
so of ever coming to terms with a question that has 
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concern for Being. Ontological-existential 
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Ontological truth, therefore, refers to the 
disclosure of Being as it happens in, through, 
and with Dasein in its Concern. 
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How? When? and Where? - The gods remain silent! 
Then stick to Because, and ask not about Why? 
Goethe. 
When through a rent in the rain-clouded 
sky a ray of the sun suddenly glides 
over the gloom of the meadows .... 
We never come to thoughts. 
to us. 
They come 
That is the proper hour of discourse. 
Discourse cheers us to companionable 
reflection. Such reflection neither 
parades polemical opinions nor does it 
tolerate complaisant agreement. The sail 
of thinking keeps trimmed hard to the 
wind of the matter. 
From such companionship a few perhaps 
may rise to be journeymen in the 
craft of thinking. So that one of them, 
unforseen, may become a master. 
Heidegger. 
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C H A P T E R S I X 
THE REHOUSING OF MAN HEIDEGGER'S CONCEPT OF AUTHENTICITY 
(a) Dasein as a Being-to-death or a Being-to­
nothing,
In our Introduction to the Thought of Martin 
Heidegger, we showed how Heidegger established the 
reciprocal relationship between Dasein and Being. 
We noted with interest that there was a gradual shift 
in emphasis from Dasein to Being itself. We shall 
analyse Being as such in the next sections of this 
chapter. Dasein, the place for the disclosure of 
Being, is finite in the sense that it is 
potentiality-to-death. The implication of such a 
charaterization is that Being, because of the place of 
its emergence into truth, is also finite. In this 
reciprocity, the finitude of Being in its emergence 
into truth becomes the ground for the finitude of 
Dasein and not the other way· round as was the case in 
traditional metaphysics. Heidegger's point is that 
emergence (of Being and of Dasein) is finite emergence. 
The meaningfulness of the thought contained in·the 
expression 11 forgottenness of Being tt (Seinsvergessenheit) 
gains a/ ... 
: 
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gains a lucidity that was not before possible. The 
fact is that the forgottenness of Being is at times 
caused by the �ithdrawal of Being; at. other times the 
forgottenness of Being results from Dasein being 
absorbed by das Man. If Heidegger characterizes Dasein 
as finite, it is because Being, in its own finite 
character, dominates Dasein, In disclosing Being, 
Dasein. also discloses non-Being. Put in another way, 
we may say that Dasein is the place where the tension 
between Being and non-Being is played out, Dasein 
naturally being powerless over either Being or non­
Being. Dasein just has-to-be-open for both. 
If the question of authenticity is to be raised 
at all, then Heidegger has to raise the question of the 
wholeness of man, or else his question is invalid. 
In Dasein's movement toward an end, Heidegger locates 
how man can be a whole. Dasein's Being-to-death is 
disclosed ontologically on the basis of the fundamental 
mood (Angst) which revealed a threat to his ex'istence, 
Death cannot be seen merely as an ending in the sense 
of fulfilment, or as a ceasing, in the sense �hat the 
rain has stopped, but as a Being-towards-the-end. 
Death is an essential part of the structure of Dasein. 
"Death is/ ... 
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"Death is something that stands before us -
something impending." (1) "Death is Dasein's 
ownmost possibility. Being towards this possibility 
discloses to Dasein its ownmost potentiality:--for­
Being, in which its very Being is the issue." (
2)
Dasein ., in the ontic preoccupations that engaged 
its interests in the world of das Man, forgets the 
authenticating nature of Death and so becomes forgetful 
of Being, and so leads an unauthentic existence. As 
an ontological disposition, Angst pulls Dasein out of 
£._as.Man
., 
and reveals to him the authentic path by 
disclosing the non-Being of the world and his own drive 
towards Being. In running forward :in thought to Death .,
Dasein can detach itself from the unauthentic way of 
living. This unauthenticity conceals from the 
individual his own Being-towards-death. The fact that 
people die (man stirbt) creates a kind of affected 
superiority that estranges Dasein from its ownmost 
potentiality for Being. 
Having exposed the unauthentic attitude of Dasein 
to Death, Heidegger now asks in what way Dasein can 
understand its own Death authentically, and behave 
accordingly. If only Dasein understands that this is 
what it 1£., then no more would it flee from the 
definitiveness of/ ... 
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definitiveness of Death, but would accept Death as 
constitutive of its finitude and would therefore free 
itself "for accepting this." 
--
(3) Herein lies the 
invitation to Dasein to either gain its authenticity 
or to lose itself. The significance Heidegger 
attaches to such a choice is of primary importance and 
he names it Resolve (Entschlossenheit). 
In gaining authenticity, Dasein is�- So, 
authenticity manifests an ontic and an ontological 
dimension: ontically Dasein is authentic when it chooses 
to "hearken" to the voice of conscience that reveals 
to Dasein its guilt, which comes from its finitude, 
the choosing of which Heidegger calls Resolve; 
ontologically Dasein is authentic when it comprehends 
its innermost potentiality as advancing towards Death. 
The unity of the authentic ontic and ontological 
dimensions Heidegger characterizes as "advancing resolve. 11
Such an advancing resolve is a liberation and in such 
a liberation is unveiled Dasein's Being-to-death, which 
:it must accept if it is to flee das 'Man. Authentic;ity, 
therefore, consists in the profundity of Dasein's 
freedom, that is, in Dasein's openness towards Death. 
As we have pointed out in our previous chapter, in 
linking openness and freedom, Heidegger is letting trut� be. 
Heidegger isolates/ ... 
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Heidegger isolates 11 resolve 11 as the most authentic 
form of openness, and says that in choosing death as 
the most authentic resolution, the most original form 
of truth is disclosed. However:, it is our contention 
that once again, in revealing the authentic nature of 
human existence, Heidegger cannot say any more than 
that, in resolution, Dasein is authentic, for the simple 
reason that when we are involved with contingent 
individuals, no adequate explanation can be given to the 
problem who man is. The answer to that question must 
of necessity be left open. 
Death no doubt closes off and makes Dasein a whole; 
but can we then draw any genuine content from this for 
the living individual? If, as Heidegger suggests, we 
heroically choose to be a Being-to-death, in order to 
fulfil ourselves authentically, to relate to others and 
to things meaningfully, then we suggest that by this 
looking at ourselves, others, and beings from the 
perspective of the end of our existence, we do not really 
fulfil ourselves, but rather, deprive ourselves of lli 
privilege of being alive. 
It is our contention that in this attitude lies the more 
authentic and meaningful perspective for the human individual. 
The tmauthenticitv / ... 
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The unauthenticity and the triteness of das Man must 
be balanced by the achievements and the excellences 
of man, and by the richness and variety of life. The 
merit of Heidegger's thought lies in his incredibly 
penetrating analysis of how Dasein' s. uniqueness is 
destroyed by das Man. In authentically resolving to 
be a Being-to-death, has not Heidegger also destroyed 
the uniqueness (Jemeinigkeit) of the individual and 
led man into a further alienation? 
While it is true that no one can die my death for 
me, we must admit that, in the final analysis, death 
is a leveller. (4) Therefore, we suggest that life and
living gives Dasein his individuality and uniqueness 
and that it is death that levels Dasein. It is Dasein's 
Being-in-the-world that gives Dasein the possibility 
to be unique and it is Dasein's Being-to-death that 
takes away the individual and his uniqueness. Rather 
than be confined by Being-to-death to an isolation that 
ends all dialogue, Dasein could get to know its self 
and its surroundings by a ,more meaningful engagement of 
these on terms that increase the awareness of ourselves 
and of the various possibilities of life. 
However, this does not detract from the value or 
significance of Heidegger's acute insight and persistent 
concern with/. , . 
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concern with the very real problem of death and 
no-thingness and their connection with his main pre­
occupation - the question of Being.. That man is 
finite is not because he is not an eternal being, but 
because there is disclosed to him in advance a not 
through which he can understand Being. The not, 
na�urally,needs Dasein as the place where it itself can 
be manifest. It is on such an analysis that Heidegger 
rejects any ontology based on a pure consciousness 
or on a "pure I". The not, Heidegger finds, necessary, 
to say again and again, is not a nihil negativum of 
logic, but that which tt gives II Das..tl£ as the pure and 
simple other of itself which of course is no thing. 
Nothing is not an object. 
Heidegger is often accused of being a nihilist and 
he is continually at pains to point out that it is this 
very nihilism that he wishes to overcome. Heidegger 
characterizes Nihilism as arising from man's 
exploitation of beings to the negl.ect of the question 
of Being, that is, when he forgets_the ontological 
difference. "To forget being and cultivate only the 
essent - that is nihilism." (S) Heidegger clearly 
attributes to nihilism the will to power and the rise of 
technology. In order to overcome nihilism, humanism, 
and subjectivism, Heidegger puts it to us that we must 
take the/ ... 
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take the first step by asking the Being-question in 
any one of its many forms, for example, "What is 
Being?", "Why is there any being at all and not 
rather nothing?", "What is what-is?tt
The essence of nothing, then, lies in its bringing 
Dasein before Being as such. In reaching beyond beings 
to Being ., Dasein as transcendence,is the place-holder 
of nothing, Heidegger now drives the point home that 
in its finitude which rests on the nothing, and in 
consequence, in its understanding of Being, Dasein can 
experience "'· .. the wonder of all wonders � that 
beings are. "' ( 6) Only in the nothingness of 
Dasein can be�ngs-in-totality reveal themselves. 
Nothing is the horizon wj_thin which beings are 
encountered. 
In his skilful search after the nothing, (8) 
(7) 
Heidegger finds that our moods bring us face to face 
with the totality of things in the world. These moods 
(of joy, of boredom) hide the nothing that Heidegger 
seeks. But there is one mood that reveals nothing 
itself - Angst which we examined in our previous chapter. 
In fear, we pointed out, we are afraid of something. 
But it is impossible to define what anxiety is anxious 
of. "The only thing that remains and overwhelms us 
whilst what/. ; • 
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whilst what-is slips away, is this 'nothing.,. 
reveals Nothin�." (9) 
Dread 
This nothingness creates the condition whereby 
we may see being as it is in its "original overtness 
(Offenheit): that it 'is' and is not Nothing."(lO
)
It is nothing that brings Dasein face to face with 
beings as such. It is now apparent why Heidegger 
places the maximum emphasis on the nothing: if we are 
to relate authentically to beings and to be an authentic 
being ourselves, then beings must reveal themselves as 
the things they are. It is now also possible for 
Heidegger to reveal the authentic nature of freedom; for, 
"Without the original manifest character of Nothing 
there is no self-hood and no freedom. Here we have the 
answer to our question about Nothing. Nothing is 
neither an object nor anything that 'is' at all. 
Nothing occurs neither by itself ., nor 'apart from' 
what-is, as a sort of adjunct. Nothing is that which 
makes the revelation of what-is as such possible for our 
hwnan existence. Nothing not merely provides the 
conceptual opposite of what-is, but is also an original 
part of essence (Wesen)." (ll)
Dasein as a being that is projected into the nothing 
(Hineingehaltenheit in das Nichts) is a 11 being beyond 11 
(Hinaussein) beings/ ... 
{Hinaussein) beings. Transcendence is its authentic 
nature. Dasein is a transcendence to Being. If 
Dasein genuinely understands this, then he will not 
alienate himself by falling prey to beings and so 
losing himself in the world of beings. It is nothing 
that gives man the possibility to see things as.they 
actually are. 
nothingness.'" 
"'Man is the seat-holder for 
(12) As such, nothingness gives Dasein 
the opportunity to move from a state of unauthentici·ty 
to authenticity. 
Heidegger holds the view that classical metaphysics 
went wrong when it.derived nothingness from negation. 
Nothingness does not come about through the act of 
negation, but, rather, it is negation that arises 
through the act of nothingness. It is in the Being 
{�) of what-is (Seiendes) "that the nihilation of 
No�hing (das Nichten des Nichts) occurs."(
l3) Nothing,
therefore, has the character of an activity. Nothing 
nothings. Only now can man see things in their 
essential being, in their true nature, When seen from 
such a nothingness, then things appear or stand out as 
they actually are. From this it follows that Dasein 
can come into the power and ability to grasp reality 
as it is, and not as it has been handed to him in a 
distorted state. Only now is it possible for him to 




gain authenticity. So ., far from being an abstract 
concept ., nothingness gives Dasein the possibility 
for authenticity. Through such authentic behaviour, 
Dasein transcends to Being. 
Traditional metaphysics conceived nothingness as 
merely the negation of what is, but for Heidegger, 
nothing, just as much as Being, belohgs to the ground 
of beings. Heidegger says: "Metaphysics is an 
enquiry over and above what-i:s j.;:. . with a view to 
winning it back again as such and in totality for our 
understanding. TJ (14) 
Therefore, we may say that Heidegger attempts, 
through Be:i.ng and Nothingness, to comprehend the totality 
of things in the world on the basis of wh:i.ch comprehension, 
man can live authentically. The philosophical dilemma 
clearly deliheated by.Kant obtains. In the Kantian view,
the conflict between human finiteness and Weltanschauungen 
which aims to explain reality in a total or 
comprehensive way is inevitable. So, Heidegger's 
attempt to attain authenticity on the basis of such a 
comprehensive Weltanschauung is defeated by human reality 
in respect of its finiteness, which is the very quality 
that Heidegger had emphasised. 
In his/ .. , 
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In his later writings, Heidegger attempts to 
solve this dilemma of the inability of man to 
comprehend totally, by his famous Kehre (Reversal) 
where Being now comprehends and man ek-sists, or 
stands out into Being. 
(b) Heidegger's/ ...
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(b) Heidegger's Kehre des Denkens or the
Reversal of Thinking.
Heidegger, in his Sein und Zeit, attempted to 
ground metaphysics properly through his Dasein 
analytic. By showing man in his true relationship 
to Being., Heidegger intended to expose man as he is, 
thereby giving him the possibility for an authentic 
existence •. Such a thinking, as important, necessary, 
and preparatory (lS) as it may be, remains metaphysical. 
It is now necessary., thought Heidegger, to adopt a 
new point of departure as given by Being itself. 
In his pursuit after the sense of Being, Heidegger 
characterized truth as Aletheia (non-concealment). 
Forgetfulness is the withdrawal of Being into concealment 
and remembering ., which, for Heidegger would be the same 
as re-trieving (Wiederholung), that is, an attaining 
to the non-concealed. The re-fetching or re-trieving of 
the authentic self would result in beings being 
revealed as they are. The significance of the Greek 
word Aletheia (non-concealment) is that it reveals 
Ousia (The Being of beings; presence). Heidegger says: 
"The disquieting., ever watchful question about Being 
under the guise of Presence (Present) developed into the 
question about Being in terms of its time-character."(l6)
With this/ ... 
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With this development, it became clear that the 
traditional conception of time was no longer adequate 
for asking the question concerning the time-
character of Presence, for the traditional 
characterization of time was a sequence of "nows", 
which, as we showed in our last chapter, is a 
distortion of authentic time. Authentic time is 
temporality as it reveals the ecstatic unity of past, 
present, and future. To avoid the Aristotelian "now", ' 
Presence replaces the present. Heidegger took the 
future to be the primary ecstasis of time. 
In recovering the original significance of the 
nature of Being, the traditional metaphysical approach, 
as we showed in our chapter three, .failed to cope 
adequately with the question of Being, because of the 
dichotomy that Plato set in motion by separating the 
world of Being (Ideas) and the world of Time (Becoming, 
Existence, Opinion). Therefore, in putting aside these 
traditional conceptions, Heidegger, following a 
phenomenological hermeneutic of man, intends coming to 
an authentic understanding of man in his relationship 
to Being, and after establishing man's authentic nature 
finds it now possible to arrive at a comprehension of 
Being as such, and as it reveals itself to man. Having 
exposed Dasein's nature as a Being-to-death or a 
Being-to/ •.. 
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Being-to-nothing, Heidegger now tries to avoid any 
subjective interferences in order that Being may 
present itself as it is. 
Sein und Zeit, as Heidegger published it, contained 
two divisions of a projected six. On this point 
Heidegger himself says: "The adequate reproduction of 
and participation in this other thinking that leaves 
subje?tivity behind is indeed rendered difficult by 
the fact that when Being and Time was published, the 
third Division of the first Part, entitled 'Time and 
Being' was held back • ••. The Division in question was 
held back because thin�ing failed in adequately 
articulating this turn, and did not achieve its goal by 
means of the language of metaphysics." (lJ) In reply 
to William Richardson's letter, Heidegger says: 
"The thinking of the reversal� is a change in my 
thought."(lB) However, he points out that his basic
standpoint is not altered, nor has he abandoned the 
fundamental issues of Sein und Zeit. 
Heidegger says that he did not invent the reversal 
and that instead of endlessly.gossipping about the 
reversal, ·he would rather that the people engage·themselves 
in the play of the whole ., that is, "Being and Time" and 
"Time and Beingll, in which titles the reversal is 
inherent. However/ •. , 
♦ 
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inherent. However. ., it is this that accounts for the 
highly experimental and possibly dangerous nature of 
the lecture called Time and Being that Heidegger gave 
in January., 1962 ., and the seminar conducted on that 
lecture in September of the same year. 
The danger lies. in the fact that the audience ha.d 
to engage themselves in "an answering prepared by 
questions". (l9) This in itself presents a difficulty
in that the participants are asked to accept a prepared 
questioning. More serious.is that the participants 
had now to experience on the basis of what was prepared 
that 11 which cannot be openly brought to light", and 
that which is by its very nature "inaccessible to-· 
communicative statements."(2o
) 
At the very heart of the
assumption ., does there not lurk the idea that the 
participants are on the same level as Heidegger? There 
is then ., either a levelling of the participants where 
an equalization just does not exist because of their very 
individuality ., or we are exposed to various individual 
11 experiences 11 and since they are not on the same level 
as Heidegger's ., these experiences must be held as 
invalid. More about this dilemma will be said later. 
Heidegger says/ ... 
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Heidegger says that Being is detel"ntined by the 
horizon of Time, when, for 'I'ime, the lighting-up of 
the self-concealingprocess of coming--to�Presence 
(Answesen), is substituted. Now the process of . 
presenc-ing Being is "inherent in.the lighting-up of 
self-concealment (Time).· (The) lighting-up of self-
concealment (Time) brings forth the process of 
presenc-ing (Being). 1f(21) This reciprocal bearing, 
says Heidegger, rests in a mutual ap-propriation which 
he calls event (Ereignis),(22)the significance of
which is that the§§. (It) of Ereignis is the ultimate 
Source of what ·.is. Time opens up the horizon which 
creates the authentic condition for Dasein and Being 
to be appropriated genuinely 'CO each other. 
Towards working out what Appropriation fully 
implies, we need to note that, in Sein und Zeit,. 
Heidegger sh.owed, through his analysis of Being-to­
death, Dasein's temporality and the fundamental nature 
of future as the primary ecstasis of time. However, in 
his essay Time and Being,· Heidegger attempts to show. 
Being itself in its temporal character, thereby avoiding 
the metaphysical by saying "something about the attempt 
to think Being without regard to its being grounded in 
terms of beings." (23) We shall discuss this issue a
little later in this thesis. In the meantime, we note 
that thought/ ..• 
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that thought is required to undergo a change, and 
this movement, Heidegger says, corresponds with the 
reversal. This means that the Kehre fulfils the 
question of Being raised in Sein und Zeit. "This 
fulfillment likewise furnishes for the first time an 
adequate characterisation of There-being, sc. of the 
essence of man (as) thought in terms of the truth of 
Being as such." (24)
Heidegger, in the letter referred to above, warns 
William Richardson that, "The distinction you make 
between Heidegger I and II is justified only on the 
condition that this is kept constantly in mind : only 
by way of what Heidegger I has thought·does one gain 
access to what is to-be-thought by Heidegger II. But 
(the thought of) Heidegger I becomes possible only if 
it is contained in Heidegger II. 11 (25)
Heidegger characterizes the shift in emphasis by 
saying that it is not that there are principally men, 
but principally there is Being.· In this shift of 
emphasis Heidegger by-passes humanism and subjectivism. 
This position enables Heidegger to arrive at the 
authentic nature of man and put aside the traditional 
characterization of what man's essential nature is. 
As such, the existentia of tradition is replaced by the 
ontological priority/.�. 
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ontological priority of ek-sistence, that is, Dasein 
is open to Being and stands within the light of 
Being. In other words, Dasein is a transcendence, 
that is, he stands outside of himself. Dasein comes­
to-presence in the throwing of Being as the "There" 
of Being .. (26
) 
n' ••• This 'Being' of _the There, and
only this ., has the fundamental structure of ek-sistence ., 
sc. of taking a stance ecstatically within the truth 
of Being. • •. ' 11 (27)
From this Heidegger dra,�s the conclusion that 
Being is the relation that sustains ek-sistence in its 
existential presence, thereby preserving the truth of 
Being as it itself in-sists in beings. Dasein 
ek-sists as subjects ., that is, he stands out towards the 
things in the world and he is the originator of 
meaning in the world, but only because of Being in the 
sense that truth is not really the creation of Dasein, 
but is the self-disclosure of Being. With such an 
exposure of truth, Dasein pulls out of the "night of 
darkness" a little intelligibility which finds expression 
in Dasein's "praxis". Words, of themselves, are 
meaningless, but can only come to a fullness in, say, 
a work of art, in a poem ., or in a game. 
As we have already emphasized ., with the Kehre comes 
the re-interpretation/ •.. 
I 
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the re-interpretation of the nature of man. 
Ek�sistence expresses its essential character as 
possession. Being possesses Dasein f◊r the disclosure 
of its truth. All thinking which emphasizes the 
power of man must give way to seeing man as the humble 
· 
·(28) "shepherd of Being". Where Sein und Zeit said 
that only insofar as Dasein is, there is Being, this 
· is now to be understood as Dasein is the There where
the Itghting-process comes-to-pass, but only on the basis
of, and only because of Being which e-mits itself
among beings. Thus.the lighting-up process through which
beings become what they are, takes place in the There
of Being. The lighting-up process is;of course, Being
itself.
We may legitimately ask: "Where in all this lies the 
character of authenticity'?" Authenticity lies in the 
appropriating of man by Being itself in that movement 
by which Being throws out its There in.the midst.of 
beings. In this throw is contained the call to Dasein 
who must let non-concealment take place. In listening 
to this call, Dasein resolves itself authentical�y. If 
the essential nature of Being is non-concealment, then 
it is through thought that Being expresses itself. 
tt, • • •  through thought Being comes to (expression in) 
language • ••. "" (29) Man does not now use language to
reach Being. / .. , 
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reach Being. It is Being that uses language to 
disclose itself to man who must respond to it. Dasein 
must lodge in the house of Being and by staying there 
authentically, bring Being to self-fulfilment. 
"' .•• Thought pays heed to the lighting-up process 
(that is) Being, insofar as it encloses its own 
utterance of Being .. in language, as (if this were) the 
lodging of ek-sistence . •.• '" (3o) Language no more
takes.on the form of articulate saying. It is now the 
"silent saying" of Being which Dasein must listen to 
and which now forms the new thought. 
Heidegger hopes to expose the essence of man and 
so respond to the present need of philosophy, 
Heidegger says: "Not only have the gods and the god 
fled, but the divine radiance has become extinguished 
in the world"s history. The time of the world's night 
is the destitute time, because it becomes ever more 
destitute." (3l) In these times, the poet has the 
weighty task of uttering the Holy ., that is, the mystery 
of Being. To these poets then ., the essence of poetry 
becomes a critical questioning that moves on the way to 
the disclosure of that which must be unconcealed.· 
"Because these more venturesome ones venture Being itself 
and therefore dare to venture into language ., the 
province of Being, they are the sayers.". ( 32) 
They. "sing/ ... 
.. 
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They "sing the healing whole in th� midst of the 
unholy." (33)
Through this soundless saying, and therefore., 
through the authentic exercise of".language, Heidegger 
hopes to give a non-hwnan interpretation to man ., world, 
and things. Aletheia as non-concealment is non-human. 
The essential nature of man must now be seen in·a 
special relation to Being ., that is ., as belonging to 
Being. In work after work,Heidegger hopes to 
reconstruct this relationship ., fo·r example ., in hi-s 
interpretation of poems and works of. art. Any hearing 
of the call,_which is the only way in which world and 
thing can achieve their truth ., of necessity ., implies a 
hearer. Try as he might ., Heidegger cannot hope to 
arrive at a non-human Saying ., for he is a human being, 
unless of course it is God that sends the message. But, 
then,Heidegger would criticize that as being metaphysical, 
hence unauthentic. 
In his essay The Origin of the Work of Art ., 
Heidegger asks: "What is at work in the work of art?" 
Heidegger answers that in the work of art it is truth 
that is at work ., for what it does is that it discloses 
the essence of an entire world; for example, vanGogh's 
painting of a pair of boots gathers together in that 
work the/ ... 
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work the entire world of the peasant. What the work 
of art does is to bring into presence the Being of 
what-is. "The art work opens up in its. own way the 
Being of beings. This opening up, i. e, , this 
deconcealing, i.e., the truth of beings, happens in 
the work." (34) Although truth happens in and through 
Dasein, it is not Dasein that brings it about. Truth 
occttrs of its own accord. In fact, Heidegger goes so 
far as to say that truth uses Dasein for its self­
disclosure, untruth being Silence, Hiddenness, or 
Darknes.il. Truth, as the light of Being, gets rid of 
Darkness in whatever form it (Truth) cares to express 
itself through Dasein. 
To arrive at a deeper meaning of "gathering", we 
need to examine what Heidegger calls Geviert (the 
Fourfold), that is, Heaven and Earth, Men and Gods. In 
their interplay, they constitute the _world in a unity 
that is governed by Language. Language cannot be seen 
as a tool or as an external power that man uses to 
appropriate the world. Language cannot be separated 
from the Fourfold,.for, being the original gathering 
(Versammlung), it gives Dasein the "is" whose deepest 
understanding gives man the possibility for authenticity. 
In his neglect of the Fourfold, man exploits the 
materials of the earth in a most uncreative way. The 
rise of/ ... 
I 
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rise of technology has seen the decline of the 
creative in man. But·the poet, in being poetical, 
captures the essence of the Fourfold in a creative way 
when Dasein would live authentically. Heidegge� in 
his essay Poetically man dwells ., quoting from 
Holderlin' s last poem says that "the life of man''· is a 
"dwelling life." Heidegger believes that the poet who 
can see the 11world 1' in its "activity" (in other words, 
the 11 �orld worlds") gathers the Fourfold together in 
a 11 play", or a dance rhythm of the appropriating and 
belonging together of the four neighbourhoods 
(Gegenden).· These constitute together what Heidegger 
calls the Holy (das Heilige) ., which must, of course, 
never be seen either as a thing or as the Divine BeingM
As an example of the gathering of the Fourfold we make 
use of the following summary: "Only 'essential thinking' 
experiences how, in the gift of the pour of water ., the 
earth in its dark slumber in the stones of the spring 
is gathered with the heavens ., the dispenser of _rain and 
dew. Or it experiences in the gift of the pour of wine 
how the nurturing earth gathers itself with the heavens, 
which through its sunlight brought the vine to blossom. 
The pour of the gift of water and wine at the· same time 
always includes in its gathering the one 'for whom' 
such an outpouring is made. As a 'libation,' it is 
originally given as a sacrifice and offering 'for the 
divine ones/ .•. 
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divine ones,' i.e., for the sphere. of the 'holy' in 
which the divinity shows or hides itself. As a 
'draught,' the gift of the pour is for ·the 'mortals'; 
it livens 'their leisure and cheers their 
conviviality'." (35)
Where, in his early writings; Heidegger was 
concerned over man's unauthentic use of language in his 
"clever talking, writing,and broadcasting of spoken 
words", he now concentrates on the relationship between 
man, language and the nature of things. "Man acts as 
though he were the shaper and.master of language, while 
in fact language remains the master of man, Perhaps 
it is before all else man's subversion of� relation 
of dominance that drives his nature into alienation. 
That we retain a concern for care in speaking is all to 
the good, but is of no help to us as long as language 
still serves us even then only as a means of expression. 11(36
Man is man only when he is devoted to the address 
of language who uses him to show, to let appear, to 
free things,world, etc., so that they may be what they 
are, that is, things as things, world as world, beings 
as beings, and the horizon of beings as the horizon of 
beings. Man is no more the producer and the user of 
language. He is the receiver. It is now the case that 
"Language speaks/ .•. 
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"Language speaks" and gives man the gift of space .,
future, freedom and so the possibility for 
authenticity. Man's privileged duty is to humbly 
accept these gifts as they are and to hold them 
Holy. This profound ability of language exists 
because this is its essence ., and the essence of 
Dasein would then be to be a lodger in the house of 
Being. (37) Quite clearly it now emerges that the
function of language is to let Being be itself; in 
this activity Dasein has a privileged access to Being 
through his ek-static nature, Therefore, his nature 
is to be the guardian or the protector of Being. 
Where, in Sein und Zeit, authenticity was achieved 
by Resolve, it is now achieved by Thought through 
which Being reaches fullness ., in the sense that it 
lets Being be by responding to the demand that it 
(Being) places on him • 
. It is essentially because of this letting-be 
activity that it is at all possible to talk of the 
authentic nature of freedom. The ""letting-be' 
exposes itself (setzt.sich aus) to what-is-as-such 
and brings all behaviour into the open (versetzt ins 
Offene). 'Letting-be',· i.e. freedom, is in its own 
self 'exposing" (aus-setzend) and 'ex-sistent' 
(ek-sistent). 11 ( 3S) Freedom is certainly no licence
to do/ ... 
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to do as you please and what you please. Freedom, 
for Heidegger ., is taking part in the unconcealedness 
of what-is-as-such (das Seiende als eiri solches).
The true nature of freedom, on the basis of which 
Dasein is able to ek-sist, is contained in Da-sein. 
"Ek-sistence ., grounded in truth as freedom, is 
nothing less than exposition into the revealed nature 
of what-is-as-such."(39) Heidegger says that only
when Dasein is understood as the letting-be of what­
is ., is freedom not conceived in a humanistic way. 
Freedom possesses man and gives him a unique 
relationship with the totality of things, Veritas 
est adaeguatio intellectus et rei as the formula for 
truth must be abandoned. Truth is the disclosure of 
what-is, and Dasei£ is Daseirt by virtue of his 
ek-sistence. 11 The "ex-position" of man into the realm 
of what-is ., which he is 'un-covering', makes 
civilisation and history possible and with them all 
the potentialities of historic humanity. u (4o) 
But, in Heidegger's attempt to give truth and 
freedom a non-human meaning
., 
we need to ask whether such 
an interpretation is possible, considering that man is 
a finite, historical being. Since he is inside this 
constitutive act, truth and freedom, no matter what 
form they take ., must remain his unique version, if it 
is unique./ ... 
•
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is unique. In Heidegger's rigorous.critical standards 
and in his unique conception of truth lies his merit. 
But it is also to the credit of Western 'tradition 
that he has had the necessary dialogue and the opportunity 
to pursue his particular line of thought for so long. 
Heidegger says: "the nature of man is released 
to that-which-regions and used by it accordingly, for; 
this reason alone - that man of himself had no power 
over truth and it remains independent of him. Truth''s 
nature can come forth independently of man only because 
the nature of man (or releasement to what-which-regions) 
is used by that-which-regions in regioning both with 
respect to man and to sustain determining. Evidently 
truth's independence� man is a relation to human 
nature, a relation which rests on the regioning of 
human nature into that-which-regions. 11 ( 4l) (For the
purpose of clarifying the meaning of this difficult 
passage, we may, for "that-which-regions tt , read "Being" 
and for "regioning 1', we. may read "opening". ) 
Heidegger sees the essence of man as that which is used 
by truth, and in 11 abiding in his origin" man is drawn 
"to what is noble in his nature. n (4z) However, we hold 
the view that such·a position is just as alienating of 
man's authentic nature as when man uses things 
indiscriminately. The 
"presentiment of/ ... 
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0presentiment of the noble mind" lies, for us, in 
man's using things with respect, If we are to 
speak of authenticity an� of authentic nature, then 
the nature of truth and freedom are to be found in 
man's relationship to his fellowman and in his 
discriminate use of things. Truth and freedom are 
humanized, but if we are to give the contingent and 
finite nature of man their fullest meaning, then this 
seems to be the best basis on which to arrive at a 
workable conception of truth and freedom, rather than 
attempting a non-human or a non-metaphysical meaning 
of truth and freedom. In a sense, the new alienation 
of man, in Heidegger's case, must be ascribed to.the 
identification of man's authentic existence with 
Being as an event, i.e., unconcealment (aletheia), in 
man's being-there. With Heidegger, it may be said� 
that the principle of identity is realized or fulfilled 
in his idea of Geviert (the Fourfold), The Geviert 
indicates man-' s dwelling. It is the space or "�" 
of his dwelling. It is the.link which shows him as 
being suspended between heaven and earth, gods and 
men, finite and infinite, Sein and Seiendes. 
In his attempt to be non-metaphysical, the union 
of the intentions of the phenomenological and.the 
hermeneutic procedure must be seen as resulting in the 
bracketing of/.,. 
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bracketing of the entire tradition from Plato to 
Nietzsche ., as characterized by Heidegger ., and in 
seeing reduction as going back into the true ground 
and essence of metaphysics. The phenomenological 
method., therefore, becomes the way that issues from 
beyond the human, in other words, the way now lies 
within the power of Being, and not within the 
subjectivity of human existence. The hermeneutical 
procedure, too ., undergoes a reversal. Language, the 
transmitter of tradition must no longer be seen as the 
articulatory vehicle that man uses to reach Being. 
Language now becomes the Soundless Saying of the Holy, 
that is ., the mystery of Being ., to which man listens. 
In his book Unterwegs zur Sprache, Heidegger derives 
the origin of the word hermeneutics from the Greek 
hermeneuein. Hermes, the divine messenger ., brought the 
message of destiny. "hermeneuein is that exposition 
which brings tidings because it can listen to a 
message. Such exposition becomes an interpretation of 
what has been said earlier by the poets who ., according 
to Socrates in Plato's� (534 e) ..• ' are interpreters 
of the gods . .,,, So, "hermeneutics means not just the 
interpretation but, even before it, the bearing of 
message and tidings."(43) and as such names the essence 
of man. The only way for man to realize his authentic 
nature is/ ... 
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nature is for him to listen to the message. 
In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger saw man as a Being-
in-the-world who, as a being that is thrown into the 
world and left there to his own resources ., is in a 
state of abandonment (Verlassenheit). In the 
reversal man must be seen in a state of abandonment 
or "releasement" (Gelassenheit), releasing oneself to 
Being by renouncing our wilfulness and waiting for Being 
to reveal itself to us. Heidegger quotes Angelus 
Silesius' poem on the rose: 
The rose is without why; it blooms because it blooms .,
It cares not for itself, asks not if it's seen. 
and he says: "'The unuttered point of the poem - and 
this is what is all important � is that in the most 
hidden recesses of his Being man is truly only when in 
his own way he is as the rose - without why. "' (44)
To be without why (the groundless ground) is to be 
open to the Mystery that will offer Itself to us. 
Searching for the Ground must give way to the silence 
of the Gods, the Groundless (Ab-grund) Silence of Being 
that gives no answer
., but is present only as an abiding 
that man has to endure. "Every question posed to the 
matter of thinking, every inquiry for its nature, is 
already borne up by the grant of what is to come into 
question. Therefore/ ... 
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Therefore the proper bearing of the thinking which 
is :needed now is to listen to the grant, not to ask 
questions."(45) But surely such a state of
a<;:ceptance of the gift of Being is the abandonment of 
man as a critical being? To ask with Professor 
Rauche., in abandoning the "why?" has not man abandoned 
the quest for his authentic nature? 
(c) The Problem/ ...
I 
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(c) The Problem of Sein and das Seiende,
The problem of Sein and das Seiende is the 
problem of metaphysics, which began when Plato 
separated the realm of Being and the realm of Time 
{Becoming, Existence). In attempting to overcome 
such a metaphysics, (Heidegger saw the entire 
tradition from Plato to Nietzsche as metaphysical, 
each historical period being an epoch of metaphysics 
from which the.authentic meaning of Being was 
withdrawn) he attempts to arrive at a non-meta­
physical meaning of Being, thereby showing Being in its 
fullness. However ., such an attempt to ov.ercome 
metaphysics,is, in our opinion, Heidegger's model 
or world-view. Reflection on the relationship 
between das Sein and das Seiende shows that metaphysics 
as reflective theory cannot really be abolished, no 
matter which way.Heidegger turns. 
The original impetus of Heidegger's particular 
conception of Being, as we have already shown, was his 
objection against the reification of Being. Being is 
not a thing, it is not any thing. An abstraction or a 
reification �, as it has its source in things. For 
Heidegger, Sein is the source of light ., meaning, and 
intelligibility which illuminates the world through 
man,· s thinking/ ••• 
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man's thinking and through the language of the poet. 
"We want to say something about the attempt to 
think Being without regard to its being grounded in 
terms of beings. The attempt to think Being without 
beings becomes necessary because otherwise, it seems 
to me, there is no longer any possibility of 
explicitly bringing into view the Being of what is 
today all over the earth, let alone of adequ!'ltely 
determining the relation of man to what has been 
called 'Being' upfto now. n <46) Heidegger exposes the
inadequacies of the traditional conceptions of Being 
and Time by drawing attention to the fact that Being 
is not a thing, therefore nothing temporal, but 
determined by time as presence; Time, too, is not a 
thing, but remains constant in its passing away 
without being something temporal. (47) Therefore,when
time is calculated as a sequence of now-points, it 
fails to see the original dimension (4B) of time which 
in the interplay of past, present, and future opens 
up the very heart of time. Such a true extending, 
Heidegger calls the fourth dimension of time in which 
the unity of true time consists. The "nearing 
nearness" or 1tnearhoodn (Nahheit) which we saw as 
having close associations with the Geviert (the. 
Fourfold), is the giving in ttit gives time", the usual 
rendering of which is "There is time. 11 
The significance/ ... 
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The significance of 11 it gives time" and its 
connection with Being itself emerges when we note 
that true time ncould be discovered as ·the 'It' that 
gives Being, i.e. , gives presence." (49) Therefore, 
when we say "It gives Being" ("There is Being'') the 
"It" appears as true time. · Heidegger firmly points out 
that "It" does not equal time in order that we can 
now say "Time gives Being." It is really the case that 
time "remains the gift of an 'It gives' whose giving 
preserves the realm in which presence is extended. 11 (SO
)
The point of this is that Heidegger wants to leave the 
11 It" open. In other words, it must remain undete rmined 
and mysterious, but yet point to the finitude of Being 
itself, so that Being as presence, and time as the 
realm of the open, belong together. This "belonging 
together" Heidegger calls Ereignis ( 51) or the
Appropriating Event. As far as any determining of the 
"It" of 11 It gives Being" and "It gives Time ff ' goes, 
we must let the "It" remain as Appropriation. 
In asking what is Appropriation, we are asking 
after the essence, in other words, how it 
(Appropriation) becomes present. The danger inherent 
here is, that,in seeing Appropriation·� Being, we are 
continuing the tradition of metaphysics which saw 
Being in terms of beings, at various times, as idea, 
as energeia/ .. , 
- 263 -
as energeia, as actualitas, as will. On the other 
hand, it is correct to say that Being belongs to 
Appropriation. Appropriation is not a·species of 
Being, but "(Insofar as the destiny of Being lies in 
the extending of time, and time, together with Being, 
lies in Appropriation, Appropriating makes manifest 
its peculiar property, that Appropriation withdraws 
what is most fully its own from boundless unconcealment. 
Thought in terms of Appropriating, this means : in 
that sense it expropriates itself to itself. 
Expropriation belongs to Appropriation as such. By 
this expropriation, Appropriation does not abandon 
itself - rather, it preserves what is its own. 11 (SZ)
In Appropriation lies the clue not only to the 
problem of Sein and das Seiende, but also to the 
problem of alienation. For, Appropriation brings man 
into his own as that being who perceives Being within 
true time, on the basis of which1beings themselves
are properly appropriated and not exploited. Thus, in 
perceiving and receiving,man gains the distinction of 
being human, but only if he sees Appropriation as an 
appropriating and not as something that is, when we 
shall again fall into the metaphysical trap. In 
arriving at the idea of Appropriation, hence at 
authenticity, Heidegger hopes to have avoided 
metaphysics and/ ... 
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metaphysics and not overcome it, for, even in the 
attempt to overcome metaphysics, a regard for it 
remains. "To think Being without beings means : 
to think Being without regard to metaphysics. Yet 
a regard for metaphysics still preva;ils even in the 
intention to overcome· metaphysics. Therefore, our 
task is to cease all overcoming, and leave 
metaphysics to itself. If overcoming remains necessary, 
it concerns that thinking that explicitly enters 
Appropriation in order to say It in terms of 
It about It. 11 ( 53)
However, to mention but·,· one· similarity to 
Wittgenstein we need to note that Heidegger in his 
Time and Being wrote: "Our task is unceasingly to 
overcome the obstacles that tend to render such saying 
(of It in terms of It about It) inadequate. The 
saying of Appropriation in the form of a lecture 
remains itself an obstacle of this kind. The lecture 
has spoken merely in propositional state�ents. 11( 54)
We find in Wittgenstein's Tractatus: "My propositions 
serve as elucidations in the following way : anyone 
who understands me eventually recognises them as 
nonsensical, when he has used them - as steps - to· 
climb up beyond them. (He must 1 .so to speak, throw 
away the ladder after he has climbed up it. ) He must 
transcend these/ ... 
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transcend these propositions, and then he will see 
the world aright." (55) 
Heidegger finds in meditative thinking the 
transcending of propositions, or as he would have it, 
saying or experiencing in a non-propositional way. 
Once he has clarified the meaning of Being on the basis 
of his Dasein analytic, he would have to repeat the 
whole process more originally. In other words, the 
foundation is no foundation and in the attempt to be 
non-metaphysical he tries, through meditative thinking, 
to get at Being directly. In this sense,the essence 
of man involves the process of travelling the path 
to Being directly, which involves an openness that 
Heidegger names Gelassenheit, As to what man is open to, 
we have already drawn attention. Man is open to the 
given. "Meditative thinking characterizes man's true 
nature, his being, as openness in which he is partly 
identified with the given. Man becomes partly 
identified with the given by opening to it as, in turn, 
the given opens to him."(56) 
Heidegger calls the given which man is open to, 
the Region. In order to overcome obstacles, that is, 
speaking in propositional statements, Heidegger says 
that, ''Releasement comes out of that-which-regi�ns 
because in/ ..• 
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because in releasement man stays released to -� 
that-which-regions and, indeed, through this itself. 
He is released to it in his being, insofar as he 
originally belongs to it. He belongs to it insofar as 
be is appropriated initially to that-which-regions and, 
indeed, through this itself . ... Out of the experience 
of and in relation to just such waiting upon the 
opening of that-which-regions, waiting came to-be 
spokeri of as releasement."(57) And so Heidegger says
that we must do nothing but wait .. This waiting is, of 
course, what he means by non-propositional or non­
metaphysical. But this waiting upon, even though 
Heidegger pointedly distinguishes it from waiting for,(SB) 
remains humanistic. For, it·: is he (Heidegger) who tells 
us that Being or Region, or whatever he may call it, 
releases man to ek-sist as the shepherd of Being, which 
is his authentic nature. Therefore, it becomes necessary 
for us to ask whether Heidegger overcomes metaphysics 
and subjectivity by transforming Being into 
Appropriation? 
However, when we consider what Appropriation 
appropriates, we have an inkling of just how significant 
Appropriation is to man and Being. For, says 
Heidegger, in Appropriation man and Being belong together. 
In this/ ..• 
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In this belonging together the finitude of both man 
and Being is revealed. He conceives of this 
finitude apart from infinity. How finitude is to be 
thought of as such ., in its self, as an end or a 
limit has to remain a mystery, inspite of Heidegger's 
transfonning Being to Appropriation. If Heidegge 1� 
can say in his essay The End of Philosophy and the 
Task of Thinking that there is no light, no brightness 
without the "opening" and that even darkness needs it ., 
then ., regardless of his intention, he should recognise 
that ., to speak of finitude apart from infinity, to 
think Being without beings, must, as such, remain an 
impossible task and that his philosophizing would 
therefore remain well within the fold of metaphysics. 
Heidegger quotes Stefan George's poem The Word 
and subsequently,over and over gain, the last line 
of that poem: 
Where word breaks off no thing may be. 
He then draws the conclusion that "It is only the word 
at our disposal which endows the thing with Being. 11( 59)
That this is of crucial importance to our problem of 
Sein and das Seiende is revealed a few lines later when 
Heidegger asks: "\\'hat does Being mean here ., that it 
appears like an endowment which is dedicated to the 
thing from the word? H Heidegger provides the answer that 
it is/ ... 
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it is the word that makes a thing? thing and it is 
the poet who has experienced that•it is the word 
that makes a thing what it is, and so lets it be 
present. "The word avows itself to the poet as that 
which holds and sustains a thing in its being. , (60)
Where word breaks off no thing may be. 
In other words, the word, in keeping with Heidegger's 
central idea of aletheia (which is named at the 
beginning of philosophy), allows the thing to reveal 
itself in the gathering that brings what presences to
its presence. As such, Word, or Being, or Saying, 
allows beings to appear in their ''it is". Logos, 
Being, Saying, Appropriation, as equivalents, say the 
same thing : beings are a gift that they themselves 
grant. The point of it all is that, "The dialogue of 
thinking of poetry aims to call forth the nature of 
language, so that mortals may learn again to live within 
language. 11 ( 6l
) 
Thus the question of authenticity,
even in his latest writings, remains the root of the 
question of Being. 
The relationship between word and thing naturally 
points to the relationship between language and thing. 
Poetry is called into the neighbourliness of thinking 
when the attempt is made to undergo an experience with 
language. Heidegger leaves undiscussed as to what happens 
to the/ ... 
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to the thing when ., often enough, we fail to receive 
that particular grant of Being by being temporarily 
incapacitated through a $lip of the mind. We 
readily see the point of Heidegger's attempt at 
authenticating Language, Being, and beings. But does 
it now mean that·there is a thing for the poet and that 
this same thing is not a thing for the lesser.mortals 
who have had an experience, but could not bring it to 
proper articulat:i.on? Is it any more authentic for the 
poet because he can articulate his experinnce with 
language or any less for the ordinary man because he 
cannot? 
To continue with Heidegger's handling of the pI"'oblem 
of das Sein and das Seiende, his analysis concerning the 
technical and scientific calculations - corl�upting and 
degenerating the way to authenticity is well taken. There 
is a need on the part of man to respond more seriously 
to the challenges that result from his being here on 
this earth. However ., Heidegger's answer to the challenge 
presents a one-sidedness that could possibly be more 
dangerous than the existing situation which arose out of 
man having to live with his fellowman. It is this 
situation that we must-never stray too far from in our 
attempt to authenticate human existence. Marvellous and 
exciting as the path Heidegger has travelled may be, 
his fundamental/ .•. 
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his fundamental ontology (inspite of his having 
abandoned this term) ends in the same land of 
absolutes as Hegel's Spirit, Fichte's Ego or Marx's 
economic principle. 
For Heidegger, language is the house of Being and 
as such affords us a clue to undergoing an experience 
with language. He sees the nature of language as the 
grant�ng of its essential being which then means that 
the being of language becomes the language of Being. 
We can see why Heidegger places so much weight on this, 
for,in the language of Being dwells the Being of 
anything that is. What Heidegger calls the guide-word: 
The being of language 
The language of being. (62)
saves mankind from the traditional way of conceiving 
language as the tool that man possesses for communication. 
The true experience of language is a Saying, that is, 
a Showing. This points to the change of meaning that 
the nature of truth has undergone. Language loses its 
original meaning of Showing, Revealing, Unconcealing, 
and now comes to mean something that designates or 
something that represents. 
Heidegger recognises that because we are human beings 
we remain within the Being of language and cannot step 
out of/ •.. 
. • 
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out of it. Language uses man, and Appropriation is 
the making of the way for Saying to come into 
tl.anguage. "This way-making puts langua·ge (the essence 
of language) as language (Saying) into language 
{into the sounded word)."(63) In this, our relation-
ship to things is touched upon. Thereforet the 
Saying of man, which, of course, must always be an 
answering, must remain 11 relationaln, and this is the 
transformation that man must undergo. 
"The moving force in Showing of Saving is 
Owning."( 64) The Owning, Heidegger calls Appropriation,
which opens.the clearing in which beings can be what they 
are. However, the Appropriation must be seen as being 
more than a mere occurrence or event. It must be seen 
as the gift given by Saying which gives things when 
we say : "There is .. ·" Heidegger resolves not only the 
problem of Sein and das Seiende but also the problem 
of authenticity, for,Appropriation appropriates or owns 
(eigen) and Heidegger takes full advantage of the fact 
that the German word for authenticity is Eigentlichkeit 
and the word for 11 appropriating event" is· Ereignis. 
By conceiving Being as Appropriation, Heidegger 
hopes to give it a non-metaphysicai meaning, for
_, 
in the 
relationship between man and Being, Heidegger says that 
the relationship/ ... 
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the relationship is more important than that which 
is related. Therefore, reference to the realm of 
Being must give way to reference to the· relationship 
between man and Being. Heidegger sees in the 
11 Es Gibt" the possibility of man's achieving his 
authenticity. Man standing within "presencen
receives the presencing as a gift given· by the "Es" 
or ttEs gibt. 11 Man is now duty-bound to show that he 
has received the gift when he lets things appear as they 
are. In not accepting the gift, the position is that 
not only is Being shut off, but more importantly, man 
is no longer man. 
Despite the criticism we have levelled against 
Heidegger on various fundamental issues, we acknowledge 
once more his incisive questioning and his relentless 
pursuit after the mystery of Being. For Heidegger, the 
primary concern of thought is the question of the 
ontological difference, that is, the difference between 
Being and beings. However, such a thought moves in 
a circle and to break into the c_ircle is to see the 
difference as the difference. This circle is what 
Grisebach has called the cycle of the self as it is 
found in any constructed theory. Being is only because 
of beings; beings are what they are only because of 
Being. To give other examples, the essence of art is to 
be found/ ... 
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be found in the work of art
., but .the work of art is 
what it is only because of the essence of art. 
Similarly, truth is to be found in what· is true, but 
what is true is true because of truth. Heidegger tries 
to break into the circle by seeing the ground of the 
ontological difference in Dasein's transcendence. Into 
this,Heidegger draws the essence of truth which he says, 
of necessity., must be bifurcated into its ontic and 
ontol�gical aspects. Then Dasein behaves towards 
beings on its understanding of Being, and the ability 
to see the ontological difference must have its roots 
in the essence of man. Therefore, the ground of the 
ontological difference is the transcendence of Dasein, 
The ontological difference emerges only through man's 
ability to distinguish between Being and beings. This 
ability Heidegger identifies with man's transcendence. 
Heidegger never tires of pointing out that Being is not 
identical with the beingness of beings, or what is most 
general in beings. Being is the emergence of the 
ontological difference ., that is, the difference between 
Being and beings, and we now note that what Heidegger 
meant by the expression "to· think Being without beings(i; 
was that Being must not be constituted from beings as 
was done in traditional metaphysics, Man, in dealing 
with beings, must therefore function as the medium through 
whom they break out into unconcealment through the same 
power that/ ... 
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power that dominates himself. The fact remains, 
however, that man is a being and by constituting man 
as transcendence, Heidegg_er does not get away from the 
position that his Being is a model. It is he, as a 
human being, who has constituted it, Not even the 
antiquated spelling of� as� would save him 
from the humanization. Richardson finds a· 
corresponding spelling in Anglo-Saxon for Heidegger's 
�- The translation is�- (65) 11 It is at once
both a hidden light and a 'luminous hiding' within 
beings. All this is familiar. What is new is that by 
reason precisely of this 'luminous hiding' that Being is 
designated as�, and Beon is intended to suggest the 
'difference that holds sway between Being and 
beings, sc, the ontological difference as such. This 
helps to see the entire problematic of revealment­
concealment in Being is nothing more than-the problem 
of the 'not' which constitutes the ontological difference 
as such. ' ... Because a luminous hiding (sc, the 'not' 
of the ontological difference) belongs to Beon, Beon. 
shines forth in the light of a concealing withdrawal. 
The name of this lighting-process is (aletheia).n(66)
Thus, Heidegger is very much preoccupied with the 
ontological difference and the relationship between Being 
and beings is explicitly named. 11 That a thing is" and 
"How it.is" is now given its fullest meaning for 
Heidegger, when/ ... 
- 275 -
Heidegger, when we see being as the.object of 
presentation and Being as that through which the object 
comes to presence. If we do not see the matter like 
this, Heidegger claims that we are existing 
unauthentically. 
(Then we come across the peculiar��(6?)in his
attempt at overcoming the alienating, and so arrivirtg 
at once,at a non-human understanding of Being by 
locating the place of the unity of the Fourfold, that 
is, the earth and sky, gods and man. Thus,the crossing 
out is not anything negative, but something positive, 
in that it gives "world",,) 
Even if 'We go along with Heidegger and accept that 
the poet, as a receiver·of the gift of Being, can save 
mankind, then we need to ask how much faith can the 
rest of mankind place on the poet. Dwelling poetically 
on this earth is but one aspect of life, albeit a 
terribly important one. But in the wake of natural 
disasters, how worthy is the singing of the poet compared 
to the spontaneous rising to the occasion by the 
ordinary man and by his ordinary institutions. There is 
a need for the common man in his common preoccupations, 
just as much as there is a need for the poet to dwell 
poetically. 
Heidegger, as/ ... 
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Heidegger, as we have stressed in our previous 
chapters, was concerned that man had alienated 
himself by forgetting th� ontological difference and 
so, being obl:ivious to :Being itself in his 
preoccupation with beings,.man forgets that it is Being 
itself that brings these into non-concealment. Such 
a concern led Heidegger to.pose the Being-question in 
order to arrive at the ground of Being, or better still, 
and as it.is now possible for us to say, to arrive at 
the groundless ground which would be quite non-
metaphysical. Through the long process of questioning, 
Heidegger now came to see the original meaning of 
language in which Being becomes word and thing. 
articulation of Being opens up and becomes what 
The 
Heidegger calls 11 world 11, and so we have the articulatipn 
11 world worlds" and not 11 world is", or 11 time times" and 
not "time is 11, or "space spaces" and not "space is 11
and so on. Therefore
., 
for Heidegger, Being; opens up the 
totality of beings as they a.re and as they are not 
(Sein und Nichtsein), What this means is that, "Being 
as the process of non-concealment is that which permits 
beings to become non-concea.led (positivity), al though 
the process is so permeated by 'not' that Being itself 
remains concealed (negativity). To think Being in its 
truth, then, is to think it in terms of both positivity 
and negativity at once. u (68) 
In overcoming/, .. 
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In overcoming the "reified tt B�ing of metaphysics 
we need to ask with Professor G. A. Rauche (69) and 
Professor Walter Schulz whether Heidegger, in 
shifting basic starting points, has overcome meta-
physics. In the shift,Heidegger claims not to start 
from das Seiende in the construction of Being, but that 
Being speaks through man and in doing so,causes the 
wor1d of the Seiende to come into existence. As 
Professor Rauche consistently·points out, though the 
accent has shifted, the dialecticai relationship between 
das Sein and das Seiende remains, giving rise to all 
the dichotomies of Being and Nothingness, Life and 
Death, Existence and Non-Existence, which a.re embedded 
in the process of man's Dasein as a Being_-to-death or 
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All our heart's courage is the 
echoing response to the 
first call of Being which 
gathers our thinking into the 
play of the world. 
In thinking all things 
become solitary and slow. 
Patience nurtures magnanimity. 




CHAPTER S E V E N 
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF HEIDEGGER'S ANSWER TO THE 
PROBLEM OF ALIENATION 
In assessing the achievements of Heidegger, we 
start from the basis that his is a genuine inquiry 
into the enigma of human existence and an evaluation 
of the human individual. In the course of this thesis, 
we have critically evaluated Heidegger's thought and 
have discovered the profundity and depth of his 
analysis of human existence. More so than many other 
philosophers, he has drawn attention to the fact that, 
if man wishes to live authentically, he must begin 
from the existential.:ontological perspective. As a 
consequence, his painstakingly detailed analyses of 
concepts like Dasein,. Being-in-the-world, Being-to-death 
or Being-to-nothing, the reversal of thinking from 
existence to ek-sistence ., the Fourfold (Geviert) and 
the "Appropriating Event 11 (Ereignis) have ensured that 
these existential elements have been given a 
philosophical significance that can no longer be ignored 
by philosophers who claim to provide an insight into 
human authenticity. Thinkers like Sartre and Bultmann, 
for example, though they may disagree with Heidegger on 
many crucial points, will not dispute his influence on 
their philosophic thought. 






The power of philosophy lies in its ability to 
raise old problems in new ways, taking into 
consideration the new and changed circumstances of 
life. Its power is also directly linked to the 
capacity inherent in many, to question continually 
and reassess the thought of the particular philosopher. 
Thus, Heidegger provides the opportunity for a 
profound intellectual activity, creating the arena for 
discussion and dialogue of meaningful thought. That 
his thought is provocative and controversial is 
legendary and is evident from the diverse interpretations 
and criticisms of his philosophy to which we have 
already drawn attention. Heidegger has set in motion 
a new mode of philosophical thinking. However, we see 
his ontology and epistemology as interconnected. Unlike 
Sartre, for whom existence precedes essence, Heidegger 
holds that existence presupposes Being and that to know 
Being is to know human nature, whose basis is its 
understanding of Being. Therefore, for Heidegger, the 
question of Being is of-fundamental importance and 
preoccupies his every intellectual effort. 
In An Introduction to Metaphysics
.., 
Heidegger has 
written: 11 • • •  when a boxer is regarded as a nation's great 
man; when mass meetings attended by millions are looked 
on as a triumph - then, yes the�;through all this turmoil 
a question/ ... 
a question still haunts us 
What for? - Whither? - And










to the extent of bottling and canning air and other 
people actually buying this canned and bottled air, 
and when birthday parties are held for soap powders, 
then the conclusion is that something, somewhere, has 
gone very wrong indeed for people to behave in this way. 
Techn�, Poiesis, and Aletheia have'had their authentic 
meaning submerged by the mass, with the result that 
man is cut off from his true nature
., 
which he receives 
from his relationship to Being. Thus, one can appreciate 
Heidegger's concern over the spiritual decline of the 
earth and his looking to the Gennan nation ("the most 
metaphysical of nations !! (2)) to "move itself and
thereby the history of the West beyond the center of 
their future 'happening' and into the primordial realm 
of the.powers of being."(3) Heidegger further adds
that ., "we have related the question of being to the 
destiny of Europe, where the destiny of the earth is 
being decided - while our o�n historic being-there proves 
to be the center for Europe itself. 11(4)
Met�physics, when it came to actuality, proved to be 
a disappointment. In his book, The Choice, Professor 
Rauche observes: "Heidegger recognized.the metaphysical 
constitution of/ ... 
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constitution of the world as an act of human 
consciousness and thus as an immanent truth. Man's 
attempt to dispose of the absolute by rational 
constitution must be regarded as having failed, 
because the act of constitution was a finite 
act. n (S) Positivist scientism failed to fulfil its 
optimism and hope for the creation of a better world 
when the sciences released the destructive power that 
presented a very definite threat to human existence. 
Thus., the "danger of losing the last bit of 
spiritual energy that makes it possible to see the 
decline ... and to appraise it as such 11( 6) became the 
most pressing problem to thinkers_.like Heidegger who 
began his search for authenticity by a massive 
re-examination, beginning with man's very being-there. 
Martin Heidegger's efforts at locating the problem and 
providing the challenge that man has to accept, has 
stimulated and kept alive, as we have already indicated, 
for more than a generation, individuals and groups of 
people who have found, in Heide·gger, a worthy partner 
in a necessary dialogue. 
The Heideggerian model, in stressing certain 
existentials, raises a number of problems of varying 
importance, Thinkers like Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen, 
Otto Friedrich Bollnow, and Fritz Heinemann have 
attempted to/ ... 
•
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attempted to deal with the more important of these. 
We now consider the most significant problems raised 
by Heidegger's thought as dealt with by these 
thinkers and as arising from my own critical analysis 
of Heidegger's philosophy. Heidegger, using the method 
of phenomenology, analyses the uniqueness of man on 
the basis that man cannot be described in the 
traditional categories that were applied to things. 
Heidegger's existentialia (basic moods or the ways in 
which it is possible for man to be) enables us to 
appreciate the depth of the concept ''alienation" and 
its importance for Heidegger. Heidegger shows that 
existence ., Being., and Time are inextricably interwoven. 
Time is the horizon for an understanding of Being. 
The significance of Heidegger's thought lies in the fact 
that he locates the meaning of Being in Sorge (Care) 
and Temporality; not in Value. More primordial 
(ursprunglicher) than man is the finiteness of Dasein 
in him. Since Being itself is finite in its essence,(?) 
the Nothing is the horizon from which an understanding 
of human existence is possible. Therefore, for 
Heidegger, the world of things is without meaning and 
without value. The "nothing mediates no value that would 
give meaning to its content; and this is the decisive, 
indispensable condition that would justify the effort. 
Nothing as being constitutes precisely finiteness as 
finiteness." There/ ... 
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finiteness. 11 (S) There is nothing beyond that would
give man any dignity or value beyond his human 
existence here on this earth ., and since man, in 
essence and as a whole, is a Being-to-death or a 
Being-to-nothing, the question of values as such, 
according to Heidegger ., cannot even arise. Hence, 
Heidegger maintains that his is a descriptive analysis 
that is devoid of any moralizing. (9) But we pointed out
in our Chapter 5 that ., despite his intentions ., his use 
of concepts such as 11freedom-to-death11 ., 11authenticity 
and unauthenticity", 11 to be one -' s self", "free for 
the worldn , etc . ., causes his philosophy to be inherently 
value-laden. Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen agrees with 
Heidegger that alienation ., self-deception ., and 
homelessness are caused by our surrender to the 
subjectivity of the rational will, but he deplores 
Heidegger's going to the other extreme of emphasizing 
the negativity of existence. 
von Rintelen makes an impressive point when he says 
that, in emphasizing this negativity of existence, 
whatever is positive and of.value must, of necessity, 
disappear ontologically. If the ground of the world and 
of man is the nothing., and if human existence is nothing 
but an act between finiteness and nothingness ., then .,
in this fearful mood, everything is in question. 
von Rintelen/ •.• 
- 289 -
von Rintelen makes the following p�netrating comment: 
"Fundamentally, however, its only possible content 
is an empty gesture that seeks release in 
dynamism.ll (
lO) Recent acts of terrorism, hi..:jacking, 
kidnapping, etc., show what _happens when humanitarian 
values are completely disregarded. Existentialism, 
which von Rintelen sees as a philosophy finiteness, 
hopes to establish a higher level in its demand on 
existence. Changing categories to existentialia does 
not alter the fact that they are empty of content. 
The "'philosophy of finiteness' usually ·results in a 
fundanmntally unbalanced type of person ... . If a man 
of this sort embarks on a higher activity he can only 
become an 'apostle without a mission', because his call 
remains ultimately devoid of form and. content."(ll)
If the content is empty then truth has been deprived of 
its meaning. The sphere of "being attuned11 
(Gestimmtsein) is a flimsy replacement, as is attested 
by Heidegger's own_travelling along the false path 
when he briefly embraced National Socialism and misled, 
for a time, the German youth, in his exhortations to 
them, during those troubled times. 
In answer to the philosophy of finiteness and its 
negativity of existence, von Rintelen says: "In our o,,n 




'value-person' (Wertperson) whose possibilities are 
to be realized with our full co-operation, The 
affirmation of our own self-being frees us from 
external alienation. We must affirm our own self as 
given to us and, despite its defects ., must develop 
its possibilities as much as in us lies. 11
(12) It is
man's great.gift that he can create values ., and this 
is what distinguishes him from other beings. As the 
conte�ts of value, von Rintelen sees the following, 
among others : greater perfection ., health, beauty .,
nobility, purity, joy and love. The significance of 
these lies in the degree to which they can be fulfilled 
in concrete reality. Retaining the idea of increase .,
no aspect can sufficiently 11 exhaust the content of a 
real idea of value. n (l3) von Rintelen wants to give 
more power to what he calls "Spirit". He sees Spirit 
as the "non-sensory interior reality which gives all 
ontic being its actual, orderly objective meaning; its 
essential form and dignity. Thus Spirit is the 
ultimate, decisive, even though not the only power, whose 
superior forces can often be obstinately and 
destructively opposed by the blind.dynamic of inferior 
orders. n (l4) His concern extends to restoring 
confidence in it, and, insofar as it establishes the 
ontological and ethical aspects of life, it helps 
overcome man's alienation ., which, for him can only be 
resolved in/ ... 
... 
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resolved in a "transcendent, absolute value. 11 (lS
)
von Rintelen sees Value as pointing beyond the finite. 
Through the idea of Value. man reaches "the threshold 
of transcendence", (l6)when alienation is overcome
through the "intentionally directed Spirit11 • (l?) Thus, 
"value, person and love are completely fulfilled only 
in authentic metaphysical transcendence." (lB)
While we have a tremendous amount of sympathy for 
such a view., we find that the replacing of the negative 
existentialia with the positive ones of joy, love, 
faith, etc., do not solve the problem of man's 
alienation� In overcoming the finite Being of 
Heidegger through his idea of Spirit ., von Rintelen has 
not put man on the threshold of authenticity., for, he 
has overcome man's actuality., his contingency and 
his finiteness. 
Otto Friedrich Bollnow, too ., points to Heidegger's 
overemphasis of negative existentialia (moods) as 
against the positive ones of say, joy and happiness, 
peace and contentment ., song and dance. Bollnow would 
have the existential attitudes of herioc defiance and 
firm resolution which are so pronounced in Heidegger's 
thought balanced by hope ., confidence and gratitude. 
"These latter values carry man ., so to speak, in the 
midst of/ .... 
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midst of all change, becoming, historicity and 
finiteness and provide him with a firm basis. 
For Bollnow, man, in his being-there, is not merely 
a passive,suffering and experiencing being, but rather 
an active and creative one. There are not only times 
of crisis, but there are quiet times as well. 11 (l9)
For Bollnow, the positive experience of human 
existence has, not only ontological significance, but 
also an ethical one, for, through love, the fellow 
human being is brought back into the presence of the 
individual. In joy, happiness, dance and the festive 
mood, the individual is transported to another world, 
and finite time is transcended at that moment, thus 
merging the self with the Absolute. Therefore, Bollnow, 
in returning man to the world as his home, and in not 
seeing the future as only menacing, locates man's 
authentic existence in man's metaphysical experience. 
In this connection, Professor Rauche makes the following 
critical observation: "Bollnow's anthropological 
approach of penetrating to the whole and, in this way, 
healing man and the world cannot be overlooked. But did
he not overlook the controversial element in human 
activities? 11( 20) Professor Rauche shows that Bollnow
has overlooked the problematic nature of human truth. 
Bollnow's neue Geborgenheit (a new sense of security) 
is as/ ... 
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is as much an assumption as is Heidegger's conception 
of man as the ek-sistence of Being ., (that is, man 
standing out into the truth of Being). If •.. if all 
constituted human truths are controversial, neither 
existential philosophy nor Bollnow -' s philosophy of 
life can possibly have overcome the crisis of truth. 
Both alternatives for dealing with the crisis are 
developed in a particular existential situation, i.e., 
under.specific circwnstances . ... neither of them can
possibly have guided man to live an authentic life; for 
each alternative sees the authentic nature of human 
existence in a different way ., in accordance with its 
respective constituted world-view."(2l)
Fritz Heinemann calls Heidegger an anti-thinker (a 
Gegendenker)
., 
"a philosopher who formulates his doctrine 
in opposition to pr'eceding thinkers," (ZZ) When we
examine Heidegger's interpretation of the great thinkers 
in the history of philosophy, then Heinemann's point 
needs to be noted. In Heidegger's defence, however, due 
regard must be given to his intention ., that is, of not 
letting Being be subjectively transformed into an 
object. But, then, in return, it.is necessary to ask 
whether one can overcome subjectivity. Heinemann says
.,
"The tendency is clear, but seems to derive from a 
misunderstanding. It is like an attempt to jump over 
one's own/ ... 
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one's own shadow. It is quite impossible to escape 
what he calls subjectivity; and in fact, instead of 
escaping it, he gets still deeper into it. Therefore, 
in spite of his enormous effort to the contrary, he 
belongs to the metaphysics of essences as well as to 
the history of subjectivism, tr (Z3) 
In his lecture, Time and Bein_g., Heidegger tries·, 
in hi� attempt to overcome philosophy, to think Being 
without beings. Regardless of our paying attention to 
the basis on which he attempts to do this, we must 
fully agree with Heinemann that, in the final analysis, 
·Heidegger does separate the natura naturans (creative
nature) from the natura naturata (created nature).
Heinemann asks: "Does it really make sense to reflect
continuously on one's own existence on the one hand, and
on Being on the other, in order to find out in the end
what we knew from the beginning, that both are
elusive? 11 (z4) He suggests that instead of merely being
caught up in the realm of possibilities, it is more
realistic to attempt a redistribution of being, meaning,
and value.
Heidegger, as anti-thinker, also rejects logic. 
Heinemann says that Heidegger's .interpretation of logos 
follows from a misuse of etymology. While the derivation 
of "logic"/ •.. 
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·of l1 logic t' is from "logos", his rejection of all logic
for a conception of logos as the more original
revelation of the truth of Being cannot be upheld.
11 This whole argumentation is based on an overvaluation
of the word logos... One cannot escape logic. If
there is to be a metaphysics at all, it cannot be
without logical.foundations. 11(25) Heinemann makes a
very significant point when he.says that Heidegger's 
attack on logic fails because logical negation and 
ontological not-being are two different problems, and 
so, operating on different levels. However ., Heinemann 
is quick to point out that "Heidegger is quite right, 
the ontological problem of not-being cannot be reduced 
to a merely linquistic or logical problem. It may be 
possible to get rid of such propositions as 'Pegasus 
is not' with the help of Russell's theory of 
descriptions, but the hard fact of death remains and 
cannot be eliminated by the m ost sophisticated 
linguistic analysis. At any moment we are faced with the 
possibility of not-being."(26
)
Another problem which I find of pressing importance 
concerns Heidegger's thinking on language. Heidegger 
has said, often enough, that the poet can best say the 
truth concerning the Whole and the Holy. By listening 
to the "soundless saying", the poet and thinker form a 
world. This/ ... 
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world. This world constitutes Heiµegger's model 
for authentic existence .. However, while in Sein und 
Zeit unauthenticity was clearly demarcated and 
Verfallenheit well defined, in his.later writings, 
Heidegger "wanted to point·directly at a mattet' which 
in accordance with its very nature is inaccessible to 
communicative statements." (27) We find no need to
question the interplay within the Fourfold; but, 
concerning.the question of authentic Being and how 
human nature.can be brought to•authenticity as.found in 
his later writings, we ask for those criteria which 
might help man decide on and respond appropriately to 
that which addresses.itself to man in. 11 soundless 
saying". For poets.and thinkers the soundless saying of 
Being may constitute an adequate path to·authenticity. 
But since Heidegger's concern is with the whole of 
mankind, there was a need for hiin to provide specific 
criteria which would enable Illan to distinguish between 
authenticity and unauthenticity, between truth and error. 
If, as we have maintained.throughout this thesis, the 
contingency, historicity, and finiteness of man are 
given their full weight by Heidegger, then it is obvious 
that these criteria are lacking in his philosophy. 
Following the Heideggerian path to authenticity 
seriously compromise$ the individual's contingent 
character and/ •.• 
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character and his responsibility for his actions 
{since there are no rules and since the individual is 
on the. threshold of authE:nticity). !n similar fashion, 
Heidegger's writings ignore "the problems of .sin, 
freedom of the will, divine grace, the efforts· to conform 
with divine providence, as well as the problems of the 
responsible struggle with temptation and with the moral 
decision, which still determine Western man today in 
secularized form. Heidegger's later writings do not 
deal.with everyday men but with creative men. 11(28)
Thus, .the Heideggerian model that is to replace a 
tradition of alienation, represents only a part of the 
Truth. •The model as.such cannot cope·with the Whole 
and the Holy. In emphasizing the Unknowable and the 
Mysterious, Heidegger's thought,in these t.imes of need, 
is certainly no model of clarity. Heidegger "could 
give no rules for either the realm, of theory or the 
realm of practice with regard to how to distinguish 
between a truth in which error and sham dominate and a 
truth which these 'equal partners' have not disguised. 
Furthermore, in the place of the moral commandments which­
according to Heidegger - have evidently been overcome and 
dismissed,forethinking has arrived at no standard which 
can decide whether a specific interpretation or action i•
is 'good' or not." (29)
We note/ ••. 
• 
We note that Heidegger makes an important point 
when he shows how, under the.power of traditional 
metaphysics, .the good earth is despoiled, and that, 
"to dwell poetically·on the earth means'to· receive the 
benediction of.the earth ., to become acclimated in 
the law of this reception ., in order to guard the 
-'mystery' of. Being.'" (3o) Thus, in dwelling 
poetically., man dwells among his "things" in their 
fourf?ld, unity (earth and heaven, �en and gods), when 
things and men are what they are. Language "shows" or 
11 1ets things appear" as they are. It is just this 
definition of language that we question. Is language 
confined to letting things appear and d1sclosing the 
hidden? In other words, for Heidegger, the sole truth 
of language.is the saying of the truth of Being. From 
this onto:Logical perspective, expressions of language 
which are not the saying of the truth of Being, are 
unauthentic. However, such a view of language stems 
from· the fact that Heidegger reduces everything· to Being 
as the source of authenticity.· Recognizing that life 
con.sis1:is of numerous dimensions, we maintain that; by 
reducing authenticity to the.ontological dimension only, 
the other equally important dimensions, for example,. the 
historical, the practical, the ethical, the economic and 
the political, are devalued in the sense.that Heidegger 
wishes to locate the.authentic source of all these 
dimensions in/ •.. 
• 
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dimensions in Being, which is his _underlying 
assumption. 
Heidegger's stress on the ontological has 
affected his view of language in the sense that he 
reduces its essence to the saying of the truth of 
Being. In our view, language can claim,quite 
legitimately, all these other dimensions of human 
existence that we have indicated above. It is also 
possible for language to increase our awareness of life 
and the .possibilities of life in.all its 
complexitiesr An even ,•:more important view of -�· � 
language, in my opinion, is the fact that it enables 
man to formulate theories and hypotheses which are 
continually widening the horizon of truth in terms of 
the. chf:mging circumstances of life. Such a view of 
language is, naturally, in line with the contingent and 
dynamic aspect of life. Since the circumstances of life 
are always changing, new theories are always being 
proposed to cope with new situations. Heidegger, however, 
who sees life as being 11 conditioned1' by Being, sees 
language as also being "conditioned" by Being. As the 
11 house of Being", la.nguage says the truth of Beirig. Thus .,
for Hei�egger, the question: How should man act in order 
to be authentic? is answered purely in terms of an 
"alert, but passive" expectancy of Being to reveal itself 
to man./ .•. 
- 300 -
to man. "We a re to do nothing b--t ·wait. " ( 31)
The question following from the one asked above: 
What can man say in orde.r to be authentic? is seen 
in terms of saying the truth of Being. Such a view 
reduces both human action and language to the 
ontological dimension. "There can be no metaphysical 
freedom without political, social,· or economic 
freedom; on the other hand, these concrete freedoms 
exist only by virtue of metaphysical freedom. 
reality, in and for itself, is destructive. 
Either 
Heidegger has shown the way to a new humanism rooted in 
the Being of being, but this humanism must relate 
itself to the structure of human freedom worked out in 
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They .(metaphysical problems) are insoluble in 
pr:tnciple
.,
i. e . ., from the point of view of the 
finite understanding. They _cannot be analysed 
into a finite number of propositiorts or concepts. 
But this does not imply that they cannot be discussed 
at all and that they do not allow of any tentative 
solution whatever. True metaphysical problems 
cannot be eliminated. One may try to discard them
., 
but nevertheless they reappear, even within 
science, e.g. the.mind-body problem in psychology. 
The problems of existentialism are alive because 
they are metaphysical, 
Heinemann. 
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C H A P T E R EIGIIT 
CONCLUSION. 
Karl Lowith has captured most aptly the essence 
of Heidegger's thought, the depth of his concern, 
and the signif.icance of his influence in the 
following passage: "Heidegger has managed to give 
new standards to a whole generation of students, to 
convince them that 'logic' and 'reason' (Vernunft) 
have to be dissolved 'in a whirlwind of a more 
fundamental kind of questioning', that ethics, 
civilization and humaneness (Humanitat) •.. are no 
serious concern of ours, that man is not the 
animal rationale, but an e<::static 'shepherd of Being', 
and that all theoretical imagination and technological 
construction, on which scientific thought is said to be 
based, represent the fall of subjectivity.which becomes 
a prey of its corresponding objectivity and of 
absolute 'objectification' (Ver�eganstandvl.ichung) 11; (
l)
The thought of Marlin. Heidegger can only be fully 
understood if seen as a reaction to the failure of 
classical metaphysics and scientism to lead man to 
authenticity. :rt must also be seen against the background 
of the mood brought about.by the world wars. In�other 
words, Heidegger/ ... 
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words, Heidegger's model cannot.be separated from the 
need and from the times out of which it arose. "If 
material possessions are.lost in an instant, if 
friends and relatives are killed every day, the only 
thing left is oneself, one's own existence.n(2)
It is.therefore understandable that existential 
philosophy begins with an analysis of human existence. 
The old belief in the dependence on a Supreme Being,
who created the world and who could be understood only 
by way of analogy, gave way to a belief that man 
himself could sblve the problem of the cosmos {through 
mathematics, mechanics, sense-experience, measuring 
nature, and through the subjectivity of the individual 
ego). Thus, the world of the beyond, with its "false 
longings", gave way to the world of the individual. 
The breakdown of traditional cultural and moral values 
heightened the individual's existential·dilemma. 
Metaphysics as a constitutive and speculative act 
remained theoretical only, and so alienated man from 
reality. The attempt to cheat time resulted in a 
forgetfulness of Being (Seinsvergessenheit). Science 
and Technology further eroded man's individuality and 
posed a threat to his existence. Existentialist thought 
was a reaction to the failure of Philosophy and Science 
to lead man to an authentic existence. 
In his/ •.. 
a 
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In his attempt to rehouse ma� in Being, Heidegger 
began by phenomenologically analysing man's very 
Being-in-the-world. Heidegger wishes to recall man 
to his authentic nature, which is to be the 
Hshepherdof Being" or the manifestation of Being. 
Thus,any attempt to constitute Being from the world on 
the part of man leads to his alienation. Man cannot 
comprehend Being but is on the way to Being. 
Professor Rauche in the manuscript of his latest book, 
which he kindly made available to me,says: "With 
the existentialist method of answering the question0of 
truth and solving the problem.of man's authentic 
existence, therefore, the abdication of philosophy 
consists in the attempt to exchange the theoretical 
constitution and conception of the world in.philosophy 
and the sciences for the functional act of self­
creation in the midst of nothing.u(3) 
As we have already emphasized in our last chapter, 
the individual's act of self-creation in the face of 
nothing lacks a content that could give his self­
creation meaning. In any case, Heidegger's 
constitutive act of self-creation is "his attempt to 
constitute man's existence as the manifestation of 
Being by the dialectical method ., {and)· is _a 
philosophical act in the classical sense of the word."(4) 
Using the/ •.. 
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Using the method of phenomenology, Heidegger hopes 
to replace Philosophy with "Fundamental Ontology". 
But in doing so, has he overcome alienation, or has he 
caused man to give up his right to his authen�ic 
being and so renounce his claim to freedom? Freedom, 
Heidegger so rightly said, is not a characteristic 
or a quality that man� possesses. Freedom is the 
source of man's existence. But the danger of creating 
new a�ienation lies in Heidegger's identifying man's 
authentic existence (freedom) with Being as an event 
or a process. This lends man's authentic existence 
a transcendent character, which is at the same time 
really transcendental, (that is, conceived as a 
relationship between� and das Seiende) and thus,an 
immanent idea. " ..• the methodological constitution of 
individual existence is no less an act of absolute 
self-transcendence than is the constitution of the 
Absolute from the world in classical metaphysics, except 
that, in existentialism ., the Absolute is won negatively, 
i.e. , it is regarded as transcendent or as an opus
externum. If, however, the existentialist approach
constitutes another act of self-transcendence and, as
such, describes another cycle of the self ., it
constitutes another philosophical theory. n (S)
In his attempt to overcome alienation, Heidegger 





would have philosophy (metaphysics) abolished as 
constitutive theory. But his reflection on the 
relationship between das Sein and das Seiende shows 
that philosophy as theory cannot be abolished. 
(despite his intentions), since it is the dialectical 
. construction of this relationship in a certain way 
that causes Heidegger's model of the man-world 
relationship to be one among others� for example, 
Sartre, \·.'i\tiil;:tgenstein, Bollnow. It is through this 
construction of the model in a rational and consistent 
way that man is fused with Being and the principle of 
identity has been fulfilled. Heidegger's model 
achieves man,s authenticity only in Heidegger's 
imagination and falls short of bringing man in line with 
reality in that it fails to give due emphasis to the 
contingent arid controversial nature of man, which must, 
of necessity, survive ., and so confirm. itself in the 
act of self-realizati,on that takes place in many 
various ways in ever new forms, as life's circumstances 
change. This is the reason why human thinking and 
human culture are for ever in a state of becoming. The 
attempt to overcome such a state naturally leads to a 
new alienation of man's true nature. This, however, 
can be said of all human theorizing on the problem of 
alienation .and authenticity. "Neither Hegel's :return 
of the Mind·to itself, nor Marx,s proletarian 
revolution, nor/ ... 
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revolution ., nor Kierkegaard's repetition understood 
as a restitution of the status pristinus, nor 
Marcel's absolute hope which does not leave room for 
any sort of despair, offer a definitive solution of 
the problem, for in spite of them alienation 
remains. 0(6)
Heidegger's attempt at the overcoming of 
philosophy as theory {which fails since this attempt 
takes place in terms of theory) ., means that the 
autonomy of the .individual must give way to his being 
a tool or a function. As we have already emphasized, 
in the case of· Heidegger., the free, creative being 
must now be seen as an agent or a manifestation of 
Being. In the negativity of existence, the· human 
individual as a creative being is reduced to a Being­
to�death and a Being-to-nothing. Such a reduction 
robs.the individual of his uniqueness. Therefore the 
attempt at overcoming philosophy as theory must be 
seen as an attempt to overcome man as a reflective being. 
Philosophy is reduced to a descriptive activity and 
replaced by a phenomenological account of human 
existence (Dasein) and an analysis of various basic 
existentialia (moods). Heidegger characterizes theory 
and theorizing as an idle speculative activity that man 
indulges in when he forgets Being. · Man can only free 
himself from metaphysics and the will.;..to-power, if 
he thinks/ ••• 
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he thinks Being only. But the nature of the human 
individual is such that he responds to the changing 
circumstances of life ., to new situations, and to 
new theories. Heidegger's conception of man's 
position in the world is itself one such theory based 
on an assumption ., namely ., the assumption of an 
underlying Being as the source of the world and man's 
activities in the world. Heidegger, therefore ., 
excha?ges philosophy for his theory of existence, which 
he constructs by way of a method that best suits what 
he wants to say. Thus philosophy remains. n .•• it
is the permanent tension between man's reasoning and 
man's striving that prevents man from comprehending 
the Absolute, that man's methods and theories remain 
controversial and problematic and are therefore always 
transcended by the controversial relation into which 
they inevitably enter with other theories."(7)
The thread of continuity.with the past which 
sustains ., nourishes, and enriches the present and which 
can be creatively used for establishing the ground for 
future possibilities,cannot be cut and replaced by a 
descriptive ontolo.gy only. Such an ontology cannot do 
justice to life as a whole. No matter how sophisticated 
the·science of ontology can become ., the subtlety of 
� remains. Life is both a blessing and a problem 
and we could say that, in a way, Heidegger ., too., 
recognizes and/ ... 
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recognizes and admits this when h� attempts to give 
up the words phenomenology, hermeneutics, and 
ontology,in his most recent writings. However, in 
the final analysis, it must be asked: "Does :the 
question of Being have a priority over all other 
questions? If so, is Heidegger's assurance authority 
enough? Or is it more reasonable to suggest that 
it is more likely that human problems are various, 
even in their origins, and that probably the best 
solution, not the final one, for there is no such 
thing, is the one that takes into account a variety of 
interrelated factors?" So, a political solution may 
satisfy certain political problems, but these must be 
seen in-relation to and balanced by an appreciation of, 
say, certain social considerations, and so on. Thus 
the idea of an Absolutely Free Individual is a myth, 
and a dangerous one at that. The individual man of 
existentialism is no real (in the sense of actual) 
man, but the man of Being or the Nothing. As such, he 
is isolated from society, from its problems and 
frustrations, and from his fellow human being who 
conceives, in the first place, the very ideas of humanity. 
A real content can only arise out of a fruitful 
dialogue.between man and his fellowmatl.!..!.. When it comes 
to the crunch, the'"windy mysticism" of Heidegger's 
latest writings, his analysis of works of art and 
poetry, though/ ... 
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poetry,though fascinating and illuminating, his 
conceptions of truth and Being,though they present 
an enticing road to what he sees as an authentic 
existence, must be regarded as having failed when 
the test of reality is given its full measure. 
Heidegger's preoccupation with Being is just as 
alienating as is the preoccupation with beings for 
which he criticized traditional philosophy. 
Heidegger's road to authenticity endangers human 
individuality and poses a real threat to the life of 
the community. Not only does Heidegger's model 
reqqire the .transformation of'the nature of the human 
being, but also that·of.society when the individual 
will see things in their essential fourfoldness. ·Even 
if we grant that the nature of the individual must be 
transformed., Heidegger fails (because he is oblivious 
of actuality) to provide a reasonably workable programme 
whereby his concern over the destiny of the alienated 
can be brought to fruition. The complex and multi­
faceted nature of man would not admit an ontological · 
solution of man's problemsonly, if it is at all possible 
to overcome them. Could that be an explanation of why 
Heidegger would want a transformation of man's 
essential nature, of why he would want metaphysics 
overcome? Is it not nearer the truth to say that man's 
individuality and/ •.. 
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individuality and contingency, his critical and 
refl.ective nature, preclude the possibility of over­
coming metaphysics or the problem of alienation in 
general? Professor Rauche aptly sums up the :problem 
of alienation and authenticity when he says: "The 
other man, because of the different structure of his 
truth-perspective, is man's permanent stumbling 
block on the way to reaching the Truth. At the same 
time, however
., the other man is man's incentive for 
continuing his quest for truth. For it is the common 
experience of the crisis of truth {by which experience 
they are separated) that causes man and his fellowman 
to enter into a dialogue with one another concerning 
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SUMMAR Y 
This dissertation investigated the problem of 
alienation with special reference to Heidegge:· 
Man's actual experience as-a contingent being was 
taken as the criterion of his authentic existence, 
and alienation was seen as the attempt to overcome 
natural controversy by theory. The various 
methodological forms of human.self-realization in or 
self-projection into the world, reflect man's true 
nature as a finite, historical, and contingent being. 
Because of the controversial relationship in which 
truth-perspectives stand to one another, the conflict 
experienced thereby is the very ground of man's 
authentic existence. Authentic existence is thus an 
existence in the midst of contingent life, one in 
reference to the other man. In the light of the above 
definitions, we examined the models presented by Plato, 
Aquinas, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and Marx, showing the 
condition under which each arose and the method under 
which each was developed. We examined how successfully 
the . .model coped with the situation in which it was 
conceived, and what new problems it created. 
Heidegger's own response to traditional classical 
metaphysics was that it was the root-cause of man's 
alienation and/, .. 
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alienation and the spiritual decline of the earth. 
Thus the motivation of Heidegger's thought was to 
authenticate human existence. Heidegger locates in 
Being the. spiritual destiny of the Western world. 
By returning man to Being he hopes to save him from 
the Weltnacht. Thus the question, 11Why is there 
any Being at all and not rather nothing?" is for 
Heidegger the foundation of Western civilization. 
Heidegger sees the origin of the problem of 
alienation in Plato's separation of the realm of 
Being fr.om the realm of Time, finally resulting in the 
separation of Being and beings. Being is now 
constituted from beings, but Being as such, (which 
is the possibility for beings showing themselves as 
they are) is forgotten. Being(�) is reduced to 
beings • .  In returning man to Being ., Heidegger, using 
the method of phenomenology ., begins with an: analysis 
of Dasein. The thesis critically examines Heidegger's 
conception of man's flight into das Man and the problem 
of authentic existence as revealed by such a flight. 
11 Anxiety11 and 11Care" constitute key concepts in 
describing the authentic nature of man's existence : 
Dasein is a Being-to-death or a Being-to-nothing. 
Having grounded metaphysics properly ., Heidegger shows 
his true relationship to Being. Dasein is an 
ek-sistent being, i.e. , he stands out into the truth 
of Being/ ••• 
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of Being, Truth (Aletheia) is the unconcealment of 
Being in and through Dasein. Being as such is not 
a thing, but the process by which finite things 
emerge from concealment. 
In critically examining Heidegger's conception 
of alienation and authenticity, we attempted to show 
the impevtance and relevancy of his approach in terms 
of the historical circumstances of his time. But, we 
also drew attention to certain serious problems that. 
arose from his approach: the over-emphasis of negative 
existentialia, the danger of operationalism, the 
question of values and experiential content, the 
rejection of logic, the problem of reductionism and the 
extent to which the Heideggerian model coped with the 
real, human needs. Our final conclusion is that, 
inspite of the relevancy and justifiability of his 
attempt to authenticate human existence, Heidegger 
ultimately failed to do so. Therefore, the problem of 
a new alienation, i.e., a new form of absolute self­
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